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This study examines how harm severity and apparentness influence physicians’ 
willingness to disclose medical errors and adverse events to patients and their families 
using a cross-sectional, mixed-mode study design. A simple random sample of 1,565 
physicians was selected from a list of licensed Minnesota physicians provided by the 
Minnesota Board of Medical Practice. In total, 341 physicians had only a postal address 
on file. The remaining 1,224 physicians had both a postal and email address on file, so 
they were randomly assigned to one of four modes of survey administration: mail-only, 
mail-web, web-mail, and web-only. Afterwards, all physicians were randomly assigned to 
receive one of the Disclosure of Medical Errors or Disclosure of Adverse Events Surveys. 
All data was collected between November of 2017 and February of 2018. 
The overall response rate was 18% ( n = 292), and there was not a statistically 
significant difference in the response rate across survey modes. Most respondents were 
non-Hispanic (98%), white (89%), and male (69%). On average, respondents reported 
that they are likely to disclose medical errors (?̅? = 7.47; 𝑠𝑑 = 1.56) and adverse events 
((?̅? = 9.04; 𝑠𝑑 = 1.14) to patients and their families. Across all model specifications, the 
probability of physicians being highly likely to disclose medical errors and adverse 
events is high, regardless of harm severity and malpractice risk. As apparentness 
increases so does the probability that physicians will be highly likely to disclose medical 
errors (not readily apparent: 0.66, somewhat apparent: 0.72, readily apparent: 0.95; p < 
0.001) and adverse events (not readily apparent: 0.59, somewhat apparent: 0.67, readily 
apparent: 0.93; p < 0.001). 
While physicians reported being likely to disclose medical errors and adverse  
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events, they may not disclose when faced with a situation that warrants disclosure. Future 
research should examine whether physicians’ actions align with their beliefs as well as 
whether the information they provide to patients during disclosure conversations is 
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Chapter I: A Historical Overview of the United States’ Medicolegal Environment 
  
In the United States, injured patients rarely sued for medical malpractice prior to 
the 1830s (De Ville, 1992; De Ville, 1998; Mohr, 2000). Numerous societal factors 
contributed to the dearth of malpractice lawsuits entering the court system. First, 
according to De Ville (1992, 1998), many Americans believed in divine providence, the 
notion that everything that happens in the world, from natural disasters to armed conflicts 
to death and disease, is under God’s control. God inflicts individuals with physical and 
mental ailments to test their faithfulness and/or punish them for their sins. If God is the 
root cause of death and disease, then “it was fruitless to look for human causation or to 
assign blame…Humble acceptable of God’s will…would be the appropriate response to 
physical misfortune” (De Ville, 2004, pg. 146). If individuals struggled to accept the 
misfortune that afflicted themselves or their loved ones, then they were expected to “‘ask 
[God] for a submissive spirit’” (Saum, 1976, pg. 339). Basically, many individuals 
thought it was pointless and socially unacceptable to sue for adverse health outcomes. 
However, by the mid-1800s, Americans’ belief in divine providence was waning 
as “religious reform movements stressed human perfectibility over human depravity” (De 
Ville, 1998, pg. 199). As a result, individuals became increasingly concerned with 
improving their spiritual and physical health through lifestyle changes and the utilization 
of health care services. Patients’ health was now under their physicians’ control, not 
God’s control. When the care they received did not meet their expectations or resulted in 
an untoward outcome, patients began blaming their physicians and seeking redress by 
filing lawsuits (De Ville, 2004). It was becoming more socially acceptable for patients to 
sue for malpractice. 
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In addition to the changes in the values and beliefs concerning the nature of life, 
there are the dramatic changes associated with the Industrial Revolution. Prior to 
industrialization, many Americans lived their lives according to the principles of 
collectivism, the notion that individuals should not be autonomous beings, pursuing their 
own goals (Tönnies, 2001). Instead, they should sacrifice their “values and goals for the 
group’s ‘greater good’” (Biddle, 2012, pg. 1). Since a family’s economic survival 
depended on each members’ contributions, everybody in a household, including children, 
were expected to, and did, contribute to the household. Thus, it was common to see adults 
and children working side-by-side in the fields and in factories, doing things like 
ploughing, planting crops, and sewing garments, as needed. Extended family members 
also lived close together, if not in the same dwelling as their children and grandchildren, 
and contributed to the overall well-being of the larger family unit. Within this social 
structure, health care was largely communal with families caring for themselves (Starr, 
1982). The societal and market penetration of medical insurers and professionals was 
quite limited (Durkheim, 1964; Weber, Roth, & Wittich, 1978; Starr, 1982; Collins, 
1999). 
At the dawn of the nineteenth century, the United States was in the throes of the 
Industrial Revolution (Park & Burgess, 1921; Weber et al. 1978). Technological 
innovations and mechanization led to the creation of large factories (Marx, Engels, & 
Tucker, 1978), the rise of specialization (Durkheim, 1964), impersonal economic 
transactions (Field, 2011), and a shift in the population from rural to urban areas (Field, 
2011). This shift from personalized, rural life to depersonalized, urban life resulted in 
individuals becoming less hesitant to sue others, including physicians (De Ville, 1998)—
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behavior that is consistent with the relational distance hypothesis. It postulates that 
individuals who are involved in a deep, interpersonal relationship prefer to resolve any 
grievances that arise amongst themselves while those who do not have such a deep 
relationship (e.g. strangers, casual acquittances, etc.) prefer to resolve their grievances in 
court (Greenhouse, 1982). The latter do not have to worry as much about disrupting their 
communal way of life or straining important social relationships (Greenhouse, 1982; De 
Ville, 1998). This was a sign that the societal belief in collectivism was being replaced 
with individualism (Tönnies, 2001). The latter is the belief that individuals are 
autonomous beings who are free to live their lives as they see fit and develop their own 
worldviews, even if it conflicts with others’ beliefs and values (Biddle, 2012). 
Field (2011) claims that improvements in transportation facilitated the diffusion 
of medical information. Improved transportation allowed physicians to interact with their 
colleagues in other regions of the country. Through these interactions, they learned about 
recent medical advances and developed and disseminated standards of care. While the 
dissemination of medical knowledge improved patient care, it also gave rise to 
malpractice litigation. In court, the standards could be introduced as evidence that 
physicians were not providing the best care possible. 
In addition to revolutionizing the means of production, mechanization contributed 
to changes in individuals’ perceptions of the perfectibility of the human body. Scientific 
advancements and mechanization allowed individuals to alter and subdue their physical 
environment (Catton, 1980, 1985, & 1986). Witnessing the marvels of mechanization, 
many individuals started believing that they could control all aspects of their world, 
including their bodies. Gradually, they began to view the “human body as if it were a 
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thing that could be manipulated and fixed, like any other machine and like other aspects 
of the natural world” (De Ville, 1992, pg. 110). As a result, they expected medical 
breakthroughs to completely restore their health and well-being. Basically, they expected 
a cure with no adverse side effects. Many physicians contributed to patients’ beliefs by 
promising to cure them (De Ville, 1992; Mohr, 2000). When physicians did not deliver 
on their promises, many patients did not hesitate to sue them for malpractice. 
Table 1 displays the number of malpractice cases that went before an appellate 
court in the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. Prior to the mid-1800s, patients 
rarely sued for medical malpractice (De Ville, 1992). Between 1790 and 1830, only two 
known cases of malpractice went before an appellate court judge (Olsen, 1996). But, 
shortly thereafter things began to change. Between 1835 and 1865, the courts witnessed a 
dramatic increase in malpractice lawsuits (De Ville, 1992; Mohr 2000), denoting the first 
medical malpractice crisis in U.S. history. Forty-six cases of malpractice went before an 
appellate court judge between 1830 and 1870 (Olsen, 1996). 
Table 1: Number of Appellate Malpractice Cases, 1790 –1930 
Time Period  Cases 











Source: Olsen (1996)  
 
However, it should be noted that only a fraction of malpractice cases decided by a 
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trial court1 end up going before an appellate court judge (Smith, 1941; Sandor, 1957; 
Olsen, 1996). Dissatisfied litigants may be unable to appeal the trial court’s decision 
because they do not have sufficient legal grounds for an appeal, cannot afford to hire an 
appellate attorney—they rarely work on a contingency fee basis—or do not want to deal 
with the mental or emotional anguish associated with the appeals process (Bader, 2015). 
Considering this, it is highly likely that the number of malpractice claims decided by a 
trial court greatly exceeds the number of appellate cases identified by Olsen (1996). 
Unfortunately, according to Burns (1969), Olsen (1996), and Mohr (1993) reliable data 
on the number of malpractice claims decide by a trial court during the 1800s and early 
1900s is not readily available. 
According to Spiegel and Kavaler (1997), many of the claims filed between 1835 
and 1865 involved orthopedic care, namely fractures and dislocations. Many physicians 
promised patients that their bones would heal perfectly. However, this was highly 
unrealistic, given the primitive state of medical knowledge (Starr, 1982). As such, 
patients often ended up with deformed, shortened, or crooked limbs, which prompted 
them to sue for malpractice. Speaking on the causes of malpractice before the Medico-
Legal Society of New York on March 25, 1875, Hamilton (1875), a physician, stated, 
“They [physicians] declared that they could do many things which they could not; and 
their patients have simply taken them at their word, and required of them damages when 
 
1 The U.S. judicial system is made up of a series of trial courts and appellate courts. Initially, malpractice 
cases must be tried in a trial court. During trial court proceedings, the plaintiff(s) and defendant(s) present 
their claims with supporting evidence before a judge and jury. Once both sides have pleaded their case, the 
jury considers the information presented and renders a verdict. If either the plaintiff or defendant is 
unsatisfied with the jury’s decision, they can file an appeal, sending the case to an appellate court for 
review. In an appellate court, a judge, not a jury, is responsible for reviewing the case and either upholding 
or reversing the trial court’s decision. 
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they have fallen short of their own claims and promises” (pg. 103). In court, disgruntled 
patients could easily demonstrate the botched results of their physicians’ handiwork. In 
1895, a Minnesota court ruled that promising a cure when one cannot be guaranteed 
constitutes malpractice (Harrison, Worth, & Carlucci, 1985). 
Feeling professionally attacked by what they perceived as overly litigious patients 
and unscrupulous lawyers, some physicians searched for and implemented strategies 
intended to prevent legal entanglements (Wood, 1849; Mohr, 1993)—which could be 
considered the earliest form of defensive medicine. For instance, some physicians tried to 
limit the types of procedures they would perform. Writing on the state of affairs in 
Pennsylvania, Wood (1849) states, “‘One of the most able and experienced practitioners 
here, now refuses to take the responsibility of surgical cases, and feels constrained to turn 
the applicants away to find help where they can’” (pg. 400). Alternatively, if physicians 
felt morally or financially compelled to take a case that they believed could result in a 
lawsuit, then they might have asked patients to agree not to sue them prior to caring for 
them (Wood, 1849). Furthermore, some scholars of medical jurisprudence provided 
physicians with strategies for avoiding a lawsuit (Mohr, 1993). For example, in an article 
published in the Boston Medical and Surgical Journal, March (1847) recommended that 
physicians ask one, or more, of their colleagues to serve as witnesses, observing and 
documenting, in detail, their diagnosis and treatment of patients. In the event of a lawsuit, 
they could ask these witnesses to testify on their behalf. 
According to De Ville (1992) and Spiegel and Kavaler (1997), weak to non-
existence state licensure laws contributed to this deluge of malpractice lawsuits. Since 
anyone could enter the health professions, there was intense competition for patients 
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amongst physicians and between physicians and alternative healers, like barbers, 
homeopaths, osteopaths, and herbalists (Starr, 1982). To bolster their practice and social 
standing, some physicians openly denigrated the therapeutic practices of their 
competitors. Even though the therapeutic practices of many alternative healers were just 
as ineffective and potentially harmful as those of physicians, patients often did not sue 
them because they were not as wealthy as physicians (De Ville, 1992; Mohr, 2000). They 
also did not promise a perfect outcome or a cure (Spiegel & Kavaler, 1997). Basically, 
patients had a better chance of obtaining compensation from physicians than alternative 
healers, provided the jury ruled in their favor. Physicians compensated patients using 
their personal assets until the late nineteenth century when they started forming mutual 
insurance companies to protect themselves from financial ruins (Starr, 1982; Mohr, 
2000). 
While the prospect of financial gain undoubtedly enticed some patients to sue for 
malpractice, they still had to find a lawyer willing to represent them. According to De 
Ville (1992), the increase in the number of people entering the health professions was 
accompanied by an increase in the number of people entering the legal profession, 
sparking intense intra-professional competition amongst lawyers. In response to 
economic realities, many lawyers attempted to expand case law by trying novel cases and 
providing representation to plaintiffs on a contingency fee basis. Under a contingency fee 
arrangement, plaintiffs do not pay their lawyers upfront. Instead, if they win their case, 
they get a percentage of their plaintiffs’ winnings. If they lose their case, then they do not 
receive any compensation (American Bar Association, 2015). On the one hand, 
contingency fee arrangements may have made it financially easier for poor patients to 
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obtain legal representation and sue for malpractice (Field, 2011). On the other hand, they 
could have made it difficult for patients with legitimate injuries, but small, expected 
winnings, from obtaining representation. Lawyers might refuse to take cases that they 
believe are not profitable (Shepard, 2008). 
Furthermore, Mohr (2000) argues that three aspects of the medicolegal 
environment have, and will continue to, contribute to an increase in malpractice 
litigation, namely medical innovation, medical liability insurance, and contingency fee 
arrangements. In the medical marketplace, researchers and providers often are driven by 
an ideology of continuous improvement through technological innovations and medical 
breakthroughs, ever striving for safer, more effective therapeutic interventions. New, 
approved therapies not only have the potential to improve patients’ health and well-being 
but also harm them significantly. This is particularly salient in the long-run when their 
risks and side effects are still being uncovered as part of phase IV trials, which can vary 
in terms of their scientific rigor (Zhang et al., 2016). When patients experience 
unanticipated harm, they may sue, increasing the incidence of litigation. In fact, an 
increase in the incidence of malpractice litigation has always accompanied changes in 
medical knowledge and innovation (De Ville, 2004). 
De Ville (1998) argues that the number of malpractice lawsuits should decrease 
over time as physicians gain experience using new interventions, discover the risks and 
side effects associated with its use, and institute precautions to minimize injury and 
death. Once physicians discover the potential side effects, they can better inform patients 
of the benefits and risks associated different procedures. In turn, this should give patients 
a more accurate understanding of the procedure’s effectiveness, reduce dissatisfaction 
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with imperfect outcomes and side effects and reduce their propensity to sue for 
malpractice. 
Contemporary malpractice scholars claim that the first malpractice crisis occurred 
in the 1970s (Mech, 2003; Mello, Studdert, & Brennan, 2003; Thorpe, 2004; Gregory, 
2005); however, they are overlooking the first crisis identified by De Ville (1992). In the 
1970s, increasing rates of malpractice litigation and more severe iatrogenic injuries 
caused liability insurers to sustain significant financial losses (Robinson, 1986; Sage, 
2004a). In response to this, some insurers stopped writing policies, leading to a “crisis of 
[insurance] availability” (Sage, 2004a, pg. 12). Medical societies, and physicians, 
established physicians’ mutuals to provide insurance and fill the gaps in coverage left by 
commercial liability insurers (Sage, 2004a). Meanwhile, state legislatures enacted 
policies aimed at regulating the medicolegal environment, such as non-economic damage 
caps, periodic payment reforms,2 and collateral-source rule reforms3 (Avraham, 2006). 
One of the key responses to the second crisis was the implementation of non-
economic damage caps. In 1975, California enacted the first cap on non-economic 
damages (Avraham, 2006), limiting the amount of money that successful malpractice 
plaintiffs could receive for the pain and suffering associated with their iatrogenic injuries. 
Since then researchers have studied their effect on insurance premiums and jury awards 
for non-economic losses (Danzon, 1984; Danzon, 1986; Viscusi, Zeckhauser, Born, & 
Blackmon, 1993; Danzon, Epstein, & Johnson, 2004; Thorpe, 2004; Viscusi & Born, 
 
2 Under periodic payment reforms, malpractice insurers must pay injured patients in a series of payments 
made over time. They cannot pay them in a single, lump-sum payment. 
3 Under collateral-source rule reforms, the judiciary is required to reduce injured patients’ malpractice 
awards if they are receiving payments from other sources. For example, if they are receiving care for 




2005). While malpractice premiums have been rising over time, they are lower in states 
with caps than in states without caps. Caps lead to a 6-13% decrease in premium growth 
(Mello, 2006). Caps lower premiums by reducing insurers’ payouts for pain and 
suffering, which vary considerably from case-to-case (Bovbjerg, Sloan, & Blumstein, 
1989; Sloan & Hsieh, 1990; Studdert, Yang, & Mello, 2004). Overall, damage caps are 
associated with a 23-31% reduction in jury awards (Mello, 2006). 
While non-economic damage caps appear to be fulfilling their intended purpose, 
they are associated with two unintended, adverse consequences—inequitable 
compensation and the cross over effect (Sharkey, 2005). Due to the inequalities 
associated with caps, some state Supreme Courts have declared them unconstitutional. 
According to Gfell (2004) and Rallo (2004), the Supreme Courts in Alabama and New 
Hampshire ruled that caps violate the equal protection clause because they do not 
adequately compensate injured patients. Patients with mild or moderate injuries may be 
justly compensated for their non-economic losses. In contrast, patients with more severe 
injuries may not be fully compensated for their losses due to cap limits. In states with 
caps, individuals with more severe injuries are undercompensated (Studdert et al., 2004), 
receiving non-economic awards close to or at the cap amount. Caps may also have a 
differential, adverse impact on the jury awards and payouts made to certain demographic 
groups, like the elderly, unemployed, and deceased (Hyman, Black, Silver, & Sage, 
2009). 
Some state Supreme Courts have declared caps unconstitutional, citing the 
separation of powers clause and the Seventh Amendment, which guarantees individuals 
the right to a jury trial in disputes involving more than $20 (U.S. Const. amend. VII). For 
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example, the Illinois Supreme Court declared caps unconstitutional, claiming that the 
state legislature was “improperly delegat[ing] to itself the power of remitting verdicts and 
judgments, which is a power unique to the judiciary (Gfell, 2004, pg. 788). According to 
the separation of powers clause, the legislative branch, consisting of policymakers, is 
responsible for drafting, passing, amending, and repealing laws (U.S. Const. art. I, § 8) 
while the judicial branch is responsible for interpreting and applying the law in the event 
of disputes between individuals and entities (U.S. Const. art. III, § 1). 
According to Sharkey (2005), the cross-over effect is another unintended 
consequence of non-economic damage caps. To offset the limits placed on non-economic 
damages, plaintiffs’ attorneys may ask for, and patients may be awarded, higher payouts 
for economic losses, like lost wages. Unconvinced, Hyman et al. (2009) argue that the 
cross-over effect is not plausible, claiming that patients’ award for economic damages 
would have to increase significantly to offset the loss imposed by caps. If lawyers 
thought they could ask for, and get, higher economic awards for their clients, they would 
do so, regardless of whether there is a cap. After all, it is in their best interest—larger 
awards mean larger contingency fees. To my knowledge, rigorous studies have not 
investigated whether the cross-over effect exists. 
Non-economic damage caps may also limit some injured patients’ access to the 
civil justice system. According to Penchansky and MacNee (1994), many lawyers believe 
that the severity of patients’ injuries affects their probability of success in court and the 
amount of compensation they receive. Cases involving permanent injuries that impact 
individuals’ functioning or quality of life, such as blindness or paralysis, are more 
successful in court and often result in larger awards than temporary injuries. These beliefs 
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affect lawyers’ willingness to take cases. Typically, lawyers are unwilling to try obvious 
cases of malpractice when expected monetary recoveries are less than $200,000. For 
uncertain cases, they are unwilling to accept cases with expected recoveries under 
$500,000 (Shepard, 2008). Without access to the civil justice system, injured patients’ 
ability to find out what happened to them and receive just compensation for their injuries 
is extremely limited. 
Even when patients can obtain legal counsel, there is no guarantee that they will 
receive just compensation for their injuries, given that the adjudication of malpractice 
lawsuits is associated with many false positive and false negative outcomes (Brennan, 
Sox, & Burstin, 1996; Studdert et al., 2006). False positive outcomes occur when patients 
receive compensation but lack compelling evidence that they were indeed injured by a 
physician’s negligent actions or a medical error. Instead, their injuries may have been 
caused by known side effects of treatment; thus, they should not be compensated. In 
contrast, false negatives occur when juries fail to award injured patients compensation for 
their injuries, despite evidence of a medical error. According to Studdert et al. (2006), 
73% of malpractice claims with evidence of an error and injury receive compensation 
while 28% of claims that lack evidence of an error and injury receive compensation. And, 
the average payment for substantiated claims is $521,560 while the average payment for 
unsubstantiated claims is $313,205. The fact that juries tend to be made up of lay persons, 
not physicians or medical experts, may contribute to the false positive and false negative 
rates. 
In the mid-1980s, the United States experienced its third malpractice crisis. Due 
to poor investment returns, liability insurers raised their premiums to remain solvent, 
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leading to a “crisis of [insurance] affordability” (Sage, 2004a, pg. 12). Faced with rising 
premiums, physicians lobbied for tort reform. In response to political pressure from 
physicians and insurers, many states enacted reforms that were similar to those enacted 
during the second crisis (Avraham, 2006). However, there were two notable exceptions. 
According to Siegal, Mello, and Studdert (2008), Florida and Virginia adopted birth-
injury compensation programs, which shifted some birth-related injury cases from the 
courts to a state-administered compensation program. They were designed to compensate 
families while simultaneously reducing the financial burden placed on insurers, 
obstetricians, and gynecologists. Data from liability insurers suggests that obstetricians 
and gynecologists are sued more often than physicians in other practice areas (Studdert et 
al., 2006; Jena, Seabury, Lakdawalla, & Chandra, 2011; Jena, Chandra, Lakdawalla, & 
Seabury, 2012). And, due to the nature and severity of some birth injuries, the claims 
against them may result in large indemnity payments (Jena et al., 2011). Taken together, 
these factors may be contributing to higher premiums for obstetricians. 
Earlier the impact of industrialization was discussed; however, recognition of the 
industrialization of medicine and its implications was late as compared to other 
professions (Perrow, 2011; Perrow & Guillen, 1990). At the dawn of the twenty-first 
century, the Institute of Medicine’s (2000) publication of To Err Is Human drew national 
attention to the plethora of preventable, system-level errors occurring in hospitals 
nationwide. These errors are contributing to the premature death and injury of thousands 
of patients annually. And, injured patients may need additional treatment or require an 
extended hospital stay, which increases the nation’s health care expenditures. Despite 
their human and financial toll, many of these errors were going undetected and 
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unacknowledged by medical professionals. They are not unique in that they often do not 
investigate the root cause of these errors (Short & Clarke, 1992; Tenner, 1996; Reason, 
1997; Vaughan, 1997; Casey, 1998; Perrow, 2011) and even blame unfortunate events on 
their patients’ underlying pathology or psychosis (Millman, 1977). Hence, some do not 
learn from their mistakes, implement policies to prevent similar occurrences in the future, 
or compensate injured patients. 
In contrast, when sued for malpractice, medical professionals and health care 
organizations can examine the root cause of injuries and deaths. The information 
uncovered during discovery provides health care organizations with a wealth of valuable 
information on the events in question. Receptive organizations can study this 
information, learn from their mistakes, and take steps to prevent similar events from 
occurring in the future (Schwartz, 2015). 
The Institute of Medicine’s (2000) report sparked policymakers’ interest in 
initiatives aimed at reducing the incidence of preventable, medical errors and 
compensating injured patients. To accomplish these goals, numerous alternatives to 
traditional tort reforms4 have been proposed. Mello and Kachalia (2010) have proposed 
creating a tiered schedule of non-economic damages. A mutually exclusive, harm 
severity hierarchy would be created and used to classify the extent of patients’ injuries. 
And, each category would be associated with a range of possible compensation values so 
that patients that fall within a specific category could only be awarded between X and Y 
dollars. In theory, having a tiered system would promote both horizontal and vertical 
 
4 In the context of medical malpractice, tort reform refers to any policy that effects patients’ access to the 
civil justice system or ability to receive compensation for the injuries, such as statutes of limitation, caps on 
non-economic damages, and joint-and-several liability laws. 
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equity. Patients with more severe injuries would receive more compensation than those 
with less severe injuries (i.e. vertical equity). Meanwhile, patients with similar injuries 
would receive similar, but not necessarily identical, levels of compensation (i.e. 
horizontal equity). To date, no state has adopted a tiered fee schedule, although the 
Washington State Legislature has considered it (Washington State Legislative Task Force 
on Noneconomic Damages, 2005). 
Researchers and patient safety advocates also have proposed establishing an 
administrative health court system. However, there is some inter-proposal variation in 
how the system would be structured (Mello, Studdert, Kachalia, & Brennan, 2006; 
Mehlman & Nance, 2007; Peters, 2008; Mello & Kachalia, 2010). According to Mello et 
al. (2006), administrative health courts have five distinguishing features. First, a specially 
trained judge is responsible for reviewing cases and awarding compensation, if 
applicable. Second, to obtain compensation, injured patients must demonstrate 
avoidability, the notion that the injury they sustained could have been avoided if their 
providers had adhered to the standard of care or implemented appropriate safety 
protocols. Third, if patients successfully demonstrate avoidability, then they are entitled 
to compensation that is proportional to the preventability of the harm they sustained. 
Fourth, the prior decisions made by health court judges are considered legal precedent 
and should be considered in future cases involving similar injuries. Lastly, injured 
patients who sustain economic losses, like lost wages, due to their injury would be 
compensated in full for them. However, compensation for their non-economic losses, like 
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   Adapted from Mello et al. (2006)   
 Figure 1: The Health Court Adjudication Process 
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Figure 1 demonstrates how the health court system proposed by Mello et al. 
(2006) would be set-up and process claims. Following an adverse event, the health 
system, or provider, is required to inform both their patients and their malpractice 
insurers of its occurrence. After being informed, patients would have the option of filing 
a claim with their providers’ insurer and seeking legal representation, if desired. Insurers, 
in conjunction with providers, would review what happened and determine whether the 
avoidability standard has been met. If so, then they are required to compensate patients 
for their economic and non-economic losses. Otherwise, they should explain to patients 
why their claim has been denied. Patients can appeal the insurers’ decision and ask the 
health court to review their claim. If they are unhappy with the court’s decision, they can 
appeal to a judicial tribunal and appellate court. To date, no state has adopted an 
administrative health court system, although some have considered it (Tobias, 2005). 
Some lawyers and legal scholars are concerned about the implementation of an 
administrative health court system, claiming that such a system could violate patients’ 
constitutional right to a jury trial under the Seventh Amendment (Mehlman & Nance, 
2007; Elliott, Narayan, & Nasmith, 2008; Widman & Hochberg, 2008). Currently, jurors 
are tasked with determining whether physicians are responsible for patients’ injuries. If 
they believe that physicians are responsible, then they are tasked with determining how 
much compensation patients should receive for their economic and non-economic losses. 
Under the proposed system, a judge, not a jury, would be responsible for determining 
whether patients have been injured and are entitled to compensation. 
Historically, according to Widman and Hochberg (2008), the judiciary has only 
allowed Congress to rescind individuals’ right to a jury trial if a sufficient quid pro quo is 
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offered. Basically, injured individuals must be guaranteed compensation for their injuries, 
regardless of who is at fault. For example, workers’ compensation cases are decided by a 
judge, not a jury, because all workers injured on the job are entitled to compensation, 
regardless of whether they or their employers are at fault. Under the proposed health 
court system, injured patients are not offered a sufficient quid pro quo because they 
would only be compensated if a judge believes their claim meets the avoidability 
standard. To date, the Supreme Court has not had the opportunity to determine whether 
health courts are constitutional. Before it can adjudicate this issue, Congress would need 
to enact health court legislation and injured patients would have to file a lawsuit, 
claiming that their right to a jury trial has been revoked. 
In lieu of a national, administrative health court system, some health systems have 
explored the possibility of implementing, or have implemented, error disclosure and 
compensation programs (Kraman & Hamm, 1999; Helmchen, 2008; Boothman et al., 
2009), which mimic the first few steps in the health court process. In 2001, the University 
of Michigan Health System (UMHS) implemented a disclosure-with-offer program. 
When medical errors occur, risk management personnel and physicians are proactive, 
investigating what factors contributed to the incident, so they can learn from their 
mistakes. Afterwards, they disclose what happened to patients and their families, and, if 
needed, patients are offered follow-up care and compensation. However, if an internal 
“investigation concludes that medical staff did all that they could [to prevent what 
happened] the system will stand behind its employees,” defending them from frivolous 
malpractice claims (Alexander, 2014, pg. 1). 
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After implementation of its disclosure and compensation program, the UMHS 
experienced a decrease in its malpractice burden. The average monthly rate of 
malpractice lawsuits brought against the system decreased from 2.13 per 100,000 patient 
encounters to 0.75 per 100,000 patient encounters (Kachalia et al., 2010). This decrease 
suggests that risk managers are promptly disclosing errors, negotiating settlement offers 
with patients, and implementing patient safety initiatives to avoid similar errors in the 
future. Once risk managers and patients reach a settlement, the decision is considered 
binding and patients are prohibited from filing a lawsuit. If they are unable to reach a 
settlement, then patients can file a lawsuit. 
However, it is possible that some of the patients who prefer litigation to a 
settlement will not receive any compensation. Physicians win most lawsuits with non-
existent to weak evidence of negligence or error as well as many with strong evidence of 
negligence or error, suggesting that lay juries have a pro-defendant (i.e. physician) bias 
(Peters, 2009). Even when cases are decided in patients’ favor, they may not receive all 
the money they are awarded. This is due, in part, to the compensation limits imposed by 
defendants’ liability insurance (Hyman, Black, Zeiler, Silver, & Sage, 2007). 
While the UMHS’s disclosure and offer program has reduced malpractice 
litigation (Kachalia et al., 2010), its widespread adoption may be limited, depending on 
whether health systems are self-insured. Currently, the health systems that have adopted 
these types of programs are self-insured, so they insure all their employees and are 
responsible for paying all malpractice-related expenses that arise (Berlin, 2006). When 
patients successfully sue for malpractice, the health system, not the physicians who 
treated them, are responsible for paying the jury award and reporting details of the 
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lawsuit to the National Practitioner Data Bank (NPDB) (Kass & Rose, 2016), a federal 
repository that contains information on malpractice settlements and successful lawsuits 
against a variety of health care professionals, including physicians (Waters et al., 2003). 
When malpractice lawsuits involve physicians that work for a self-insured system, the 
organization, not physicians, is reported to the NPDB. Since this protects physicians from 
reputational harm and professional sanctions, they should be more willing to disclose 
medical errors and adverse events to patients and/or their families than those who work 
for a health system that is not self-insured (Kass & Rose, 2016). 
To assuage physicians’ malpractice fears, some state legislatures have passed 
apology and/or disclosure laws, hoping they will prompt physicians to engage in the 
honest, timely disclosure of medical errors and adverse events. In April of 2003, the 
Colorado state legislature enacted the nation’s first apology law, making both expressions 
of sympathy and admissions of fault, such as I’m sorry I injured you while performing 
surgery on your lower back, made following an unexpected medical error or adverse 
event inadmissible in court (Cohen, 2004). Since then, other states have enacted apology 
laws. However, they only protect expressions of sympathy, such as I’m sorry you were 
hurt during surgery, not expressions of fault, which could be introduced as evidence of 
malpractice (Mastroianni, Mello, Sommer, Hardy, & Gallagher, 2010). Apology laws do 
not protect what some ethicists consider a true apology, namely an acknowledgement that 
the apologizer violated social norms or did not live up to our expectations, is responsible 
for what happened, and is genuinely sorry for what happened (Robbennolt, 2003). 
In contrast, according to Mastroianni et al. (2010), in states with mandatory 
disclosure laws, health systems are required to inform patients of unanticipated health 
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outcomes. For instance, during surgery, your lower back was injured. Overall, these laws 
are largely silent on admissions of fault, suggesting that they could be admissible in 
court. As of June 2010, 34 states have apology laws, 9 have disclosure laws, and 6 states 
have both types of laws (see Table 2). The remaining states do not have either law. There 
is also significant interstate variation in who is protected by these laws (e.g. health 
systems vs. physicians), the types of events protected (e.g. medical error, adverse event, 
negligence, etc.), and the forms of communication that are protected (e.g. written, oral, or 
both). 
The limited scope of states’ apology and disclosure laws neither reduces 
physicians’ malpractice risk nor meets patients’ emotional or informational needs. 
Following unanticipated health outcomes, many patients want an apology, an explanation 
of what happened to them, and a promise that steps will be taken to prevent similar 
occurrences in the future. Denied this, they may sue for malpractice (Hickson, Clayton, 
Githens, & Sloan, 1992; Vincent, Pincus, & Scurr, 1993; Vincent, Phillips, & Young, 
1994; Witman, Park, & Hardin, 1996; Wu, 1999; Schwappach & Koeck, 2004). And, 
even when offered an apology and explanation of what happened, some injured patients 
still opt to sue for malpractice (Witman et al., 1996; Mazor et al., 2004; Hobgood, 




Table 2: Apology and Disclosure Laws by State 




















































Source: Mastroianni et al. (2010). 
Even if apology and disclosure laws afforded physicians greater legal protections, 
it still might not assuage their malpractice fears. The medical community is plagued by a 
persistent, pervasive fear of being sued for malpractice with many physicians 
significantly overestimate their probability of being sued (Lawthers et al., 1992), possibly 
due to errors in risk perception. According to Kahneman’s (2011) availability heuristic, 
individuals are apt to overestimate the probability of rare events occurring, like being 
struck by lightning, if they can easily recall instances of the events in question. 
Considering this, the frequent discussions of malpractice-related issues by the mass 
media and amongst policymakers and physicians may be contributing to physicians’ 
irrational fear of being sued. 
Physicians’ fear of being sued, or their prior involvement in a malpractice lawsuit, 
may prompt them to change the way they practice medicine (Hershey, 1972; Charles, 
Pyskoty, & Nelson, 1988; Localio et al., 1993; Harris Interactive Inc., 2002), a practice 
known as defensive medicine. According to Studdert et al. (2005), there are two types of 
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defensive medicine—positive and negative. Positive defensive medicine occurs when 
physicians provide more care than medically necessary to avoid a malpractice lawsuit. 
For instance, they may order additional diagnostic tests to confirm their diagnosis, even 
though their initial testing provided evidence to support their original diagnosis. In 
contrast, negative defensive medicine occurs when physicians limit the scope of their 
practice to reduce their risk of being sued. For instance, they might stop performing 
certain procedures, such as spinal taps, and stop seeing certain types of patients, such as 
those receiving medical assistance or workers’ compensation. 
While practicing defensive medicine seems like a rational response to the fear of 
being sued, there is some debate over whether it truly exists, given mixed research 
findings (Sloan & Shadle, 2009). If it indeed exists, then it is having a significant impact 
on health care expenditures. According to Weinstein (2008), the United States spent 
between $100 billion and $178 billion dollars on defensive medicine in 2005. The bulk of 
these expenditures would probably be borne by health insurers and their enrollees or self-
insured employers and their employees in the form of higher premiums, deductibles, and 
copayments. And, since medical care is not risk free, exposing patients to unnecessary 
tests and procedures could have an adverse impact on their health and well-being. 
Given the current medicolegal environment, the success of the proposed health 
court and medical error disclosure and compensation systems is somewhat dependent on 
physicians’ willingness to openly and honestly disclose medical errors and adverse events 
to patients and/or their families in a timely manner. A structured literature review 
conducted by Kaldjian, Jones, and Rosenthal (2006) indicates that numerous factors may 
influence physicians’ willingness to disclose, including their fear of being sued for 
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malpractice and their workplace’s policies and procedures. Since physicians in different 
practice areas are concerned about being sued for malpractice and report practicing 
defensive medicine (Studdert et al., 2005; Nahed, Babu, Smith, & Heary, 2012; Sethi, 
Obremskey, Natividad, Mir, & Jahangir, 2012; Ramella, Mandoliti, Trodella, & 
D’Angelillo, 2015; Reisch et al., 2015), physicians’ willingness to disclose may be 
affected by their malpractice concerns, especially their beliefs about the relationship 
between disclosure and malpractice risk. 
Purpose of Study 
 
This dissertation examines whether apparentness and harm severity affect 
physicians’ willingness to disclose medical errors or adverse events to patients and/or 
their families. I hypothesize that those 2 factors will influence their willingness to 
disclose, given the physician community’s preoccupation with malpractice risk. I tested 
the following hypotheses: 
• Hypothesis #1: Physicians will refrain from disclosing medical errors that do 
not harm patients. 
o Rationale 1: Physicians have a very demanding workload, so taking 
time out of their busy schedules to disclose errors that are not harmful 
would not be an efficient use of their time. Furthermore, telling 
patients about unharmful errors could cause them undue stress and 
anxiety, raising concerns about the primum non nocere (i.e. first, do no 
harm) principle that governs medical practice. 
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• Hypothesis #2: Physicians’ beliefs regarding the relationship between 
disclosure and malpractice risk will influence their willingness to disclose 
harmful medical errors. 
o Rationale 2a: If physicians believe that disclosing harmful errors 
increases their malpractice risk, then they will be reluctant to engage in 
disclosure. They would not want to risk doing or saying something that 
patients and/or their families could use as evidence against them in 
court (Bell et al., 2012). Physicians’ concerns are warranted, given that 
many lawsuits involve harmful medical errors (Wallace et al., 2013). 
o Rationale 2b: If physicians believe that disclosing harmful errors 
decreases their malpractice risk, then they will be apt to engage in 
disclosure, considering it as in their best interest. By engaging in 
disclosure, they could potentially avoid the psychological and 
physiological distress that is often associated with malpractice 
litigation (Charles et al., 1988; Charles, 2001). 
• Hypothesis #3: Compared to less apparent errors, physicians will be more apt 
to disclose more apparent errors. 
o Rational #3: If errors are readily apparent to patients and/or their 
families, then they will probably ask their providers about them. If 
physicians evade their questions or provided vague, unsatisfactory 
answers, patients and/or their families may become upset and file a 
lawsuit, viewing it as the only way to find out what really happened. 
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Thus, it is in physicians’ best interest to truthfully disclose what 
happened. 
• Hypothesis #4: Physicians will disclose adverse events to patients and/or their 
families, regardless of harm severity. 
o Rationale #4: Adverse events are harmful and have a known, 
statistical probability of occurring. While physicians do not know a 
priori which patients will experience a specific adverse event, they 
should have a rough estimate of the likelihood a given adverse event 
will occur. For example, if they regularly prescribe oral contraceptives, 
then they should know that X% of women on the pill will develop a 
potentially fatal blood clot. Since adverse events are an inherent part of 
therapeutic interventions, and not the result of providers’ knowledge or 
skill level, they should be apt to disclose them. They are not at fault for 
what happens to patients. 
• Hypothesis #5: Physicians’ willingness to disclose medical errors may or may 
not be influenced by how readily apparent they are to patients and/or their 
families. 
o Rationale #5. If medical errors are readily apparent, then patients or 
their families may ask questions about what happened and sue for 
malpractice when an explanation is not forthcoming. If physicians are 
concerned about their malpractice risk, they may be less apt to disclose 
what happened out of fear that patients or their families will 
misconstrue what they said, interpret it as an admission of legal 
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liability, and sue them. Alternatively, if physicians believe that 
disclosure will reduce their malpractice risk, then they will be apt to 
disclose readily apparent medical errors. 
• Hypothesis #6: Physicians’ willingness to disclose adverse events will not be 
influenced by how readily apparent they are to patients and/or their families. 
o  Rationale #6: Since adverse events are a known, expected part of 
medical care that is beyond physicians’ immediate control, they 
cannot, and should not, be held legally responsible for them. Thus, 
their liability concerns, or lack thereof, should not influence their 
willingness to disclose adverse events, regardless of how readily 




Chapter II: Conceptual Model 
Defining Negligent Events, Adverse Events, and Medical Errors 
 
Central to this work is the ability to distinguish between the following five 
concepts: negligence, negligent adverse events, adverse events, preventable adverse 
events, and medical errors. Figure 2 provides a visual representation of the relationship 
between each of these concepts, and the remainder of this section discusses each of them 
in turn. 
Medical negligence occurs when physicians fail to abide by the standard of care 
reasonably expected of them, given their training, expertise, and practice area (Kapp, 
1996; Oyebode, 2006; Sohn, 2013). Basically, it is the provision of substandard medical 
care. For example, physicians would be negligent if they prescribed penicillin to children 
with ear infections without first checking their medical records for known drug allergies. 
Of the five concepts, negligent adverse events are the most complex because other 
issues beside practice come into play—most notably the law. At a fundamental level, 
negligent adverse events occur when patients are harmed by medical negligence (Grober 






Figure 2: Relationship Between Negligent Events, Adverse Events, and Medical Errors 
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cord prolapse, which occurs when the cord becomes compressed, reducing the amount of 
oxygen reaching the baby (American Pregnancy Association, 2015). The obstetrician 
overseeing the birth notices the prolapse but does not do anything to address it. As a 
result, the child is born with severe brain damage. The obstetrician failed to properly 
address the prolapse, despite the known consequences of cord prolapse and the 
availability of viable treatment options. In such instances, the obstetrician should have 
performed a Cesarean section (American Pregnancy Association, 2015). 
According to the American Board of Professional Liability Attorneys (2017), 
medical negligence becomes medical malpractice when three conditions are met. First, 
the plaintiff must demonstrate that physicians were negligent. If a standard of care does 
not exist, then they must demonstrate that the care provided was unreasonable, or not 
what “reasonably prudent health care professionals [would do] under like or similar 
circumstances” (pg. 1). Second, attorneys must demonstrate that physicians’ actions 
harmed patients in some way. If patients were harmed, but the standard of care was 
followed, then their injuries were not caused by negligence. Lastly, attorneys must 
demonstrate that patients sustained significant personal (e.g. disability) or economic (e.g. 
lost wages) damage due to their injuries. If patients cannot clearly demonstrate that they 
were under the alleged physicians’ care when the negligent acts occurred and that these 
actions harmed them, then they probably will not be successful in court (Smith, 1941; 
Harrison et al., 1985). 
Typically, malpractice cases are adjudicated in civil court; however, in rare 
instances, they may be adjudicated in criminal court (Steinman 2008; Bryden & Storey, 
2011). In civil proceedings, juries are responsible for determining whether physicians 
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have engaged in malpractice. And, if so, how much compensation to award injured 
patients. In contrast, with criminal proceedings, juries must determine whether 
physicians’ actions rise to the level of criminal, or gross, negligence, which is often 
punished with time in prison under state law.5 According to Fleury (2013), physicians 
may be found criminally negligent if they practice without the proper credentials (e.g. 
without a license), do not respond to emergencies in a timely manner, practice while 
under the influence of drugs and/or alcohol, and/or engage in any other behaviors that 
demonstrate a “willful disregard to human life or depraved indifference to human life” 
(pg. 2). For instance, a jury found Dr. David Benjamin guilty of second-degree murder 
and sentenced him to 25 years to life in prison after he perforated the uterus and lacerated 
the cervix of a pregnant woman during an illegal, outpatient abortion. Due to her injuries, 
she experienced heavy bleeding, which Dr. Benjamin did not address in a timely manner. 
Instead, he left her to bleed out and die unattended while he performed another abortion 
(Steinman, 2008). 
Adverse events are an unavoidable part of medical care. They occur when patients 
are injured by medical management, not their current health status or the presence of 
multiple comorbidities (Sohn, 2013). Adverse events can be thought of as the side effects 
of diagnostic and therapeutic interventions, like the changes in appetite and weight 
experienced by patients taking anti-depressants. While treatment side effects have a 
known probability of occurring, physicians do not know a priori whether a specific 
 
5 Typically, the federal government is responsible for investigating and prosecuting alleged crimes related 
to the powers granted to it under the United States Constitution and expanded over time through federal 
judicial court rulings (Justia, 2018). For example, human trafficking is often considered a federal crime 
since individuals are often transported across state lines. Since the Constitution’s Commerce Clause allows 
the federal government to regulate interstate commerce, it can make laws prohibiting human trafficking and 
investigate and prosecute those suspected of sex trafficking. 
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patient will experience them. For instance, physicians who regularly prescribe oral 
contraceptives should know that the use of combination pills is associated with an 
increased risk (adjusted odds ratio 2.97, 95% confidence interval 2.78 to 3.17) of 
developing a potentially life-threatening blood clot (Vinogradova, Coupland, & 
Hippisley-Cox, 2015). 
The final core concept is that medical errors are an unfortunate, routine part of 
medical care, “given its inherent uncertainty and complexity and the need to make 
decisions despite limited information” (Wu, Folkman, McPhee, & Lo, 2003, pg. 226). 
They are mistakes caused by human fallibility, system fallibility, or the dynamic 
interaction between them (Reason, 1990; Casey, 1998; Zhang, Patel, Johnson, & 
Shortliffe, 2004; Perrow, 2011; Sohn, 2013; Smorti, Cappelli, Zarantonello, Tani, & 
Gensini, 2014). Human errors occur because all individuals are prone to making mistakes 
(see Table 3). Physicians, and other providers, may make mistakes because they are tired, 
stressed, overworked, inexperienced, or distracted (Ulanimo, O’Leary-Kelley, & 
Connolly, 2007; Kronman, Paasche-Orlow, & Orlander, 2011; Bari, Khan, & Rathore, 
2016). They are also apt to make mistakes when treating patients presenting with atypical 





Table 3: Medical Errors Classified by Genesis 
Genesis Definition 
Human Errors Mistakes caused by physicians’ innate fallibility (e.g. 
inattentiveness, lack of medical knowledge, lack of 
technical skills, or a combination of these factors) 
System Errors Specifying system errors is quite complex, given the 
variability in how systems are designed. However, models 
of system errors are usually reduced to two core concepts*: 
• Interactions (linear → complex) 
• Coupling (loose → tight) 
*Source: Perrow (2011)  
 
 According to the Institute of Medicine (2000), “a system is a set of interdependent 
elements interacting to achieve a common aim. The elements may be both human and 
non-human (e.g. equipment, technologies) [italics in original]” (pg. 52). A hospital is an 
organizational system composed of many subsystems—like the emergency department, 
intensive care unit, obstetrics ward, and pharmacy—that work together to improve 
patients’ health and well-being. Each of a hospital’s subsystems is composed of 
numerous, interdependent elements. For instance, pharmacists, pharmaceutical products, 
telephones, computers, machines programmed to dispense pre-specified doses of a 
particular drug, and even the shelves lined with bottles, jars, and tubes are just a few of 
the elements that make up a pharmacy. 
Based on Perrow’s (2011) typology, the design of systems can be classified by 
their degree of interaction and coupling (see Figure 3). A system’s level of interaction 
can be arrayed on a continuum from linear to complex. In linear systems, a prespecified, 
expected sequence of events should occur regularly and predictably. As such, when 
unexpected or unplanned events occur, there effects are often readily apparent because 
the system can no longer function as originally intended. An assembly line is an example 
of a linear system. 
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In complex systems, there is not a prespecified, expected sequence of events. The 
elements within the system regularly interact with each other—often in highly 
unpredictable ways. Given the sheer number of interactions taking place, mistakes and 
errors that occur may not be readily apparent, although their effects may be. Hospitals are 
highly complex systems. In the process of exploring possible diagnoses, physicians might 
refer patients to the radiology department for imaging and to laboratory services for 
blood tests. Once diagnoses are declared, they often must rely on pharmacists to dispense 
the drugs their patients need. Since numerous individuals are responsible for any given 
patient’s health, unexpected events may occur. For instance, due to incorrect dispensing 
by the pharmacist, a patient might receive the wrong drug, a mistake that might not be 
discovered until the patient has a severe, adverse reaction to it. 
According to Perrow (2011), coupling refers to the extent to which the different 
elements within a system or subsystem are dependent on one another. It can be arrayed 
on a continuum from loosely to tightly. In tightly coupled systems, what happens to one 
component of the system directly affects one, or more, of the system’s other components. 
Tightly coupled systems are like a row of dominoes. If one domino falls over, then so do 
the rest of them. The assembly line in a manufacturing plant is a tightly coupled system. 
If one worker runs out of the raw materials needed to build their portion of a widget, then 
the assembly line must be shut down until the plant can get more raw materials. As a 
result of this disruption in the production process, widget purchasers might not receive 






In contrast, in loosely coupled systems, the systems’ components are not as reliant 
on one another as they are in tightly coupled systems. However, they still regularly 
interact with each other. Since the different components are not very reliant on each 
another, the individuals working within the system are better equipped to handle and 
respond to unexpected events, like delays and employee absenteeism. For instance, when 
a nurse on a hospital’s obstetrics ward calls in sick, the maternity ward does not shut 
down. Instead, an attempt is made to find an off-duty nurse willing to come into work on 
short notice. If no one is available, then the other nurses on the ward will have to pick up 
the slack. Meanwhile, the other subsystems within the hospital are unaffected by the 
nurse’s absence and able to carry on with business as usual. 
System errors are mistakes caused by unintended or unseen flaws in the design of 
a system that trigger a chain of events that can produce unexpected, dangerous, or 
catastrophic results. Many people are familiar with system errors, like those associated 















Figure 3: Perrow’s (2011) System Typology 
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1987). While system errors in healthcare may not receive as much attention as the two 
aforementioned disasters, they are commonplace. For example, distracted by the chaos 
going on around him, a physician accidently prescribes 100 units of insulin, instead of 10 
units. Unbeknownst to the physician, an overnight update of the computerized order entry 
system has disabled the pop-up warning message that lets physicians know that the 
dosage they entered lies outside of the typically therapeutic range. As a result, the 
physician does not realize his mistake. The pharmacist, not realizing that the 
computerized system has malfunctioned, pulls up the prescription and fills it without 
questioning the unusually large dosage. Later that day, a nurse administers the dosage. 
And, due to an insulin overdose, the patient falls into a coma. In this instance, a linear, 
tightly coupled system’s process triggered an unfortunate chain of events. 
Since mistakes are apt to occur in highly complex systems, hospitals and health 
systems cannot eliminate all medical errors (Perrow, 2011). However, they can reduce 
their chances of occurring by implementing numerous institutional precautions and 
safeguards aimed at preventing an unfortunate chain of events (Roberts, 1989). For 
instance, to reduce drug interactions and allergic reactions, hospitals could implement 
computerized pharmacy systems that scan patients’ medical records for allergies and 
contraindications and only dispense drugs when none are present. Afterwards, the 
pharmacist could double check patients’ medical records to ensure there are no known 
drug allergies or contraindications. And, lastly, when patients come to pick up their 
prescriptions, the pharmacist could ask them if they have any known drug allergies, just 




Reason’s (1990, 1997) model is a more recent model of organizational error that 
has been widely used in health services research. The hallmark of Reason’s (1990, 1997) 
model is a rather simple analogy using Swiss cheese; hence, the referral to his model as 
the Swiss cheese model. This model postulates that mistakes will happen. However, if 
organizations implement the appropriate safeguards, then they can reduce, but not 
eliminate, the likelihood of errors occurring. Mistakes can still occur in systems that have 
implemented multiple safeguards (see Figure 4). In the model, each slice of Swiss cheese 
represents a safeguard that a system has implemented to prevent errors. In each slice, the 
holes represent the opportunities for errors to occur. When the holes in the slices are 
aligned, then an error, or series of errors, can occur (i.e. red arrows). For instance, if an 
automated drug dispensing system is not functioning properly, then it may not dispense 
the correct drug or dosage. And, if the pharmacist forgets to double-check the 
prescription because they are distracted, then the patient might receive the wrong 
medication, which could adversely impact their health. In contrast, if the holes are not 





Figure 4: The Swiss Cheese Model of Error Prevention 
Reason’s (1990, 1997) model has gained widespread usage, which is due in part 
to the usefulness of the analogy. But, as is often the case when an analogy is used, the 
substance of the model is reduced. In this case, the operation of a complex system and its 
multiple safeguards has been reduced to ‘slices’ and ‘holes.’ 
Within the research on medical errors, a fundamental classification of errors has 
emerged which aggregates them into one of three classes: preventative care, diagnostic, 
or treatment errors (see Table 4) (Elder & Dovey, 2002; Dovey et al., 2002; Oyebode, 
2006). Preventative care errors occur in the process of providing preventative health 
services. Physicians would be committing a preventative care error if they did not offer a 
flu shot to a 55-year-old man with diabetes and asthma who is not currently vaccinated. 
Each slice represents a policy or 
procedure designed to prevent 
medical errors 
When the holes align, the 
safeguards have failed, 
causing a medical error 
Each hole is an 
opportunity for error 




Diagnostic errors occur in the process of investigating possible diagnoses and 
declaring an official diagnosis (Dovey et al., 2002; Elders & Dovey, 2002; Schiff et al., 
2009). In primary care, they are apt to occur when patients present with atypical 
symptoms, non-specific symptoms, and/or multiple comorbidities (Kostopoulou, 
Delaney, & Munro, 2008). For instance, there are known sex differences in the risk 
factors for heart disease. Despite this, the risk factors for and signs of heart disease in 
men are often used to diagnose heart disease in women (Harvard Health Publishing, 
2017). Due to this, women may not receive the appropriate diagnosis or receive 
additional diagnostic testing for heart disease. Prior research suggests men with suspected 
coronary artery disease are more apt to receive additional diagnostic testing than women 
with suspected coronary artery disease (Shaw et al., 1994). In the intersection of law and 
medicine, there is substantial overlap between diagnostic error and medical malpractice 
cases. Many medical malpractice lawsuits involve diagnostic procedures (Wallace, 
Lowry, Smith, & Fahey, 2013). 
Treatment errors occur in the process of treating patients for existing conditions 
(Elder & Dovey, 2002; Dovey et al., 2002; Graber, Franklin, & Gordon, 2005; Oyebode, 
2006). Examples of treatment errors include performing surgery on the wrong limb, 
prescribing the wrong medication, and prescribing the right medication, but administering 
the incorrect dosage. When medical errors harm patients, they are considered preventable 




Table 4: Typology of Medical Errors 
Preventative Care Diagnostic Therapeutic 
Providing inappropriate 
care 
Ordering the wrong test Administering the wrong 
treatment 
Delaying needed care Declaring the wrong 
diagnosis 
Delaying needed treatment 
Failing to provide needed 
care 
Delaying a diagnosis Failing to provide needed 
treatment 
 Failing to follow-up on test 
results or lab work 
 
Sources: Dovey et al. (2002); Elders & Dovey (2002); Schiff et al. (2009); Graber, Franklin, & Gordon (2005); Oyebode (2006) 
 
Within the research on treatment errors, there is a special case known as the near 
miss, which occurs when errors are caught and corrected before they reach patients 
(Chamberlain, Koniaris, Wu, & Pawlik, 2012; Agency for Healthcare Research and 
Quality, 2018). For instance, consider a middle-aged man who is admitted to the hospital 
and placed in a shared room with an elderly man. A nurse enters the room to give the 
older patient his medications. However, since some of the unit’s other nurses called in 
sick, she is overworked and distracted by all the things she must do. As a result, she 
inadvertently gives the medication to the younger patient. Fortunately, he realizes that the 
medications he received are not his and presses the call button to alert the nurse. The 
nurse retrieves the medication and gives it to the correct patient (Agency for Healthcare 







To ensure conceptual clarity, a clear distinction must be drawn between medical 
negligence and medical error (see Figure 5). According to Sohn (2013), the dividing line 
is physicians’ motives and intentions. If physicians abide by the standard of care, then 
they are not negligent, regardless of the impact their actions have on patients’ health 
outcomes. However, if they do not follow the standard of care, then their motives must be 
examined. If they intentionally choose not to abide by it, then they are negligent, 
regardless of the outcome. Since physicians are making a conscious choice, regulatory 
bodies, like state licensure boards, can use incentives and sanctions to deter them from 
practicing negligently. When they fail to abide by the standard of care and their actions 
are not intentional, then an error has occurred. With medical errors, physicians do not 
intend to make mistakes; they happen because people are fallible. Thus, there is only so 
much that can be done to prevent them. In practice, it may be quite difficult to distinguish 
negligence from a medical error, given that only physicians know their true motives. To 
some extent, regulatory authorities may be able to deduce health care providers’ true 
motives by identifying patterns in their practice behaviors and patient outcomes. Using 
Yes Were the physician’s 
actions intentional? 
Yes Did the physician abide 
by the standard of care? 
Physician is not 
negligence 
No 
Physician is negligent 
Physician committed a 
medical error 
No 
Figure 5: The Role of Physician Intent in Medical Negligence and Error 
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this method, regulatory agencies have been able to identify providers with malicious 
intent, like nurse Ben Geen who gave patients at Horton General Hospital in the United 
Kingdom potentially lethal doses of drugs to induce cardiac arrest, so he could play God 
and resuscitate them (FirstLook TV, 2016). 
Assessing Harm Duration and Severity 
In the preceding section, we covered the items included in the black box on the 
left-hand side of Figure 6 to provide some background context. Now, we will move onto 
what is being studied as part of this research—the relationship between harm, 
apparentness, and the disclosure of medical errors and adverse events to patients and their 
families. 
Figure 6: The Relationship Between Harm, Apparentness, and Disclosure 
Operation of apparentness













Operation of harm None      Death
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According to a White Paper produced by the American Society for Healthcare 
Risk Management (ASHRM) (2014), the magnitude of medical errors can be determined 
by examining their duration and the severity of the harm, if any, that patients sustain 
because of them (see Table 5). Harm duration is classified as unknown, temporary (less 
than a year), or permanent (a year or more). Harm severity is classified as unknown, no 
harm, mild harm, moderate harm, severe harm, and death. The harm that patients sustain 
can be emotional, psychological, physical, or some combination of these. Patients sustain 
mild harm when they temporarily become symptomatic or experience a temporary loss of 
functioning that resolves on its own or with additional treatment. For example, a patient 
develops a maculopapular rash after being given a drug they are known to be allergic to. 
Upon noticing the rash, their provider switches them to a different medication and treats 
the rash, resulting in the patient making a full recovery. Patients sustain moderate harm 
when their injuries have an adverse impact on their functional status and/or quality of 
life. For instance, developing ototoxicity (i.e. hearing loss and balance difficulties) after 
being prescribed Gentamicin for an infection. Patients sustain severe harm when their 
injuries have a significant adverse impact on their functional status and/or quality of life. 
For instance, failing to accurately diagnosis a male patient’s prostate cancer until it has 




Table 5: The American Society for Healthcare Risk Management’s Classification 
of Harm by Duration and Severity 
Scale Description 
Harm Severity Scale 
Unknown  
 
None While a medical error occurred, there is not any evidence that it 
harmed the patient.  
 
Mild Due to a medical error, the patient temporarily becomes 
symptomatic and/or experiences a loss of functioning that resolves 
on its own or with additional treatment.  
 
Moderate Due to a medical error, the patient’s functional status and/or 
quality of life is adversely affected. 
 
Severe Due to a medical error, the patient experiences a significant 
decrease in their functional status and/or quality of life.  
 
Death Due to a medical error, the patient is no longer alive. 
Harm Duration Scale 
Unknown  
 
Temporary Due to a medical error, the patient experiences harm that lasts for 
less than a year.  
 
Permanent Due to a medical error, the patient sustains harm that lasts for a 
year or more. 
Source: American Society for Healthcare Risk Management (2014). 
 
Additionally, according to the ASHRM (2014), harm duration and severity are 
often intertwined. When patients sustain mild harm, it is, by definition, always 
temporary. Most likely, in the case of the maculopapular rash, the patient would be 
prescribed a topical steroid and antihistamines and switched to a different medication. 
Based on this treatment regimen, the rash would likely resolve within two weeks of its 
onset. When patients sustain moderate or severe harm, it could either be temporary or 
permanent. In the case of ototoxicity, the patient’s hearing loss is apt to be permanent. 
52 
 
Aminoglycosides, like Gentamicin, are known to cause irreversible hearing loss 
(Selimoglu, 2007). 
Non, Partial, and Full Disclosure 
Disclosure refers to what physicians tell patients and/or their families about a 
medical error that has occurred, provided they choose to say anything at all. According to 
Fein et al. (2007) and Espin, Levinson, Regehr, Baker, & Lingard (2006), there are three 
types of disclosure—full disclosure, partial disclosure, and non-disclosure. 
When physicians articulate the causal link between medical errors and the harm, 
if any, patients sustained, they are engaging in full disclosure. For instance, let’s imagine 
that an elderly, male patient with diabetes is admitted to the hospital for a gastrointestinal 
bleed. In preparation for an endoscopy, the treating physician says that he cannot have 
anything to eat or drink for the next few hours. Misinterpreting the physician’s orders, a 
nurse gives him his insulin. Consequently, he becomes hypoglycemic, has a seizure, falls 
out of bed, and fractures his right hip. Following this incident, the physician tells the 
patient’s wife and adult children, “‘Your family member had low blood sugar, which 
caused him to fall out of bed and the reason that occurred was they got a dose of insulin, 
which they…should not have gotten’” (Fein et al., 2007, pg. 758). The physician clearly 
acknowledges the error that caused the patient’s injuries. 
In contrast, partial disclosure occurs when physicians do not articulate the 
relationship between a medical error and the resulting harm, if any. It also occurs when 
they mislead patients, implying they were harmed by the natural progression of their 
disease (Fein et al., 2007; Espin et al., 2006). For instance, imagine that a physician had 
told his diabetic patient, “‘You had a seizure. We think it was because of your low blood 
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sugar”’ (Fein et al., 2007, pg. 759). This explanation is misleading. Since individuals’ 
blood sugar levels regularly fluctuate, the patient might not have questioned whether the 
seizure could have been prevented. However, if he is a savvy health care consumer, he 
might ask why his blood sugar was so slow. Prior research suggests that some physicians 
believe that it is acceptable to willingly deceive or mislead patients in some instances 
(Novack et al., 1989). 
With non-disclosure, physicians do not tell patients anything. They do not 
acknowledge the error, mention the harm patients sustained, and/or directly link the error 
to the harm patients sustained. With non-disclosure, some physicians may be operating 
according to the principles of caveat emptor, or buyers beware. In the real estate market, 
caveat emptor refers to the fact that sellers do not have to voluntarily disclose their 
properties’ defects and flaws, such as leaky pipes and termites, unless they are legally 
required to or specifically asked by potential buyers (Moses, Pebworth, & Olsen, 2017). 
Applied to medical error disclosure, the principles of caveat emptor suggest that 
physicians do not need to voluntarily disclose errors to patients unless they are 
specifically asked about them or legally required to do so. Thus, the burden of uncovering 
the truth falls on patients and their families, who may not have enough medical 
knowledge to know what questions to ask or realize that something has gone horribly 
wrong. 
While Fein et al. (2007) limits their disclosure typology to medical errors, their 
discussion could also be applied to negligent and negligent adverse events. Following a 
negligent adverse event, full disclosure occurs when physicians clearly articulate the 
relationship between the harm their patients have sustained and their deviations from the 
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standard of care. If nurse Ben Geen had told his patients that he purposely sent them into 
cardiac arrest by giving them potentially lethal drugs, he would have been engaging in 
full disclosure. However, since statements like these amount to an admission of malicious 
intent, personal responsibility, and guilt, physicians are not going to share them with their 
patients. If physicians openly acknowledge their engagement in negligent acts, they know 
that they will most likely face severe sanctions. For instance, depending on the 
circumstances, they may lose their jobs, have their medical license revoked or suspended, 
and/or face life in prison. 
Following a negligent adverse event, partial disclosure occurs when physicians 
acknowledge the harm that patients sustained but do not admit their role in causing that 
harm. They might even try to mislead their patients into thinking that what happened was 
unavoidable, simply a case of bad luck, and/or a natural progression of their disease. In 
the case of Ben Geen, partial disclosure occurred when he informed his patients of their 
cardiac arrest but did not acknowledge his role in triggering it. Partial disclosure should 
be more apt to occur following a negligent event than full disclosure, given that the 
former does not involve an admission of malicious intent and personal responsibility for 
what happened. 
Harm, Apparentness, and the Disclosure of Medical Errors 
When asked, many physicians state that medical errors should be disclosed and/or 
that they would disclose them to patients and their families (Garbutt et al., 2007; 
Linthorst, Kallimanis-King, Dekker, Hoekstra, & de Haes, 2012). Unfortunately, 
physicians do not always act in accordance with their beliefs. When medical errors occur, 
they are not always disclosed to patients and their families (Kronman et al., 2011; 
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Ghalandarpoorattar, Kaviani, & Asghari, 2012). Numerous regulatory, economic, social, 
and cultural factors may dissuade physicians from disclosing errors (Kaldjian, Jones, & 
Rosenthal, 2006), despite their ethical obligation to “be honest in all professional 
interactions” (American Medical Association, 2016, pg. 1). 
Many physicians believe that near misses do not need to be disclosed (Garbutt et 
al., 2007; White et al., 2008). As a result, they may not disclose them to patients and their 
families. On the topic of near misses, one physician stated, “‘I think if we were held to 
disclose all of those, I think that happens so often we wouldn’t have the opportunity to 
practice medicine. My job is to relieve anxiety, not to create it’” (Gallagher, Waterman, 
Ebers, Fraser, & Levinson, 2003, pg. 1004). Since physicians have a limited amount of 
time to spend with each of their patients, they may forgo disclosure in favor of discussing 
more pressing issues, such as treatment options and side effects. Physicians may also 
forgo disclosing near misses because they do not want to appear incompetent or 
undermine patients’ trust in them and the healthcare system. 
In theory, many physicians support the disclosure of harmful minor6 and serious7 
medical errors (Garbutt et al., 2007; White et al., 2008; Linthorst et al., 2012). However, 
following a minor or serious error, their malpractice concerns may influence whether 
they disclose it to patients and their families (White et al., 2008). The physician 
community is divided on the issue of whether disclosing harmful medical errors increases 
or decreases their malpractice risk. On this issue, one physician stated: 
 
6 According to Garbutt et al. (2007), a minor error is “an error that causes harm that is neither permanent 
nor potentially life-threatening” (pg. 180). 
7 According to Garbutt et al. (2007), a serious error is “an error that causes permanent injury or transient 
but potentially life-threatening harm” (pg. 180). For instance, amputating the wrong limb. 
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‘Everything you read and everything that you’re told says that you are supposed 
to tell what errors you make as soon as you can. Let them know what your 
thinking is, what you are going to do about it. And your chances of having an 
adverse litigation are less…. Now, the question is, how many of us believe that?’ 
(Gallagher et al., 2003, pg. 1004) 
Physicians concerned about being sued may forgo disclosure because they do not want 
patients misconstruing what they say, interpreting it as an admission of legal liability, and 
suing them for malpractice (Bell et al., 2012). Following harmful errors, many patients 
want to know what happened (Gallagher et al., 2003). When deprived of this information, 
they may sue to uncover the truth (Hickson et al., 1992; Vincent et al., 1993; Vincent et 
al., 1994; Witman et al., 1996; Wu, 1999; Schwappach & Koeck, 2004). 
In contrast, physicians who believe that disclosing harmful errors reduces their 
malpractice risk may be more apt to disclose them to patients and their families. If most 
patients sue to find out what happened to them, then physicians may have multiple 
personal and legal incentives to engage in disclosure. First, they would be sparing 
themselves the emotional and psychological anguish that often accompanies accusations 
of malpractice (Charles et al., 1988; Nash, Tennant, & Walton, 2004; Balch et al., 2011). 
Second, physicians could save themselves a significant amount of time and money, given 
that malpractice cases can take anywhere from a few months to a few years to be 
adjudicated (Seabury, Chandra, Lakdawalla, & Jena, 2013). Lastly, they would be 
shielding themselves from any negative publicity and reputational harm that could arise 
from their involvement in a lawsuit. 
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However, if other concerns prompt patients to sue, then disclosing medical errors 
probably would not reduce physicians’ malpractice risk. Following disclosure, Witman et 
al. (1996) and Hobgood et al. (2005a) found that patients with moderate to severe injuries 
may be more apt to sue than patients with temporary, mild injuries. Since severe injuries, 
like paraplegia, can have a significant impact on patients’ functional status and quality of 
life, they may sue to obtain the money they need to pay for rehabilitation services, 
purchase assistive devices, or hire a home care aid. 
Physicians’ willingness to disclose medical errors also may be influenced by 
apparentness, or how readily apparent or obvious the error is to patients and/or their 
families (Gallagher et al., 2006b; Loren et al., 2008; White et al., 2011). While prior 
research has classified errors as dichotomous, obvious or not obvious (White et al., 
2011), or using vague quantifiers, like more apparent or less apparent (Gallagher et al., 
2006b), apparentness lies on a continuum that ranges from not at all apparent to readily 
apparent. This continuum indicates that some medical errors are not at all apparent, such 
as being injected with 9, instead of 10, units of insulin, to readily apparent—wrong site 
surgery. For instance, a patient waking up after surgery only to find that their right, not 
left, foot was amputated. 
By considering apparentness a unipolar phenomenon, we can explore the gray 
area between the two endpoints. Let us consider a retained sponge or surgical instrument. 
In and of itself, the presence of a retained sponge would not be readily apparent to 
patients upon waking after surgery. However, its presence could be made known through 
its adverse health consequences, such as severe pain at the surgical site or the 
development of an infection or abscess (Zejnullahu, Bicaj, Zejnullahu, & Hamza, 2017). 
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In one situation, a patient could live with it inside of them for years without experiencing 
any adverse health effects. However, another patient could experience severe pain. Once 
patients experience discomfort and seek care, the retained foreign body would be brought 
to their attention. 
Prior research suggests that physicians are more apt to disclose more apparent 
errors, compared to less apparent errors (Gallagher et al., 2006a; Loren et al., 2008; 
White et al., 2011). Physicians may be less apt to disclose less apparent, or non-apparent, 
errors due to asymmetric information. Since they have more clinical expertise than their 
patients, patients may not realize that an error has occurred. Thus, they would not have a 
reason to question the quality or appropriateness of the care they are receiving. In 
contrast, when errors are readily apparent, patients and their families may inquire about 
what happened. If an explanation is not forthcoming, they may consider litigation as a 
means of uncovering the truth (Hickson et al., 1992; Vincent et al., 1993; Vincent et al., 
1994; Wu, 1999; Schwappach & Koeck, 2004). 
Institutional, Regulatory, and Provider-level Factors that Impact Disclosure 
In the proceeding section, we examined the relationship between harm, 
apparentness, and disclosure. In this section, we will examine how the various 
institutional, regulatory, and provider-level factors depicted in Figure 7 impact 
physicians’ willingness to disclose medical errors and adverse events to patients and their 
families. Due to the physician community’s preoccupation with issues related to medical 









 Faced with the prospect of litigation, physicians have an incentive to disclose 
more apparent medical errors. Gallagher et al.’s (2003) study suggests that when 
disclosure follows more apparent errors, physicians often choose their words very 
carefully. For instance, when presented with a vignette depicting an insulin overdose due 
to sloppy penmanship, one physician said he would disclose the following: “‘You got a 
big bunch of insulin and your blood sugar went down, and we got that fixed up and we’re 
glad you’re great’” (pg. 1004). By not explicitly mentioning the error, the physician may 
have been trying to absolve himself from reputational harm and legal liability. 
Alternatively, if physicians do not believe that disclosing medical errors will reduce their 













-Fear of Reputational Harm
-Disclosure Training










Figure 7: Regulatory, Institutional, and Provider-level Factors That Influence Disclosure 
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Physicians who want to disclose readily apparent or harmful errors may believe 
that they are prohibited from doing so by their malpractice insurers. According to Liang 
(2004), many insurance policies contain a “‘no statements/no actions’ clause” (pg. 68). 
Under this provision, insured physicians are prohibited from doing or saying anything 
that could be interpreted as an admission of liability, such as telling patients that they 
were harmed by a medical error. If physicians disclosed this, their insurers may refuse to 
defend them in court or pay for the expenses associated with litigation, such as jury 
awards for injured patients’ economic and non-economic losses. Alternatively, insurers 
may revoke their coverage. 
While some hospital administrators and physicians may believe that disclosure 
will result in coverage loss, Banja (2005) argues that their beliefs are erroneous and not 
supported by existing legal precedents. The courts have only allowed insurers to deny 
coverage when insured individuals do not cooperate with their efforts to investigate 
claims. Individuals may be considered uncooperative if they fail to notify their insurers of 
a covered incident in a timely manner, do not answer questions about the incident, or fail 
to appear in court. The truthful disclosure of medical errors is not considered sufficient 
grounds for coverage loss. 
Furthermore, if physicians are sued for malpractice due to their involvement in an 
error, they are not likely to experience an increase in their malpractice premiums, given 
the current structure of the medical liability insurance market. For many types of 
insurance products, like auto insurance, individuals’ premiums are experience rated. With 
auto insurance, this means that drivers that cause an accident will have to pay a higher 
premium than drivers who are not involved in an accident (Fournier & McInnes, 2001). 
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In contrast, physicians’ malpractice premiums are rarely experience rated (U.S. Congress, 
Office of Technology Assessment, 1993; Fournier & McInnes, 2001; CunninghamGroup, 
2015), so those who are sued are not apt to pay a higher premium than their counterparts 
who have not been sued. Essentially, physicians who are at a low risk of being sued are 
subsidizing the premiums of those who are at a higher risk of being sued (Fournier & 
McInnes, 2001). Numerous factors may contribute to the lack of experience rating in the 
medical liability marketplace, including the physician community’s strong opposition to 
experience rating (Sloan, 1990) and the difficulties associated with accurately predicting 
a physician’s risk of being sued, given the relatively small number of claims filed against 
any particular physician at any given time (CunninghamGroup, 2015). 
In addition to liability concerns, many physicians cite a lack of confidence in their 
disclosure skills and abilities as barriers to disclosing medical errors (Fein et al., 2005). 
Perhaps, they are not sure whether what happened was an error, how to disclose errors, or 
what they should tell patients and their families (Kaldjian, Jones, Rosenthal, Tripp-
Reimer, & Hillis, 2006). Numerous theories of behavioral change suggest that self-
confidence plays a significant role in the performance of specific behaviors and 
behavioral change (Dixon, 2008). Considering this, physicians may be able to increase 
their confidence in their disclosure skills through disclosure trainings that focus on role 
playing possible disclosure scenarios. Prior research on disclosure training programs for 
medical students indicate that formalized training increases their self-confidence and self-
efficacy with respect to knowing how to initiate disclosure conversations, what to say, 
and how to respond to patients and their families’ emotional responses and questions 
(Bonnema, Gosman, & Arnold, 2009; Gunderson, Smith, Mayer, McDonald, & 
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Centomani, 2009; Sukalich, Elliott, & Ruffner, 2014). Similarly, some physicians and 
nurses working in obstetrics at five hospitals operated by Ascension Health reported an 
increase in their disclosure behaviors following training in medical error disclosure 
(Hendrich, McCoy, Gale, Sparkman, & Santos, 2014). Taken together, these findings 
suggest that when faced with a situation warranting disclosure physicians who have 
received formal training will be more apt to engage in disclosure than their counterparts 
who have not been trained. Some physicians state that they would like to receive 
disclosure education, training and/or support (Garbutt et al., 2007). 
Another core issue is the impact of errors on physicians and the norms 
surrounding discussion of those errors. Following medical errors, physicians report 
experiencing a myriad of negative emotional and physiological responses, including 
anxiety, sleeplessness, guilt, decreased self-confidence, inadequacy, and decreased job 
satisfaction (Wu et al., 2003; Hobgood et al., 2005b; Waterman et al., 2007; Schwappach 
& Boluarte, 2009). To help them cope, many physicians express a strong desire for 
support from the institutions they work for. Sadly, this support is often not forthcoming. 
In a study of U.S. and Canadian physicians, Waterman et al. (2007) found that 90% of the 
physicians they surveyed disagreed with the statement “that hospitals and health care 
organizations adequately support them in coping with stress associated with medical 
errors” (pg. 470). As such, they are left to seek social support elsewhere. Many 
physicians report discussing medical errors with their colleagues (Garbutt et al., 2007; 
Bari et al., 2016). These discussions may help physicians learn from their mistakes. 
Physicians who discussed their errors with their colleagues reported making constructive 
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changes, such as seeking help from their colleagues, to the way they practice medicine 
(Wu et al., 2003). 
When physicians learn about or witness their colleagues’ mistakes, they are not 
apt to disclose them to the affected patients or their families. According to Gallagher et 
al. (2013), numerous barriers may deter physicians from disclosing their colleagues’ 
mistakes. For instance, since they were not directly involved in the patients’ care, they 
may feel like they do not have enough information about what happened. Without all the 
facts, they may opt to say nothing out of fear of misleading patients or saying something 
that is not true. Alternatively, they may have all the facts but refuse to disclose them to 
patients and their families because they are concerned about tarnishing their colleagues’ 
reputations or triggering unnecessary malpractice litigation. 
They may also be reluctant to disclose their colleagues’ mistakes because they 
believe that it is not their responsibility. Mazor, Roblin, Greene, Fouayzi, and Gallagher 
(2016) found that primary care physicians were more apt to disclose errors that they 
believed both they and their colleagues shared responsibility for than those they believed 
their colleagues were solely responsible for. Thus, if physicians believe that their 
colleagues are not going to disclose their mistakes, then they have little reason to 
proactively disclose them to patients and their families. 
Physicians practice within formal organizations that, as noted elsewhere, may 
have adopted policies and implemented protocols to encourage the truthful, timely 
disclosure of medical errors and adverse events (Kraman & Hamm, 1999; Helmchen, 
2008; Boothman et al., 2009). However, their institutional history and culture may work 
against these changes. Historically, many health systems have adhered to, and continue to 
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adhere to, a deny-and-defend approach to patient grievances following unanticipated 
health outcomes (Boothman et al., 2009). Under this approach, health systems and 
liability insurers discourage physicians from disclosing pertinent information to patients 
and their families because they do not want them to say anything that could be used 
against them in court. And, when patients file a lawsuit, “the prudent insurer and its 
counsel urge secrecy, dispute fault, deflect responsibility, and make it as slow and 
expensive as possible for plaintiffs to continue the fight” (Sage, 2004a, pg. 11). 
Vigorous denial and deflection do not create an environment that is conducive to 
disclosure. It only serves to reinforce human beings’ natural tendency to engage in self-
preservation using defense mechanisms, like denial, rationalization, or displacement 
(Grohol, 2017). In a study of how physicians cope with medical errors, Wu, Folkman, 
McPhee, and Lo (1993) found that some physicians coped by implementing defense 
mechanisms. For example, after making an error that led to congestive heart failure, one 
resident said, “‘I can occasionally rationalize that I was not the proximate cause of his 
death, as the patient was deteriorating slowly, but I must accept that I likely accelerated 
the course of his demise’” (Wu et al., 1993, pg. 567). 
To create an environment that is more conducive to acceptance and disclosure, 
some health systems have discarded their deny-and-defend approach in favor of an active 
disclosure approach. Under this approach, health systems are committed to disclosing 
errors to patients and their families (Kraman & Hamm, 1999; Boothman et al., 2009; 
Peto, Tenerowicz, Benjamin, Morsi, & Burger, 2009). For instance, the University of 
Michigan Health System (UMHS) adopted a disclosure, apology, and offer approach in 
2001. According to Boothman et al. (2009), when medical errors occur, risk management 
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personnel and physicians are proactive, investigating what happened. The purpose of 
these investigations is to determine whether physicians’ actions were reasonable, given 
the circumstances, and whether the care provided adversely impacted patients’ health and 
well-being. When patients are injured by unreasonable care, they disclose what happened, 
offer compensation, if needed, and implement policies and procedures aimed at 
preventing similar occurrences in the future. However, if an internal “investigation 
concludes that medical staff did all that they could [to prevent what happened] the system 
will stand behind its employees,” defending them when disgruntled patients or their 
families file a lawsuit (Alexander, 2014, pg. 1). After implementing this approach, the 
UMHS experienced a significant decrease in malpractice litigation (Kachalia et al., 
2010). This suggests that physicians are proactively engaging in disclosure, given 
patients and their families’ propensity to sue for malpractice when physicians are not 
forthcoming about what happened (Hickson et al., 1992; Vincent et al., 1993; Vincent et 
al., 1994; Wu, 1999; Schwappach & Koeck, 2004). While there is a trend towards 
disclosure, the past may persist indefinitely. Organizational policies may change quickly 
and drastically but it takes time to change human behavior. 
To facilitate health systems and physicians’ adoption of active disclosure 
practices, some state legislatures have adopted apology and/or disclosure laws 
(Mastroianni et al., 2010). Apology laws make expressions of sympathy and/or 
admissions of fault inadmissible in court, depending on the state, while disclosure laws 
require health systems and/or providers to tell patients about unanticipated health 
outcomes, depending on the state. Since these laws are limited in scope, they may not 
facilitate disclosure or reduce the incidence of malpractice litigation, given that they do 
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not fulfill patients’ emotional and informational needs. Following a medical error, many 
patients want an apology, an explanation of what happened, and assurance that steps will 
be taken to prevent similar occurrences in the future. Denied this, they may sue for 
malpractice (Hickson et al., 1992; Vincent et al., 1993; Vincent et al., 1994; Witman et 
al., 1996; Wu, 1999; Schwappach & Koeck, 2004). And, even when provided with that 
information, some patients still opt to sue for malpractice (Witman et al., 1996; Mazor et 
al., 2004; Hobgood et al., 2005a). 
Even if apology and disclosure laws afforded physicians greater protection against 
malpractice litigation, it probably would not increase their willingness to disclose. For 
decades, physicians have been closing ranks and portraying themselves as infallible 
healers of human suffering, a practice that can be traced back to the 1800’s (De Ville, 
1992). Thus, if physicians willingly engaged in disclosure, they would not only be 
violating the norms of their community but also tarnishing their own self-image—that of 
a knowledgeable, competent healer. Any acknowledgement of a mistake or error is often 
interpreted as a sign of their carelessness or incompetence (Institute of Medicine, 2000). 
 Physicians’ need for self-preservation perpetuates the belief that physicians are 
perfect amongst both physicians and patients, an illusion that makes both parties ill-
equipped to deal with mistakes. According to Dr. Hilfiker (1985): 
We [physicians] are not prepared for our mistakes, and we don’t know how to 
cope with them when they occur. Doctors are not alone in harboring expectations 
of perfection. Patients, too, expect doctors to be perfect. Perhaps patients have to 
consider their doctors less prone to error than other people: how else can a sick or 
injured person, already afraid, come to trust the doctor?...But the degree of 
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perfection expected by patients is no doubt also a result of what we doctors have 
come to believe about ourselves, or better, have tried to convince ourselves about 
ourselves. (pg. 76-77) 
Given how firmly entrenched the illusion of perfection is amongst physicians and 
patients, it will take more than a few laws to facilitate behavior change. 
Conclusion 
Numerous philosophical, ideological, institutional, and medicolegal factors may 
influence physicians’ willingness to disclose medical errors and adverse events to 
patients and/or their families. Given the medical community’s preoccupation with 
malpractice risk, physicians’ disclosure practices may be heavily influenced by their 
beliefs regarding the relationship between disclosure and malpractice risk. Physicians that 
believe disclosure will reduce their malpractice risk will be more apt to disclose an 
adverse event than their counterparts who believe that disclosure increases their 
malpractice risk. The latter often believe that patients will file a lawsuit, using any 
statements made during disclosure against them in court (Bell et al., 2012). And, since the 
more severe the injuries; the greater the likelihood of a lawsuit (U.S. Congress, Office of 
the Technology Assessment, 1993), physicians’ willingness to disclose may decrease as 
the severity of patients’ injuries increase. 
Additionally, physicians’ willingness to disclose may be influenced by the culture 
of medicine as well as their workplaces’ policies and procedures. For decades, the 
medical community has internalized and propagated the image of physicians as infallible 
healers of human suffering. Considering this, physicians may be reluctant to engage in 
disclosure, fearing that it will tarnish their profession’s image and decrease patients’ trust 
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in them and their colleagues. Nevertheless, the government and various healthcare 
institutions are trying to change the culture of medicine through the implementation of 
disclosure programs and policies. Following the implementation of its disclosure and 
compensation program, the University of Michigan Health System experienced a 
decrease in malpractice litigation, suggesting both that physicians are disclosing errors 
and patients are less apt to sue for information on what happened to them. Nevertheless, 
old habits are difficult to change, so creating a healthcare system where timely disclosure 
is the norm will require a significant investment of time and effort—both on the part of 




Chapter III: Methodology 
Study Design 
 In approaching my research questions, I considered different study designs and 
data collection methods, including observation, focus groups, and survey methods. I 
decided not to engage in naturalistic or participant-observation for three reasons. First, I 
would have had to regularly shadow physicians, be able to accurately identify when a 
medical error or adverse event has occurred and determine whether it was disclosed to the 
patient and/or their families. I felt ill-equipped to do this, given that I am not a physician. 
My lack of medical knowledge would probably have biased my results. Second, since 
many physicians, especially surgeons, work long, irregular hours, sometimes over sixty 
hours a week, I would have been unable to observe some of them engage in disclosure. 
My school, work, and personal obligations would have prevented me from shadowing 
physicians at all hours of the day and night week after week for months on end. Lastly, if 
I had chosen direct observation, I could have found myself confronting some murky, 
ethical issues. If I had noticed physicians about to make a mistake, I would have been 
torn between pointing it out to them and allowing them to proceed so that I could further 
my research agenda. Most likely, I would have done the former, compromising the 
integrity of my research. 
 I also considered conducting focus groups with physicians but decided against 
them for two reasons. First, physicians are extremely busy, which could make it difficult 
for them to participate in a two-hour focus group. Second, since prior focus group and 
interview research suggests that there might be a relationship between harm severity, 
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apparentness, and disclosure (Gallagher et al., 2003), I decided that it was time to move 
beyond exploratory research towards explanatory research. 
Prior cross-sectional, survey research on the relationship between harm severity 
and disclosure has either focused on physicians practicing in other countries (Gallagher et 
al., 2006a; Linthorst et al., 2012), or those practicing at two academic medical centers in 
Missouri and Washington (Gallagher et al., 2006a; Garbutt et al., 2007; Loren et al., 
2008; White et al., 2008; White et al., 2011). Additionally, they have focused on 
pediatricians and pediatric residents (Garbutt et al., 2007; Loren et al., 2008), internists 
(Linthorst et al., 2012), internal medicine trainees (White et al., 2008; White et al., 2011), 
or physicians in a variety of specialties (Gallagher et al., 2006a). While the results of 
these studies suggest that there is a relationship between harm severity and disclosure, 
their generalizability to physicians practicing in other states may be limited, given the 
unique attributes of each state’s medicolegal environment. Missouri has enacted an 
apology law while Washington has enacted both apology and disclosure laws. In contrast, 
Minnesota has not enacted either of these laws (Mastroianni et al., 2010). To see if the 
results of the aforementioned studies are applicable to Minnesota’s physician population, 
I choose to conduct a cross-sectional survey of Minnesota physicians using simple 
random sampling. 
Survey Development 
To answer my research questions, I developed survey questions and clinical 
vignettes, following the process depicted in Figure 8. I started by reviewing some of the 
existing survey instruments related to patient safety, such as the Hospital Survey on 
Patient Safety Culture (Agency for Healthcare Research and Quality, 2017), the Medical 
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Student Safety Attitudes and Professionalism Survey (Liao et al., 2014), the Error 
Orientation Questionnaire (Rybowiak, Garst, Frese, & Batinic, 1999), and the Safety 
Attitudes and Safety Climate Questionnaire (Sexton et al., 2006). Using these documents, 
I compiled a list of questions that captured the different components of my conceptual 
model (Figure 5). I wrote my own questions to capture aspects of my model that were not 
assessed in the reviewed questionnaires. 
 
Simultaneously, I reviewed the literature on error disclosure to find vignettes that 
varied in terms of harm severity and apparentness. I selected four vignettes from studies 
conducted by Espin et al. (2006), Fein et al. (2007), and White et al. (2011). The 
vignettes are displayed in Table 6. I chose these vignettes because they were developed in 
collaboration with physicians and nurses and have undergone several rounds of pilot-
testing to ensure that they were realistic and factually accurate (Espin et al., 2006; White 
et al., 2011). Since I do not have a clinical background, I wanted to ensure that any 
vignettes I used were accurate, given that unrealistic scenarios could jeopardize the 














Figure 8: Survey Development Process 
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Table 6: Clinical Vignettes 
Source Vignette 
Espin et al. 
(2006) 
You are seeing a patient 3 weeks after elective splenectomy for ITP. 
The splenectomy was technically challenging because of the patient’s 
obesity, but seemed uncomplicated. At this follow-up visit, the patient 
complains of vague persistent left upper quadrant (LUQ) pain. You send 
the patient for an abdominal x-ray film, which shows a foreign body 
consistent with a retained surgical sponge in the patient’s LUQ. You 
remember that the sponge count was correct at the end of the procedure. 
However, you also remember that you packed off a small bleeding 
vessel near the stomach with a sponge, and do not recall removing the 
sponge. When you review the postoperative records, you observe that a 
math error was responsible for a falsely correct sponge count. You 
believe a subsequent operation to remove the retained sponge is 
indicated, and expect the patient will make a full recovery 
Espin et al. 
(2006)  
The scrub and circulating nurses, anesthesia resident, and 
anesthesiologist are in the operating room prior to a liver transplant. The 
anesthesiologist asks out loud if the patient has any allergies. While the 
scrub nurse is busy arranging the surgical instruments, the resident is 
busy with another task, and neither of them responds; however, the 
circulating nurse says, “I didn’t check the patient in, but no, I don’t think 
so.” The anesthesiologist proceeds to inject Cefazolin into the patient’s 
IV. Later, the anesthesiologist checks the patient’s chart and discover 
that the patient has an allergy to penicillin 
Fein et al. 
(2007) 
A 62-year-old diabetic patient with chronic renal insufficiency is 
admitted to the hospital with a new onset gastrointestinal bleed. He is 
made NPO (nothing by mouth) for endoscopy, but his medications were 
not held. Because of severe hypoglycemia the patient had a seizure, fell 
of his bed, and fractured his hip 
White et al. 
(2011) 
You have admitted a diabetic patient to the hospital for a chronic 
obstructive pulmonary disease (COPD) exacerbation. You handwrite an 
order for the patient to receive “10 U” of insulin. The “U” in your order 
looks like a 0. The following morning, the patient is given 100 U of 
insulin, 10 times the patient’s normal dose, and is later found 
unresponsive, with a serum glucose level of 35mg/dL (1.94 mmol/L). 
The patient is resuscitated and transferred to the intensive care unit 
where they are expected to make a full recovery. 
 
After drafting my survey, I conducted cognitive interviews with a convenience 
sample of physicians (n = 8) practicing in the Twin Cities metropolitan area in the spring 
of 2017. Since I was concerned about interpersonal variation in physicians’ definition and 
understanding of medical errors, preventable adverse events, and adverse events, I asked 
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my interviewees to define and give some examples of each concept. I presented each 
vignette to them one at a time and asked to them to tell me whether it was plausible and 
factually accurate, given that I do not have a background in medicine. I also asked them 
whether the vignette depicted a medical error, preventable adverse event, adverse event, 
or something else. If they choose the latter, they were asked to elaborate on their 
response. A copy of my interview script is included in Appendix A. 
Many physicians found the term preventable adverse event confusing. Instead, 
they preferred to use the phrase medical error with harm or medical error without harm. 
Based on their comments, I removed the phrase preventable adverse event(s) from my 
survey. I replaced it with one of the following phrases: medical error(s), harmful medical 
error(s), a medical error that has no potential to harm the patient, a medical error that 
could potentially harm the patient but does not, a medical error that causes mild harm, a 
medical error that causes moderate harm, or a medical error that causes serious harm. 
Additionally, many physicians thought that my vignettes were outdated or 
unrealistic, given the policies and procedures being implemented at their institution, 
across the state, and nationwide, to improve patient safety. In response, I removed them 
from my survey and started searching the published literature for more timely, relevant 
examples of medical errors and adverse events. While using Google to search for 
examples, I found the National Rural Bioethics Project’s website, which contained 
numerous vignettes that depicted medical errors or adverse events. After reviewing each 
vignette, I selected 18 that suited my research purposes. They varied in terms of the type 
of event depicted (i.e. medical error or adverse event), the level of harm, if any, the 
patient sustained, and how readily apparent what happened would have been to patients 
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and/or their families. Then, I emailed Ann Freeman Cook, Ph.D., the Director of the 
National Rural Bioethics Project, asking for her permission to use and modify some of 
the vignettes for research purposes, which she freely granted. 
After making all the necessary changes to my survey, I programmed it into 
QualtricsTM (2017-2018) so that I could conduct another round of pilot testing in August 
through October of 2017. I conducted a pilot test using a convenience sample of 
Minnesota physicians who had an email address on file with the Minnesota Board of 
Medical Practice. To reduce response burden, 4 of the 18 vignettes were randomly 
presented to each physician, who was asked to assess its plausibility and factual accuracy. 
Also, they were asked to state whether the vignette depicted a medical error, adverse 
event, or something else and to identify the level and duration of harm the patient 
sustained, if any. A copy of the questions asked is included in Appendix B. Four hundred 
fifty-six physicians responded to the survey. 
Based on physicians’ feedback, I revised the vignettes to improve their readability 
and factual accuracy. I also removed one of them from my survey because it depicted a 
near miss, which is not the focus of this study. I only retained the vignettes that depicted 
a medical error or adverse event.8 
Afterwards, I created two versions of my final survey. One version focused on the 
disclosure of medical errors while the other focused on the disclosure of adverse events. 
A copy of the medical error disclosure and adverse event disclosure survey is included in 
 
8 Cohen’s Kappa, a measure of inter-rater reliability, was used to assess the level of agreement between my 
classification and physicians’ classification of the type of event being depicted (i.e. medical error or 
adverse event), the level of harm the patient sustained, and how apparent what happened is to the patient 
and/or their family. Overall, there was good agreement on the type of event depicted (𝑘 = 0.6844; 𝑝 −
𝑣𝑎𝑙𝑢𝑒 < 0.0001), moderate agreement on harm severity (𝑘 = 0.4456; 𝑝 − 𝑣𝑎𝑙𝑢𝑒 < 0.0001), and fair 
agreement on apparentness (𝑘 = 0.2000; 𝑝 − 𝑣𝑎𝑙𝑢𝑒 < 0.0001). 
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Appendix C and D, respectively. I created two surveys to reduce the cognitive burden 
placed on potential respondents. I also hoped to prevent any confusion or measurement 
error that could arise from using both terms on the same survey. 
The medical errors survey contained 114 questions and the adverse events survey 
contained 99 questions. Due to the nature of medical errors, the former had more 
questions than the latter. Medical errors may or may not be harmful, so respondents were 
asked their likelihood and comfort disclosing both harmful and unharmful errors. In 
contrast, adverse events are always harmful. Regardless of the survey version, I grouped 
questions capturing similar aspects of my conceptual model together. Each survey has 7 
sections—legal considerations, human fallibility, practice culture, professional ethics, 
self-efficacy, clinical scenarios, and about you (i.e. demographic information). The 
following is a brief description of each section: 
• Legal considerations: These questions were designed to capture physicians’ 
beliefs regarding the relationship between disclosure and patients and/or their 
families’. 
propensity to sue for malpractice. 
• Human fallibility: These questions were designed to capture how physicians feel 
about having to admit their mistakes. 
• Practice culture: These questions were designed to assess the extent to which 
improving patient safety is valued in physicians’ workplaces. They also were 
asked about the disclosure practices, or lack thereof, that exist in their workplace. 
•  Professional ethics: These questions were designed to assess whether physicians 
believe that engaging in disclosure is the right thing to do. It also measures their 
76 
 
likelihood of disclosing medical errors or adverse events that vary in terms of 
harm severity and apparentness. 
• Self-efficacy: The questions in the self-efficacy section were designed to capture 
how much training and experience physicians have disclosing medical errors and 
adverse events as well as how comfortable they would feel disclosing them. 
• Clinical vignettes: Physicians were presented with 4 vignettes that varied in terms 
of harm severity and apparentness. For each one, they were asked to determine 
the level of harm the patient sustained, how apparent what happened would be to 
the patient and/or their family, their likelihood of disclosing what happened, and 
the likelihood that their disclosure would prompt a malpractice lawsuit. 
• About you: Physicians were asked to provide some basic demographic 
information—race, ethnicity, sex, age, speciality, number of years in practice, 
practice location, and their prior involvement in malpractice litigation, if any. 
Since survey respondents are more apt to answer close-ended versus open-ended 
questions (Griffith, Cook, Guyatt, & Charles, 1999; Reja, Manfred, Hlebec, & Vehovar, 
2003), most of my survey questions were close-ended. This was a deliberate choice made 
in hopes of reducing response burden; thereby, decreasing the likelihood that respondents 
would stop answering questions partway through the survey (i.e. partial non-response). 
 The clinical vignettes were placed towards the end of the survey after careful 
consideration of the tradeoffs between non-response and measurement concerns 
(Dillman, Christian, & Smyth, 2014). Compared to placing cognitively demanding and 
potentially threatening items first, the survey literature suggests that placing low 
cognitive burden, non-threatening topically related items at the start of a survey helps to 
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increase response rates (Dillman et al., 2014). Since reading, interpreting, and responding 
to vignettes is a cognitively demanding task and the prospect of disclosure is an 
emotionally triggering, threatening endeavor, I decided to place the vignettes towards the 
end of the survey. 
Vignette Assignment 
Physicians assigned to the medical error disclosure survey were randomly 
assigned to 1 of 3 clinical vignette groups—medical error group 1, medical error group 2, 
or medical error group 3. In each group, physicians received 4 scenarios—3 depicting a 
medical error and 1 depicting an adverse event. Similarly, physicians assigned to the 
adverse events disclosure survey were randomly assigned to 1 of 3 groups: adverse event 
group 1, adverse event group 2, or adverse event group 3. Physicians received 4 
scenarios—3 depicting an adverse event and 1 depicting a medical error. In total, there 
are 17 different vignettes (9 medical error, 8 adverse event). 
The purpose of presenting physicians with both medical error and adverse event 
vignettes was to obtain data for a subsequent study on priming effects, a potential source 
of survey bias. According to Parkin (2008), “priming is a psychological process in which 
exposure to a stimulus activates a concept in memory that is then given increased weight 
in subsequent judgement tasks. Priming works by making the activated concept 
accessible so that it can be used in evaluating related objects” (pg. 216). By placing the 
vignettes after dozens of attitudinal questions, it is expected that physicians who receive 
the medical error survey would misclassify the adverse event vignette as a medical error 
vignette. And, those who receive the adverse event survey would misclassify the medical 
error vignette as an adverse event vignette. 
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The vignettes used varied in terms of apparentness and harm severity (see Table 
7). I used the data from my second round of pilot testing to help me classify each vignette 
as depicting a medical error or adverse event and to assess the severity of the harm the 
patient sustained. Since I did not assess incident apparentness during my cognitive 
interviews, the apparentness classifications (readily apparent vs. not readily apparent) are 
based on my assessment of how readily apparent the medical error or adverse event 
would be to patients and/or their family. Table 8 outlines the rationale for my 









Harm Severity Apparentness 
Medical Error Group 1   
CT Scan Yes -- Mild Not Readily Apparent 
Retained Sponge Yes -- Moderate Not Readily Apparent 
Prostate Cancer Yes -- Severe Not Readily Apparent 
Leukemia -- Yes Mild-Moderate Readily Apparent 
Medical Error Group 2    
Childhood 
Vaccination 
Yes -- Mild Not Readily Apparent 
Foot Amputation Yes -- Severe Readily Apparent 
IV Mix-up Yes -- Death Not Readily Apparent 
Chemotherapy -- Yes Moderate Readily Apparent 
Medical Error Group 3    
Breast Biopsies Yes -- Moderate Not Readily Apparent 
Knee Replacement Yes -- Severe Readily Apparent  
IV Mix-up Yes -- Death Not Readily Apparent 
Gastrointestinal Bleed -- Yes Moderate-
Severe 
Readily Apparent 
Adverse Event Group 1    
Allergic Reaction -- Yes Mild Not Readily Apparent 
Shunt Revision -- Yes Moderate Not Readily Apparent 
Gastrointestinal Bleed -- Yes Moderate-
Severe 
Readily Apparent 
IV Mix-up Yes -- Death Not Readily Apparent 
Adverse Event Group 2   
IV Infiltration -- Yes Mild Readily Apparent 
Birth Control -- Yes Moderate Not Readily Apparent 
Appendectomy -- Yes Death Readily Apparent 
CT Scan Yes -- Mild Not Readily Apparent 
Adverse Event Group 3   
IV Infiltration -- Yes Mild Readily Apparent 
Gastrointestinal Bleed -- Yes Moderate-
Severe 
Readily Apparent 
Appendectomy -- Yes Death Readily Apparent 





Table 8: Rationale for Apparentness Classification 
Vignette Classification Rationale 
CT Scan NRA Given the patient’s cognitive impairment, they 
probably would not realize that the CT scan was 
performed on the wrong body part. And, in the 
absence of timely disclosure, what happened probably 
would not be apparent to the patient’s family.  
Appendectomy RA The patient’s death would be apparent to their family. 
GI Bleed RA Since a wave of dizziness preceded the patient’s fall, 
they would be able to link their fall and resulting 
fracture to their dizziness, which is a common side 
effect of diazepam.  
Allergic 
Reaction 
NRA The cause of the rash would not be readily apparent 
to the patient, given they do not have any known drug 
allergies. Additionally, it could have been caused by 
something else they were exposed to. 
Retained 
Sponge 
NRA The retained sponge is not readily apparent to the 
patient, given that 3 weeks elapsed between their 
surgery and follow-up visit.  
Prostate 
Cancer 
NRA The laboratory mix-up and its possible contribution to 
the patient’s metastatic prostate cancer were not 
apparent to the patient. The mix-up went undetected 
for a year. 
Breast 
Biopsies 
NRA The specimen mix-up would not have been apparent 
to the patient and/or their family, especially in the 
absence of disclosure. 
Foot 
Amputation 
RA Upon waking from surgery, the patient would have 
realized that the healthy, not diseased, foot was 
accidentally amputated. 
Shunt Revision NRA Most likely, the patient and/or their family would not 
have realized that the placement of the feeding tube 
caused the pneumonia, given that hospital-acquired 
pneumonia is fairly common. 
IV Infiltration RA The swelling around the IV insertion site was 
apparent to the mother, given that she called for 
assistance. 
IV Mix-up NRA The cause of the patient’s death would not have been 
apparent to their family. The patient could have 
passed away from the flu, not the mix-up. 
Hearing Loss NRA The physician’s failure to promptly review the 
patient’s lab results would not have been apparent to 
them and/or their family. Thus, they would not have 
known about the drug-induced hearing loss. 
Knee 
Replacement 
RA Upon waking from surgery, the patient would have 
realized that the wrong knee was replaced. 
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Birth Control NRA The patient did not realize she was experiencing side 
effects from birth control. 
Breast Cancer RA The patient should have realized she was 
experiencing the common side effects of 
chemotherapy, given they would have been disclosed 
to her prior to treatment. 
Leukemia RA The patient’s parents should have realized he was 
experiencing the common side effects of 
chemotherapy, given they would have been disclosed 
to them prior to treatment. 
Childhood 
Vaccination 
NRA The patient’s mother did not know that her child had 
already received all the required vaccinations, 
resulting in the duplicate administration of the Hib 
vaccine. 
Notes: 
RA = Readily Apparent, NRA = Not Readily Apparent 
 
Sampling Method 
 My population of interest is physicians currently practicing medicine in 
Minnesota. I obtained a list of 15,470 licensed, practicing physicians from the Minnesota 
Board of Medical Practice, which served as my sampling frame. It contained physicians’ 
licensure number, name, specialty, mailing address (office or home), and email address 
(personal or professional). From this list, I identified 698 duplicate entries. Physicians 
practicing multiple specialties were listed once for each subspecialty. From all these 
duplicates, I only randomly selected one entry from my listings. Upon inspecting the list 
further, I noticed quite a few incomplete addresses (e.g. streets without a building 
number; clinics/hospitals without a street address, etc.). Additionally, most physicians did 
not have an email address listed. 
Since data quality issues can contribute to coverage error, I used the internet to 
fill-in as much missing information as possible. I visited the websites of the 
clinics/hospitals listed and searched for physicians’ postal and email addresses. When 
mailing addresses were not listed, I used their workplace address as their mailing address. 
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While most of the websites did not list email addresses, I was still able to find quite a few 
of them. Unfortunately, since I did not keep track of my internet searches, I am unable to 
provide data on the number of postal and email addresses I found. 
After updating my sampling frame, I selected a simple random sample of 1,565 
physicians. Of those selected, 341 (21.79%) only had a postal address listed. The 
remaining 1,224 (78.21%) physicians had both a postal and email address listed. The 
number of physicians selected was based on resource constraints, not statistical power 
calculations. I selected the maximum number of physicians I could afford to study, given 
the costs associated with printing and disturbing my surveys (e.g. postage and printing 
costs). 
Table 9 provides a detailed breakdown of the reasons for respondent ineligibility. 
The American Association for Public Opinion Research’s Standard Definitions were used 
to classify ineligible respondents (American Association for Public Opinion Research, 
2016). Thirty-eight physicians refused to participate in the study (code 2.11). 
I was unable to determine the eligibility of 104 physicians due to bad contact 
information. More specifically, 13 web invitations were returned as undeliverable (code 
3.30). Amongst mailed surveys, 18 were returned undeliverable as addressed (code 3.31), 
39 were returned because the potential respondent had moved and left no forwarding 
address (code 3.32), and 17 were returned unable to forward, not deliverable as addressed 
(code 3.3141). One mailed survey was returned due to the absence of a mail receptacle 
(code 3.253) while four were returned because no such address existed (code 3.3131). 
Ten mailed surveys were returned with forwarding information (code 3.40). Follow-up 




Table 9: Reasons for Respondent Ineligibility 
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Temporarily away, holding period expired 
Returned with forwarding information 


























Invitation returned as undeliverable 
Undeliverable as addressed 
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NE = non-experimental; Exp. = experimental 
 
The large number of physicians who could not be contacted suggests that they are 
not regularly contacting the Minnesota Board of Medical Practice to update their contact 
information. Instead, they may only be updating their contact information once a year as 
part of the license renewal process (Minnesota Board of Medical Practice, 2016). The 
amount of undeliverable mail could also be the result of poor data entry and management 
practices. 
Nineteen physicians called or wrote to the researcher explaining their ineligibility 
for the study, namely that they were retired, no longer practicing medicine, or primarily 
engaged in research or administrative work (i.e. disposition code 4.10). All the cover 
letters and emails sent out stated that the population of interest was Minnesota physicians 
currently practicing medicine. Compared to retired physicians, who may not have 
practiced medicine for years, currently practicing physicians are apt to be aware of the 
discourse surrounding disclosure and patient safety at their institutions and nationally. As 
part of the survey, physicians were asked about disclosure practices and patient safety 
initiatives in their workplace. 
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For those who were deemed ineligible or could not be contacted, a replacement 
element was randomly drawn to replace the sampled element (Kish, 1965). More 
specifically, prior to each reminder mailing, I removed both ineligible physicians and 
those with bad contact information from my sample. I replaced them with another 
physician that I randomly selected from my sampling frame. In total, I replaced 81 of the 
123 physicians who were ineligible or could not be contacted. The remaining 42 
physicians were not replaced because they were deemed ineligible after the final mailings 
had been sent out. 
Survey Mode Randomization 
 In addition to the substantive research questions this study aims to answer, a 
supplemental mode experiment was embedded within it to determine the impact the mode 
of survey administration has on the physician response rate. Specifically, I conducted a 
cross-sectional, experimental, mixed-mode study of licensed physicians currently 
practicing in Minnesota. I randomly assigned the selected physicians to different survey 
modes (i.e. mail only, mail-web, web-mail, or web only). Figure 9 outlines the mixed-
mode design I used for this study. 
Physicians without an email address (n = 341) were automatically allocated to the 
non-experimental, mail-only group. Physicians with both a postal and email address (n = 
1,224) were randomly assigned to one of four groups: mail only, mail-web, web-mail, 





Figure 9: Crossover, Mixed-mode Study Design 
Survey Version Assignment 
To avoid mode effects, or changes in participants’ responses caused by 
differences in the layout and design of paper and web surveys (Dillman et al., 2014), an 


















































as similar as possible. The web and paper survey questions were displayed in the same 
order. And, most of the web survey questions were formatted like those on the paper 
survey with one notable exception. On the web survey, some of the tables used to display 
the statements that participants were asked to rate how strongly they agree or disagree 
were broken down into two smaller tables. This was done to improve their appearance 
and readability on mobile devices, particularly smartphones. 
Within each of the groups, physicians were randomly assigned to receive either 
the medical error disclosure survey or adverse event disclosure survey. In the non-
experimental group, 171 and 170 physicians were assigned the medical error disclosure 
survey and the adverse event disclosure survey, respectively. Within each of the 
experimental group, 153 physicians were randomly assigned to each version of the 
survey. In total, 783 physicians were assigned to receive the medical error disclosure 
survey. The remaining 782 were assigned to receive the adverse events disclosure survey. 
Data Collection Procedures 
 Between November 2017 and February 2018, 1,565 physicians were invited to 
participate in this study. All surveys were administered according to the flowchart 
depicted in Figure 10. All mail contacts included a cover letter printed on the University 
of Minnesota, Twin Cities letterhead. It detailed the purpose of the survey, why they were 
selected, and statements regarding the voluntary, confidential nature of their 
participation. Copies of the cover letters used for the initial and follow-up mailings are 
included in Appendices F through H. Enclosed with the letter was a copy of potential 






The paper surveys were returned to me at the School of Public Health at the 
University of Minnesota, Twin Cities. Using the unique identifiers printed on the survey 
booklets, I was able to identify who returned the survey as well as what mode and survey 
version they were assigned. When physicians responded to the survey, refused to 
complete it, or were deemed ineligible, I ceased all contact with them. 
Since sending multiple reminders can increase the response rate (Barclay, Todd, 
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Figure 10: Survey Administration Procedures 
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initial non-responders in the mail-only groups were sent up to two additional mailings. 
While the first reminder increased the response rate, it was still quite low. In an effort to 
increase it further, a shortened version of each survey, referred to henceforth as the short-
form, was used for the final mailings, given that the response rate amongst physicians to 
shorter questionnaires is greater than it is for longer ones (Kellerman & Herold, 2001; 
Jepson, Asch, Hershey, & Ubel, 2005; VanGeest, Johnson, & Welch, 2007; Flanigan, 
McFarlane, & Cook, 2008; Glidewell et al., 2012). Since some of the questions were 
designed to capture similar pieces of information, I removed some of them from the 
original survey versions. For example, I removed the following question: “In your 
workplace, how much of a priority is patient safety—the top priority, in top 3, in top 5, in 
top 10, or less than that?” With this question removed, I could still get a sense of how 
much of a priority patient safety is by looking at physicians’ responses to some of the 
other attitudinal questions. For instance, please rate how strongly you agree or disagree 
with the following statements: “In my workplace, reporting medical errors to the 
institution (e.g. risk managers, patient safety advocates, etc.) is considered an important 
component of patient safety” and “In my workplace, it is easy for me to learn from 
others’ mistakes.” The short-form medical error and adverse event surveys contained 97 
and 84 questions, respectively. Copies of the short-form medical error disclosure survey 
and adverse event disclosure survey can be found in Appendix I and J, respectively. 
I used QualtricsTM (2017-2018) to administer the web surveys. All emails sent to 
potential respondents explained the purpose of the study, why they were chosen, and the 
voluntary, confidential nature of their participation. The emails also included a 
personalized, hyperlink to the survey. Participants could access the survey by clicking on 
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the link or copying and pasting it into their web browser. Copies of the initial and follow-
up emails sent are included in Appendices K through N as well as Appendix R. 
Physicians assigned to the web-mail group received up to two emails inviting 
them to participate in the survey. For the third mailing, non-responders were randomly 
assigned to one of two follow-up options. Half of non-responders received a cover letter, 
printed on the University of Minnesota, Twin Cities letterhead. It reiterated the 
importance of the study and provided them with a personalized link to the survey 
(Appendix O). To access the survey, they had to type the URL into their web browser. To 
reduce the burden placed on potential respondents, a URL shortener was used to shorten 
the lengthy, personalized links provided by QualtricsTM (2017-2018). The remaining non-
responders were sent a reminder letter (Appendix P), paper copy of their assigned survey 
booklet, and a business reply envelope. The final, follow-up reminder sent to non-
responders in the web-mail group consisted of a cover letter (Appendix Q), copy of the 
short-form survey, and a business reply envelope. 
At the end of the data collection period, all returned surveys were brought to 
Northwest Keypunch, Inc., where they were entered into a database by data entry 
professionals. Upon return of the surveys and receipt of the database, I randomly spot-
checked the data to ensure its accuracy. All web survey data were automatically 
populated into a database by QualtricsTM (2017-2018). I downloaded a copy of it and 
merged it with the file from Northwest Keypunch, Inc. prior to data analysis. 
Prior research indicates that offering incentives is an effective means of 
increasing the response rate amongst physicians (Pit, Vo, & Pyakurel, 2014; Abdulaziz et 
al., 2015; Young et al., 2015). And, in a study of radiologists at academic medical 
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centers, Ziegenfuss, Niederhauser, Kallmes, and Beebe (2013) found that responders 
preferred the chance to win an iPad to the guarantee of receiving a $5 Amazon giftcard 
upon completion and receipt of the survey. Considering these findings, all potential 
respondents were offered an incentive to participate in this study. Those who returned the 
survey were entered into a drawing for 1 of 4 tablets (approximate market value $500). 
Winners were notified via email or postal mail in the summer of 2018 and given their 
choice of an iPad or Android tablet. All study protocols were approved by the 
Institutional Review Board at the University of Minnesota, Twin Cities. 
Response Rate and Non-response Analysis 
In total, 292 physicians responded to the survey, resulting in an overall response 
rate of 18.0%. For decades, the physician response rate has been declining (Cull, 
O’Connor, Sharp, & Tang, 2005; Cook, Dickinson, & Eccles, 2009; Cho, Johnson, & 
VanGeest, 2013; McLeod, Klabunde, Willis, & Stark, 2013), so it is not uncommon to 
see low to moderate physician response rates (Yusuf & Baron, 2006; Golnik, Ireland, & 
Borowsky, 2009; Wong et al., 2009; Einarsson et al., 2010; Nahed et al., 2012; Pereira, 
Lewin, Yousem, & Yousem, 2014; Tawfik et al., 2018). While the response rate varied 
across modes, the differences were not statistically significant (see Table 10). Roughly 
16% of physicians assigned to the web-only group responded to the survey compared to 
21.2% of physicians assigned to the web-mail group. 
Table 10: Response Rates by Mode of Administration 










18.0% 15.2% 19.3% 19.1% 21.2% 15.6% 
Notes: 




Table 11 compares the practice areas of respondents and non-respondents. There 
were not any statistically significant differences in the reported specialties of respondents 
and non-respondents, regardless of how non-response was defined. 



















































    
Group 1 includes all potential participants who did not complete or refuse to complete the survey. 
 
Group 2 includes all potential participants who did not complete or refuse to complete the survey, excluding those who 
could not be contacted due to incorrect postal addresses and/or undeliverable mail. 
Group 3 includes all potential participants who did not complete or refuse to complete the survey, excluding those who 
could not be contacted due to bounced email addresses. 
Generalist practice includes the following practice areas: Emergency Medicine, Family Medicine, and Internal 
Medicine. 
Specialist practice includes the following practice areas: Allergy and Immunology, Anesthesiology, Dermatology, 
Medical Genetics and Genomics, Neurological Surgery, Neuromusculoskeletal Medicine, Nuclear Medicine, Obstetrics 
and Gynecology, Ophthalmology, Ophthalmology and Otolaryngology, Orthopedic Surgery, Otolaryngology, 
Pathology, Pediatrics, Physical Medicine and Rehabilitation, Plastic Surgery, Preventative Medicine, Psychiatry and 
Neurology, Radiology, Surgery, Thoracic Surgery, and Urology 
 
Table 12 compares the practice location of respondents and non-respondents. To 
determine location, I merged the state licensure database with the 2004 ZIP RUCA Code 
files for the state of Minnesota, which was obtained from the Washington, Wyoming, 
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Alaska, Montana, and Idaho (WWAMI) Rural Health Research Center (WWAMI, 2007). 
Overall, most respondents and non-respondents practice in an urban area. There were not 
any statistically significant differences in the practice location of respondents and non-
respondents, regardless of how non-response was defined. 
Table 12: Rural-Urban Commuting Area (RUCA) by Response Status 






























































    
Group 1 includes all potential participants who did not complete or refuse to complete the survey. 
Group 2 includes all potential participants who did not complete or refuse to complete the survey, excluding those who 
could not be contacted due to incorrect postal addresses and/or undeliverable mail. 
Group 3 includes all potential participants who did not complete or refuse to complete the survey, excluding those who 
could not be contacted due to bounced email addresses. 
 
It was not possible to compare respondents and non-respondents on other 
demographic variables that could affect the response rate, such as sex, age, and the 
number of years in practice. This information was unknown to the researcher and the 
state licensure board. Having access to more demographic variables would have allowed 
for a more thorough exploration of the possibility of non-response bias. The ability to 
conduct a detailed analysis is important, given that prior research suggests that 
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responders and non-responders to physician surveys may differ in terms of key 
demographic variables, like gender, age, and number of years in practice (Cull et al., 
2005; McFarlene, Olmsted, Murphy, & Hill, 2007; Bjertnaes, Garratt, & Botten, 2008). 
Statistical Approach 
Principal components factor analysis was used to determine whether the 
attitudinal items could be combined into a series of latent variables. All latent variables 
identified were included as explanatory variables in subsequent regression analyses. 
Afterwards, a correlational analysis using Fisher’s Exact Test was conducted to 
examine whether there was an association between harm severity, apparentness, and 
disclosure. Initially, harm severity had six categories—unknown, none, mild, moderate, 
severe, and death. However, due to the paucity of values in some categories, they were 
combined into low (i.e. unknown, none, and mild), moderate, or severe (i.e. severe and 
death) harm. While apparentness was originally measured on an 11-point scale (0 = not 
readily apparent; 10 = readily apparent), it was transformed into a categorical variable, 
given the paucity of responses in the middle of the scale. It was recoded as not readily 
apparent (0 – 4), somewhat apparent (5 – 9), and readily apparent (10). Similarly, the 
likelihood of disclosure was originally measured on a 10-point scale (1 = highly unlikely; 
10 = highly likely). However, due to a paucity of responses on the lower end of the scale, 
it was transformed into both a dichotomous and ordinal variable. The dichotomous 
variable was coded a 1 for highly likely to disclose and 0 otherwise. The ordinal 
disclosure variable had three categories—unlikely (1 – 4), somewhat likely (5 – 8), and 
highly likely (9 – 10) to disclose. 
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If the Fisher’s Exact Test yielded statistically significant results, then the 
relationship between harm severity, apparentness, and disclosure was examined using 
Somers’ D. It is a non-parametric, rank statistic used to examine the association between 
an ordinal independent and dependent variable. Somers’ D lies between -1 and 1, 
inclusive. The closer it is to -1 or 1, the greater the model’s predictive ability (Wagner & 
Gillespie, 2019). Specifically, Somers’ D was used to determine whether more severe 
harm is associated with an increased likelihood of disclosure, compared to less severe 
harm. It was also used to determine whether more apparent incidents are associated with 
an increased likelihood of disclosure, compared to less apparent incidents. 
Two bivariate probit regression models were used to examine the relationship 
between harm severity, apparentness, and disclosure, controlling for physicians’ 
sociodemographic characteristics, general attitudes towards disclosure, and comfort 
engaging in disclosure. In Model I, no interaction terms were included. In Model II, an 
interaction term was included in the regression to test the hypothesis that the relationship 
between harm severity and disclosure varies depending on physicians’ perceived risk of 
being sued for malpractice—very unlikely, unlikely, likely, or very likely. Additionally, 
two ordered probit regression models were used to examine the relationship between 
harm severity, apparentness, and disclosure. Except for the coding of the dependent 
variable, these two models were identical to the two aforementioned bivariate probit 
models. After estimating each regression model, the probability of disclosure was 
estimated for the independent variables of interest—apparentness, harm severity, and the 
interaction between harm severity and malpractice risk. 
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Since physicians responded to multiple scenarios, their responses to them are apt 
to be correlated, resulting in serial correlation, sometimes referred to as auto correlation. 
In the presence of serial correlation, regression coefficients will not be biased; however, 
their standard errors will be underestimated. Since small standard errors contribute to 
inflated test statistics, the chances of obtaining statistically significant results and making 
a Type I error (i.e. rejecting the null hypothesis when it is true) increases (Studenmund, 
2006). To address the possibility of serial correlation, all regression models were 
estimated using cluster-robust standard errors grouped at the physician level. 
For all analyses, the data from the medical error and adverse event scenarios were 
analyzed separately. Physicians’ classification of each scenario as either a medical error 
or adverse event was used to subset the data for analysis. Results with a p-value less than 
0.05 were considered statistically significant. All analyses were performed using STATA 




Chapter IV: Latent Variable Analysis 
Overview of Factor Analysis 
Given the relatively small sample size (n = 292), I performed a series of factor 
analyses to reduce the number of variables included in the regression analyses. A 
principal components factor analysis (PCA) was performed using both an orthogonal (i.e. 
varimax) and oblique (i.e. promax) rotation. PCA is used to evaluate the correlation 
amongst items to determine whether they are measuring the same underlying construct. 
When a group of items is related to one another, then factor analysis identifies this 
grouping as a factor. The strength of the relationship between an item and a particular 
factor is measured using factor loading scores. A high factor loading indicates that an 
item is strongly associated with a particular factor. In contrast, a low factor loading 
indicates that the item is not strongly correlated with a particular factor. Items were 
retained and considered to be associated with a particular factor if they met one of the 
following criteria: 
1) Eigenvalue greater than 1, 
2) Had a factor loading score greater than or equal to 0.60 and did not load at 
greater than 0.40 on more than one of the factors identified, or 
3) Had a factor loading score that was at least 0.20 greater than its loading 
score on all other factors identified. 
After determining the items that would be retained on each factor, Bartlett’s 
sphericity test was used to determine whether they are indeed correlated with one 
another. If they are correlated, then they can be combined to form a single variable (Pett, 
Lackey, & Sullivan, 2003). A p-value of 0.05 was used to determine statistical 
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significance. The Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin (KMO) test for sampling adequacy was also 
conducted on all retained items to determine whether performing a factor analysis was 
appropriate, given the data (Pett et al., 2003). If the KMO statistic was ≥ 0.500, the 
analysis was considered appropriate. 
For items that were not appropriate for a factor analysis because they represented 
a cumulative hierarchy, a Mokken analysis was conducted. The goal was to determine 
whether a group of items formed a unidimensional scale composed of hierarchically 
ordered items measuring the same underlying construct. To determine scalability, 
Loevinger’s H coefficient was used. For each item, it measures its correlation with all the 
other items included in the scale. The data from the medical error and adverse event 
survey versions were analyzed separately. All analyses were performed using STATA 
Version 15 (StataCorp, 2017). 
Results 
Table 13 presents the exact question wording and factor loading scores for each of 
the latent variables identified during the factor analysis of the data from the medical error 
and adverse event surveys. The information seeking grouping consists of questions that 
capture one of the things that may prompt patients’ and/or their families to sue for 
malpractice—a lack of information about what happened to them or their loved ones 
during diagnosis and treatment. Patients and/or their families may sue for malpractice to 
find out what happened to them, especially in the absence of timely, honest disclosure 




Table 13: Factor Analyses Results, By Survey Type 
 Medical Error Adverse Event 
Question Factor 1 Factor 2 Factor 1 Factor 2 
Part A: Information Seeking (initial model 4)    
Failing to disclose (harmful medical 
errors/adverse events) to patients 
and/or their families will make them 
suspicious of a cover-up and more 
likely to sue for malpractice. 
0.8439  0.8314  
Patients harmed by (medical 
errors/adverse events) invariably want 
to know the truth, and when deprived 
of it, will consider litigation. 
0.8439  0.8314  
Bartlett’s Test of Sphericity (p-value) <0.01* <0.01* 
Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin (KMO) Test 0.5000 0.5000 
Part B: Blame Culture and Safety Culture (initial model 12) 
In my workplace, direct care 
providers (e.g. physicians, nurses) 
feel like their mistakes are held 
against them.  
0.6850  0.6433  
In my workplace, it is difficult for 
direct care providers (e.g. physicians, 
nurses) to discuss patient safety 
issues. 
0.7445  0.6945  
In my workplace, it is difficult for me 
to speak up when I perceive a 
problem with patient safety. 
0.7732  0.7524  
My supervisor/manager routinely 
overlooks patient safety problems that 
happen repeatedly. 
0.6279  0.4518  
When I have patient safety concerns, 
my colleagues encourage me to report 
them to the appropriate personnel 
(e.g. my supervisor, risk managers, 
patient safety advocates, etc.). 
 0.8088  0.7045 
In my workplace, when changes are 
made to improve patient safety, their 
effectiveness is evaluated. 
 --  0.6942 
My supervisor/manager seriously 
considers my suggestions for 
improving patient safety. 
 0.7977  0.7522 
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In my workplace, it is easy for me to 
learn from others’ mistakes. 
 0.6792  0.6437 
In my workplace, the procedures and 
systems that are in place are good at 
preventing (medical errors/adverse 
events) from happening. 
 0.8045  0.7479 
In my workplace, reporting (medical 
errors/adverse events) to the 
institution (e.g. risk managers, patient 
safety advocates, etc.) is considered 
an important component of patient 
safety. 
 0.7446  0.8445 
In my workplace, direct care 
providers (e.g. physicians, nurses) are 
regularly doing things to improve 
patient safety. 
 0.8372  0.6827 
Bartlett’s Test of Sphericity <0.01* <0.01* 
KMO Test 0.8178 0.8350 
Part C: Likelihood of Disclosing Unharmful and Harmful Medical Errors (initial 
model 6) 
How likely or unlikely would you be 
to disclose the following to one of 
your patients and/or their families, if 
it was to occur: 
    
A near miss 0.9318    
A medical error that has no potential 
to harm the patient 
0.9679    
A medical error that could potentially 
harm the patient but does not 
0.8644    
A medical error that causes mild harm  0.6462   
A medical error that causes moderate 
harm 
 0.9678   
A medical error that causes serious 
harm 
 0.9546   
 Bartlett’s Test of Sphericity <0.01*   
KMO Test 0.6727   
Part D:  Likelihood of Disclosing Adverse Events (initial model 3) 
How likely or unlikely would you be 
to disclose the following to one of 
your patients and/or their families, if 
it was to occur: 
    
An adverse event that causes mild 
harm 
  0.6715  
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An adverse event that causes 
moderate harm 
  0.9527  
An adverse event that causes serious 
harm 
  0.7638  
Bartlett’s Test of Sphericity   <0.01* 
KMO Test   0.3983 
Part E: Comfort Disclosing Unharmful and Harmful Medical Errors (initial model 10) 
How comfortable or uncomfortable 
would you feel disclosing the 
following to one of your patients 
and/or their families, if it was to 
occur: 
    
A medical error that is not readily 
apparent to the patient and: 
    
Has no potential to harm the patient 1.0472    
Could potentially harm the patient but 
does not 
0.9540    
A medical error that is readily 
apparent to the patient and: 
    
Has no potential to harm the patient 0.8026    
Could potentially harm the patient but 
does not 
0.6621    
A medical error that is not readily 
apparent to the patient and: 
    
Causes mild harm  0.6899   
Causes moderate harm  0.9472   
Causes serious harm  1.0137   
A medical error that is readily 
apparent to the patient and: 
    
Causes mild harm  0.7927   
Causes moderate harm  0.9945   
Causes serious harm  1.0142   
Bartlett’s Test of Sphericity <0.01*   
KMO Test 0.8000   
Part F: Comfort Disclosing Adverse Events (initial model 6) 
How comfortable or uncomfortable 
would you feel disclosing the 
following to one of your patients 
and/or their families, if it was to 
occur: 
    
An adverse event that is not readily 
apparent to the patient and: 
    
Causes mild harm   0.8806  
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Causes moderate harm   0.9692  
Causes serious harm   0.9110  
An adverse event that is readily 
apparent to the patient and: 
    
Causes mild harm   0.9113  
Causes moderate harm   0.9671  
Causes serious harm   0.9111  
Bartlett’s Test of Sphericity   <0.01* 
KMO Test   0.7311 
Notes:  
The factor loadings reported are from the principal components factor analysis with an oblique, promax rotation. 
* Denotes statistical significance at the 0.05 level of significance. 
 
The blame culture grouping consists of questions that capture attributes of an 
organizational blame culture. Often, in a culture of blame, the root causes of medical 
errors and preventable adverse events are not investigated, disclosed, or addressed. 
Instead, health care providers may be blamed and feel shamed for the errors that occur, 
which encourages them to hide their mistakes and not discuss and learn from them or 
those of others (Radhakrishna, 2015; Zabari & Southern, 2018). Additionally, the focus 
on finding fault with providers ignores the fact that some errors are caused by faulty 
systems and procedures. 
The safety culture grouping is comprised of questions that capture attributes of an 
organizational safety culture. According to Becker’s Hospital Review (2014), in a culture 
of safety, health care providers, and other key personnel, are actively doing things to 
prevent errors, reporting errors when they occur, and learning from their mistakes and 
those of others. Learning and continuous quality improvement are the hallmarks of an 
active safety culture. The blame culture and safety culture groupings are weakly 
correlated (𝑟 =  −0.3094). 
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The likelihood of disclosing unharmful and harmful medical errors groupings 
consist of questions that capture how likely physicians are to disclose these types of 
errors, respectively. Prior research suggests that physicians’ willingness to disclose errors 
may be influenced by the severity of harm patients sustain—with their support for 
disclosing serious errors exceeding their support for disclosing minor errors (Garbutt et 
al., 2007; White et al., 2008; Linthorst et al., 2012). Additionally, some physicians 
believe that near misses do not need to be disclosed to patients and/or their families 
(Garbutt et al., 2007; White et al., 2008; Gallagher et al., 2003). However, in reality, they 
may not act in accordance with their beliefs. When medical errors occur, they are not 
always disclosed to patients and/or their families (Kronman et al., 2011; 
Ghalandarpoorattar et al., 2012). 
Similarly, the comfort disclosing unharmful and harmful medical errors groupings 
consist of questions that capture how comfortable physicians feel disclosing these types 
of errors, respectively. Physicians may have differing levels of comfort when it comes to 
disclosing unharmful versus harmful errors. This may be due to the physician 
community’s preoccupation with and fear of being sued for malpractice as evidenced 
through their self-reported engagement in defensive medicine (Studdert et al., 2005; 
Nahed et al., 2012; Sethi et al., 2012; Ramella et al., 2015; Reisch et al., 2015). 
Physicians may feel more comfortable disclosing unharmful errors because they do not 
have to worry about saying something that could be used against them in court. If they 
happen to say something incriminating, they are unlikely to be sued for malpractice. 
Lawyers may be unwilling to try these types of cases because the monetary costs 
associated with doing so are apt to outweigh the benefits. In contrast, physicians may feel 
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more uncomfortable disclosing harmful errors because they are worried about saying 
something incriminating, which could be used against them in court. Lawyers’ 
willingness to try cases involving harmful errors should increase as the severity of the 
harm patients sustain increases, given the possibility of recovering sizeable economic and 
non-economic losses. 
The results of the factor analyses performed on the adverse event data is similar to 
those obtained using the medical error data with one notable exception. Since adverse 
events, by definition, cause harm, there is no scale for the likelihood of disclosing 
unharmful events or comfort disclosing unharmful events. 
Table 14 displays the results of the reliability analysis by survey type. For most 
groupings, Cronbach’s Alpha exceeds 0.60, indicating that they have moderate, internal 
consistency. The questions on each subscale form a cohesive grouping that is different 
from the content measured by the other subscales. 
Table 14: Reliability Analysis, By Survey Type  





Information Seeking 0.5959 0.5531 
Blame Culture 0.6749 0.5096 
Safety Culture 0.8833 0.8505 
Likelihood of Disclosing Unharmful Errors 0.9116 -- 
Likelihood of Disclosing Harmful Errors 0.8008 -- 
Likelihood of Disclosing Adverse Events -- 0.6399 
Comfort Disclosing Unharmful Errors 0.9368 -- 
Comfort Disclosing Harmful Errors 0.9762 -- 
Comfort Disclosing Adverse Events -- 0.9651 
 
Table 15 displays the results of the Mokken analyses by survey type. Since all the 
values of Loevinger’s H exceed the recommended lower bound cutoff for a 
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unidimensional scale, the items can be treated as part of a unidimensional scale. All 




Table 15: Scales for Not Readily Apparent and Readily Apparent Medical Errors 
and Adverse Events 
Item Loevinger’s Coefficient 
 Medical Error Adverse Event 
Part A: Not Readily Apparent Medical Errors  
How likely or unlikely would you be to disclose 
the following to one of your patients and/or their 
families, if it was to occur: 
  
A medical error that is not readily apparent to the 
patient and: 
  
Has no potential to harm the patient 0.6911  
Could potentially harm the patient but does not 0.7235  
Causes mild harm 0.6830  
Causes moderate harm 0.7026  
Causes serious harm 0.6230  
Part B: Readily Apparent Medical Errors  
How likely or unlikely would you be to disclose 
the following to one of your patients and/or their 
families, if it was to occur: 
  
A medical error that is readily apparent to the 
patient and: 
  
Has no potential to harm the patient 0.7566  
Could potentially harm the patient but does not 0.7860  
Causes mild harm 0.7697  
Causes moderate harm 0.6891  
Causes serious harm 0.5485  
Part C: Not Readily Apparent Adverse Events   
How likely or unlikely would you be to disclose 
the following to one of your patients and/or their 
families, if it was to occur: 
  
An adverse event that is not readily apparent to the 
patient and: 
  
Causes mild harm  0.5687 
Causes moderate harm  0.7506 
Causes serious harm  0.5675 
Part D: Readily Apparent Adverse Events   
How likely or unlikely would you be to disclose 
the following to one of your patients and/or their 
families, if it was to occur: 
  
An adverse event that is readily apparent to the 
patient and: 
  
Causes mild harm  0.5935 
Causes moderate harm  0.8035 





 Upon completion of the factor and Mokken analyses, scale scores were created 
for use in subsequent regression analyses. For each respondent, a scale score was 
calculated after missing values had been checked. Any scale with more than 50% of 
items without a response were not included in the calculations. The scale score was 
computed by taking the average of the numerical values respondents provided for the 
items included in a particular scale. All scores were considered continuous. 
Table 16 displays summary statistics for each of the scales identified during the 
analysis. For the medical error and adverse event blame culture scales, the average score 
was 3.28 and 3.31, respectively. In contrast, the average medical error and adverse event 
safety culture scores were 1.73 and 1.71, respectively. Taken together, these findings 











ME 1: Information Seeking (n = 111) 2 1.52 0.5836 1 – 4  
ME 2: Blame Culture (n = 109) 4 3.28 0.5823 1.75 – 4  
ME 3: Safety Culture (n = 134) 6 1.73 0.6622 1 – 4 
ME 4: Likelihood of Disclosing 
Unharmful Errors (n = 130) 
3 5.22 2.8111 1 – 10  
ME 5: Likelihood of Disclosing 
Harmful Errors (n = 131) 
4 9.09 1.3016 4 – 10  
ME 6: Comfort Disclosing Unharmful 
Errors (n = 129) 
4 3.29 2.3340 1 – 10  
ME 7: Comfort Disclosing Harmful 
Errors (n = 131) 
6 4.80 2.9945 1 – 10  
ME 8: Not Readily Apparent (n = 130) 5 6.92 1.9020 2 – 10  
ME 9: Readily Apparent (n = 130) 5 8.69 1.5460 3.6 – 10  
AE 1: Information Seeking (n = 108) 2 1.43 0.5227 1 – 3.5 
AE 2: Blame Culture (n = 111) 4 3.31 0.5156 1.25 – 4  
AE 3: Safety Culture (n = 134) 6 1.71 0.6040 1 – 4  
AE 4: Likelihood of Disclosing (n = 
133) 
3 9.01 1.1828 5 – 10  
AE 5: Comfort Disclosing (n = 126)  6 4.28 2.7675 1 –10 
AE 6: Not Readily Apparent (n = 130) 3 8.74 1.4309 4 – 10 
AE 7: Readily Apparent (n = 130) 3 9.38 1.0198 5 – 10  
Notes: 
The information seeking, blame culture, and safety culture scales are composed of strongly agree and strongly disagree questions 
(1 = strongly agree, 4 = strongly disagree). 
All the questions on the likelihood scales measure the likelihood of disclosure using a 10-point scale (1 = unlikely, 10 = likely). 
All the questions on the comfort scales measure comfort using a 10-point scale (1 = comfortable, 10 = uncomfortable). 
All the questions on the not readily apparent and readily apparent scales measure the likelihood of disclosure on a 10-point scale 
(1 = unlikely, 10 = likely). 
 
For the likelihood of disclosing unharmful and harmful errors scales, the average 
score was 5.22 and 9.09, respectively. This suggests that respondents are more likely to 
disclose harmful errors than they are to disclose unharmful errors. For the comfort 
disclosing unharmful and harmful errors scales, the average score was 3.29 and 4.80, 
respectively. Overall, this indicates that respondents are fairly comfortable disclosing 
errors, regardless of harm severity. Similarly, respondents reported a high likelihood of 
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disclosing adverse events to patients and/or their families. They are also fairly 
comfortable doing so. 
The average scores for the not readily apparent and readily apparent medical error 
scales were 6.92 and 8.69, respectively. This suggests that respondents are more likely to 
disclose medical errors that are readily apparent to patients and/or their families than they 
are to disclose errors that are not readily apparent to them. Likewise, respondents are a bit 
more likely to disclose readily apparent adverse events compared to ones that are not 
readily apparent. 
Combining Scale Scores 
After scale scores were computed for each observation, Pearson’s Correlation 
Coefficient was used to determine whether there was a bivariate relationship between 
them. Overall, there was a moderate, positive relationship between respondents’ 
likelihood of disclosing not readily apparent and readily apparent medical errors (r = 
0.62; p-value<0.05). Similarly, there was a strong, positive relationship between 
respondents’ likelihood of disclosing not readily apparent errors and their likelihood of 
disclosing unharmful (r = 0.68; p-value<0.05) and harmful (r = 0.73; p-value<0.05) 
errors. A moderate, positive relationship was found between respondents’ comfort 
disclosing unharmful and harmful errors (r = 0.61; p-value<0.05). 
There was a strong, positive relationship between respondents’ likelihood of 
disclosing harmful adverse events and their likelihood of disclosing not readily apparent 
(r = 0.88; p-value<0.05) and readily apparent (r = 0.78; p-value<0.5) adverse events. 
There was also a strong, positive relationship between respondents’ likelihood of 
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disclosing not readily apparent and readily apparent adverse events (r = 0.79; p-
value<0.05). 
Given the correlation between scale scores, it was likely that multi-collinearity 
could be a problem in subsequent analyses. To avoid the problems associated with multi-
collinearity, such as inflated standard errors (Studenmund, 2006), I used principal 
components factor analysis to determine whether respondents’ scale scores could be 
further combined. I analyzed the results of the medical error and adverse event surveys 
separately. The results are presented in Table 17. They indicate that respondents’ blame 
culture and safety culture scale scores form a bi-polar continuum and can be combined 
(Factor 1), but only for those who received the medical error survey. The likelihood of 
disclosing unharmful errors, harmful errors, not readily apparent errors, and readily 
apparent errors scale scores can be combined to produce a single likelihood of disclosure 
score (Factor 2). This score would indicate respondents’ general inclination towards 
disclosing medical errors. The comfort disclosing harmful and unharmful errors scale 
scores can also be combined to produce a single comfort score (Factor 3). This score 
would indicate respondents’ general comfort with disclosing medical errors to patients 
and/or their families. Thus, the 9 initial medical error scales have been combined into 4 
medical error scales—Information Seeking, Organization Culture, Likelihood of 




Table 17: Factor Analysis Results for Medical Error and Adverse Event Scale Scores 
Scale Factor 1 Factor 2 Factor 3 
Medical Error Scales    
ME 2: Blame Culture 0.7664   
ME 3: Safety Culture -0.8441   
ME 4: Likelihood of Disclosing Unharmful Errors  0.6762  
ME 5: Likelihood of Disclosing Harmful Errors  0.8732  
ME 8: Likelihood of Disclosing Not Readily Apparent Errors  0.9018  
ME 9: Likelihood of Disclosing Readily Apparent Errors   0.8444  
ME 6: Comfort Disclosing Unharmful Errors   0.9253 
ME 7: Comfort Disclosing Harmful Errors   0.9043 
Adverse Event Scales    
AE 4: Likelihood of Disclosing 0.9477   
AE 6: Likelihood of Disclosing Not Readily Apparent  0.9523   
AE 7: Likelihood of Disclosing Readily Apparent 0.9096   
Notes: 
The factor loadings reported are from a principal components factor analysis with a varimax rotation. 
 
With the adverse event surveys, respondents’ likelihood of disclosing, likelihood 
of disclosing not readily apparent, and likelihood of disclosing readily apparent adverse 
events scale scores can be combined to produce a single disclosure score (Factor 1). It 
would indicate respondents’ general propensity towards the disclosure of adverse events. 
Thus, the 7 initial adverse event scales have been reduced to 5—Information Seeking, 
Blame Culture, Safety Culture, Likelihood of Disclosing, and Comfort with Disclosing—
for use in subsequent analysis. 
Composite scale scores were computed by taking the average of the numerical 
values respondents provided for the items included in that particular scale. Any scale with 
more than 50% of items without a response was not included in the calculations. All 












ME: Organizational Culture (n = 107) 10 -0.78 0.4964 -1.5 – 0.38 
ME: Likelihood of Disclosing (n = 129) 17 7.47 1.5570 2.85 – 10 
ME: Comfort with Disclosing (n = 129) 10 4.06 2.3983 1 – 10 
AE: Likelihood of Disclosing (n = 130) 9 9.04 1.1389 5.11 – 10  
Notes: 
The organizational culture scale is composed of strongly agree and strongly disagree questions (1 = strongly agree, 4 = strongly 
disagree). 
All the questions on the likelihood of disclosure scales measure the likelihood of disclosure using a 10-point scale (1 = unlikely, 
10 = likely). 
All the questions on the comfort scale measure comfort using a 10-point scale (1 = comfortable, 10 = uncomfortable). 
 
For the medical error organizational culture scale, the average score was -0.78 
(±0.50). The average score for the likelihood of disclosing and comfort with disclosing 
medical errors scales was 7.47 (±1.56) and 4.06 (±2.40), respectively. This suggests that 
while respondents are inclined to disclose medical errors to patients and/or their families, 
they are only somewhat comfortable doing so. For the likelihood of disclosing adverse 
events scale, the average score was 9.04 (±1.14), which suggests that physicians are 
inclined to disclose adverse events to patients and/or their families.  
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Chapter V: Relationship Between Harm Severity, Apparentness, and Disclosure 
Descriptive Statistics 
Table 19 summarizes the sociodemographic characteristics of physicians who 
returned the surveys. Most respondents were non-Hispanic (97.3%) Caucasian (88.6%) 
and male (69.2%). The average age of physicians is 52.4 years of age (± 10.6 years). On 
average, they have been practicing medicine for 21.6 years (± 11.2 years). Of particular 
relevance for this study is physicians experience with malpractice. Most respondents have 
never provided testimony as part of a malpractice lawsuit (59.1%), been named as a 
malpractice defendant (71.8%) or been sued by their patients (73.7%). These findings are 
consistent with the results of a study conducted by Jena et al. (2011) that estimates that 
36% and 88% of physicians practicing in low-risk and high-risk specialties will face their 
first malpractice claim by the time they are 45 years old, respectively. Additionally, they 
estimate that 75% of physicians practicing in low-risk specialties and 99% of those 
practicing in high-risk specialties will have at least one malpractice claim filed against 
them by the time they are 65 years old. Overall, there were not any statistically 
significant differences in the characteristics of those who received the medical error and 




Table 19: Sample Demographics 





Sex     
Male 0.69 0.74 0.64 
0.075 
Female 0.31 0.26 0.36 
Hispanic     
Yes 0.03 0.02 0.04 
0.234 
No 0.97 0.98 0.96 
Race     
Caucasian 0.89 0.89 0.89 0.968 
African American 0.03 0.02 0.03 0.648 
American Indian/Alaskan Native -- -- -- -- 
Asian/Pacific Islander 0.06 0.08 0.05 0.358 
Other 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.937 
Age 
34 or younger 
 
0.04 0.03 0.06 
 
0.501 
35-44 0.23 0.19 0.27 
45-54 0.23 0.25 0.21 
55-64 0.40 0.42 0.37 
65 or older 0.10 0.11 0.09 
Practice area     
General practice# 0.34 0.31 0.37 
0.289 
Specialty practice^ 0.66 0.69 0.63 







Provided testimony in a lawsuit     
Yes 0.41 0.44 0.38 
0.315 
No 0.59 0.56 0.62 
Named as malpractice defendant     
Yes 0.28 0.31 0.25 
0.294 
No 0.72 0.69 0.75 
Number of lawsuits     
Zero 0.74 0.72 0.76 
0.388 One 0.17 0.16 0.17 
Two or more 0.10 0.12 0.07 
Notes:  
For nominal and ordinal variables, proportions are reported. 
For continuous variables, the mean is reported with the standard deviation in parentheses.  
# General practice includes hospitalists and practitioners of primary care, emergency, family or internal medicine 
^ Specialty practice includes anesthesiology, cardiology, colon rectal surgery, critical care, dermatology, endocrinology, 
gastroenterology, general surgery, geriatrics, hematology, infectious disease, neonatology, nephrology, neurology, 
neurosurgery, obstetrics and gynecology, occupational medicine, oncology, ophthalmology, orthopedics, orthopedic 
surgery, otolaryngology, pain management, pathology, pediatrics, phlebology, physical medicine and rehabilitation, 
plastic surgery, psychiatry, radiology, sleep medicine, sports medicine, trauma care, urology, and urological surgery 
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The distribution of sex, race, and age in the sample was compared to the distribution of sex, race, and age of the 
population of Minnesota physicians for the year 2017, the year the data was collected. No statistically significant 
differences were found between the attributes of the sample and the population. 
 
In the analysis, scenarios were pooled according to respondents’ rating of the 
harm and apparentness of each of the scenarios they received. Table 20 summarizes how 
physicians classified each scenario, the level of harm patients sustained, how apparent 
what happened would be to patients and/or their families, and their likelihood of 
disclosure. 
Overall, across scenarios, there is quite a bit of variability in physicians’ 
perceptions of the severity of the harm patients sustained. For the childhood vaccination 
scenario, all physicians stated that the patient sustained little harm. In 3 and 7 of the 17 
scenarios, the majority of physicians stated that the patient sustained either low or 
moderate harm, respectively. In the remaining scenarios, the majority of physicians stated 
that the patient sustained severe harm. 
Across scenarios, there is quite a bit of variability in physicians’ perceptions of 
how readily apparent what happened would be to patients and/or their families. The 
childhood vaccination scenario was considered the least apparent with an average 
apparentness score of 2.47 (±3.05). Physicians considered the prostate cancer and IV 
mix-up scenarios somewhat apparent to patients and/or their families with average 
apparentness scores of 5.44 (±3.97) and 5.63 (±4.58), respectively. In contrast, the knee 
replacement and foot amputation scenarios were considered the most readily apparent 
with average apparentness scores of 9.22 (±2.00) and 9.85(±0.70), respectively. 
Physicians reported a high likelihood of disclosing what happened to patients 
and/or their families, regardless of the scenario presented. The childhood vaccination 
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scenario had the smallest, average likelihood of disclosure at 8.59 (±2.20). In contrast, the 
foot amputation scenarios had the largest, average likelihood of disclosure at 9.91 
(±0.38), respectively. Overall, there is little variability in the likelihood of disclosure, 
suggesting that physicians are apt to engage in disclosure. 
Table 20: Descriptive Statistics, by Scenario 
 Event Type Harm Severity    
 ME AE Other Low Moderate Severe Apparentness 
Disclosure 
Likelihood 


























































































For event type and harm severity, proportions are reported.  
For apparentness and disclosure, the mean is reported with the standard deviation in parenthesis. 
 
The Relationship Between Harm Severity, Apparentness, and Disclosure 
Table 21 summarizes the association between harm severity and disclosure 
separately for medical errors and adverse events. When medical errors occur, most 
physicians reported that they are likely to disclose them to patients and/or their families. 
Approximately 19% of the variation in physicians’ likelihood of disclosing medical 
errors can be explained by the variation in harm severity (Somers’ D = 0.1851; p-value < 
0.05). Alternatively, for adverse events, there is not a statistically significant relationship 
between harm severity and disclosure (Somers’ D = 0.0673; p-value = 0.372). 
Table 21: The Association Between Harm Severity and Disclosure 
  Likelihood of Disclosure   
  Unlikely 
Somewhat 

















































Row percentages shown in parenthesis 





Turning to apparentness, Table 22 summarizes the association between 
apparentness and disclosure separately for medical errors and adverse events. For medical 
errors, 42.48% of the variation in willingness to disclose is associated with how apparent 
the error is to patients and/or their families (Somers’ D = 0.4248; p-value < 0.001). 
However, for adverse events, the effect of apparentness is stronger. Specifically, 52.15% 
of the variation in physicians’ likelihood of disclosing adverse events can be explained by 
the variation in how readily apparent the events are to patients and/or their families 
(Somers’ D = 0.5215; p-value < 0.001). 
Table 22: The Association Between Apparentness and Disclosure 
  Likelihood of Disclosure   
  Unlikely 
Somewhat 
Likely Likely P-value 
Medical Errors 




















































Row percentages shown in parenthesis 
* denotes p-value < 0.05   
      
Table 23 displays the coefficients from the probit and ordered probit regression 
analyses of the medical error data only. Tables 24 and 25 display the predicted 
probabilities of disclosing not readily apparent, somewhat apparent, and readily apparent 
medical errors that were estimated using the probit and ordered probit models, 
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respectively. Based on probit Models I and II, there is a statistically significant 
relationship between apparentness and physicians’ likelihood of engaging in disclosure. 
The probability of being highly likely to disclose is 0.7191 (p-value < 0.001) and 0.7182 
(p-value < 0.001) for somewhat apparent medical errors, respectively. In contrast, the 
probability of being highly likely to disclose is 0.9512 (p-value < 0.001) and 0.9477 (p-
value < 0.001) for medical errors that are readily apparent to patients and/or their 
families, respectively. Across both probit model specifications, the predict probabilities 
are quite similar. 
Based on both ordered probit models, there is also a statistically significant 
relationship between apparentness and disclosure. Based on model I, the probability of 
being unlikely to disclose what happened is 0.0739 (p-value = 0.012) and 0.0527 (p-value 
= 0.045) for not readily apparent and somewhat readily apparent errors, respectively. For 
readily apparent errors, the probability is 0.0042; however, it is not statistically 
significant. The probability of being somewhat likely to disclose is 0.2643 (p-value < 
0.001) and 0.2247 (p-value < 0.001) for not readily apparent and somewhat readily 
apparent errors, respectively. For readily apparent errors, the probability is 0.0487 (p-
value = 0.009). The probability of being highly likely to disclose what happened is 
0.6618, 0.7226, and 0.9471 for not readily apparent, somewhat readily apparent, and 
readily apparent errors, respectively (p-values < 0.001). The results of Model II are 




Table 23: Predictors of the Likelihood of Disclosing Medical Errors 
  Probit Ordered Probit 
  Model I Model II Model I Model II 
  Coef. P-value Coef. P-value Coef. P-value Coef. P-value 
Harm Severity#         








 (0.3470) (0.7502) (0.2875) (0.5230) 








 (0.3902) (0.3471) (0.4338) (0.5844) 
Apparentness^         
Somewhat 
Apparent 0.2131 0.466 0.3675 0.230 0.2230 0.417 0.3972 0.191 
 (0.2926) (0.3059) (0.2747) (0.3038) 
Readily 
Apparent 1.5314 <0.001* 1.7294 <0.001* 1.5436 <0.001* 1.7793 <0.001* 
 (0.3268) (0.3675) (0.3101) (0.3708) 
Harm Severity x 
Malpractice Risk  
 
      
Moderate Harm 
x Unlikely   -0.1900 0.842   -0.4816 0.517 
   (0.9546)   (0.7431) 
Moderate Harm 
x Likely  
 
0.7831 0.448   -6.6335 <0.001* 
  
 
(1.0310)   (1.0662) 
Moderate Harm 
x Very Likely  
 
--   6.1927 
<0.001* 
       (0.8467)  
Severe Harm x 
Unlikely  
 
-2.4234 <0.001*   -7.7372 <0.001* 
  
 
(0.6562)   (0.7547) 





  -11.8784 <0.001* 
  
 
  (0.9273) 
Severe Harm x 




  -4.9088 
 
<0.001* 
     (0.6935)  
Malpractice 
Risk+         


























 (0.3712) (0.4616) (0.3401) (0.4412) 












 (0.2429) (0.2495) (0.2086) (0.2176) 
Organizational 
Culture -0.6379 0.102 -0.7244 0.084 -0.5958 0.095 -0.7630 0.052 
 (0.3899) (0.4189) (0.3572) (0.3934) 
Likelihood of 
Disclosure -0.0016 0.988 0.0155 0.885 0.0685 0.495 0.0900 0.391 
 (0.1018) (0.1068) (0.1005) (0.1050) 
 Comfort with 
Disclosure -0.1540 0.037* -0.2222 0.005* -0.1668 0.028* -0.2378 0.003* 
 (0.0740) (0.0786) (0.0760) (0.0791) 
Physician 
Attributes         
Age^^         








 (0.5700) (0.6221) (0.5276) (0.5941) 








 (0.8094) (0.8679) (0.7561) (0.8510) 








 (0.8389) (0.8951) (0.7983) (0.8873) 









 (0.3612) (0.3817) (0.3234) (0.3525) 









 (0.4454) (0.4739) (0.4360) (0.4866) 







   (0.8640) (0.9781) 









 (0.3473) (0.3409) (0.3499) (0.3503) 
Years in 
Practice++         








 (0.6743) (0.6492) (0.5518) (0.5880) 








 (0.8334) (0.8840) (0.7726) (0.8588) 








 (1.0215) (1.0756) (0.9856) (1.0979) 








 (1.0278) (1.0714) (0.9687) (1.0523) 








 (1.1810) (1.2443) (1.1454) (1.2189) 
Ever Sued for 











 (0.4131) (0.4314) (0.4033) (0.4296) 
Pseudo R2 0.2975 0.3441 0.2838 0.3526 
Number of 
observations 190 181 192 192 
Notes:  
Standard errors have been adjusted for clustering at the physician level and are shown in parentheses. 
* p-value < 0.05 
# The reference group is low harm. 
^ The reference group is not readily apparent. 
+ The reference group is very unlikely. 
^^ The reference group is 30 – 39 years of age. 
## The reference group is non-white. 
++ The reference group is 1 – 5 years in practice. 
Generalist practice areas: Emergency Medicine, Family Medicine, and Internal Medicine 
Specialist practice areas: Allergy and Immunology, Anesthesiology, Dermatology, Medical Genetics and Genomics, Neurological Surgery, Neuromusculoskeletal 
Medicine, Nuclear Medicine, Obstetrics and Gynecology, Ophthalmology, Ophthalmology and Otolaryngology, Orthopedic Surgery, Otolaryngology, Pathology, 




Table 24: The Predicted Probability of Disclosing Not Readily 
Apparent, Somewhat Apparent, and Readily Apparent Medical 
Errors (Probit Models Only) 
 Model I Model II 
  
Highly Likely to 
Disclose 
Highly Likely to 
Disclose 
 Pr(Y) P-value Pr(Y) P-value 
















Standard errors in parentheses. 





Table 25: The Predicted Probability of Disclosing Not Readily Apparent, 
Somewhat Apparent, and Readily Apparent Medical Errors (Ordered Probit 
Models Only) 
 Model I 
 
Not Likely to 
Disclose 
Somewhat Likely to 
Disclose Likely to Disclose 



























(0.0036) (0.0188) (0.0213) 
 Model II 
 
Not Likely to 
Disclose 
Somewhat Likely to 
Disclose Likely to Disclose 



























(0.0034) (0.0194) (0.0217) 
Notes: 
Standard errors in parentheses. 
*p-value < 0.05 
 
Table 26 and 27 display the predicted probability of disclosing medical errors by 
harm severity and malpractice risk for the probit and ordered probit models, respectively. 
Based on probit Model I, there is a statistically significant relationship between harm 
severity and disclosure. The probability of being highly likely to disclose medical errors 
that cause low or moderate harm is 0.8102 and 0.8316, (p-values <0.001) respectively. 
For severe harm, the probability is 0.7986 (p-value < 0.001). Similarly, there is a 
statistically significant relationship between malpractice risk and disclosure. For medical 
errors that are unlikely or very unlikely to result in a malpractice lawsuit if disclosed, the 
probability that physicians will be highly likely to disclose it is 0.7639 and 0.8386 (p-
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values < 0.001), respectively. For errors that are likely or very likely to result in a 
malpractice lawsuit, the probabilities are is 0.7619 and 0.8410 (p-values < 0.001), 
respectively. 
When an interaction term for harm severity and malpractice risk is added to probit 
Model I, the results are statistically significant, indicating that physicians’ willingness to 
disclose medical errors varies based on the severity of the harm patients sustain and their 
perceived likelihood that what happened will result in a malpractice lawsuit. When 
patients sustain little to no harm and physicians believe that a lawsuit is very unlikely or 
unlikely, the probability that they will be highly likely to disclose it is 0.6984 and 0.8837 
(p-values < 0.001), respectively. When the risk of a lawsuit is highly likely, the 
probability decreases to 0.6315 (p-value < 0.001). If patients sustain severe harm and 
physicians perceive their malpractice risk as unlikely or very likely, the probability that 
they will be highly likely to disclose what happened is 0.5783 and 0.8396 (p-values < 
0.001), respectively. 
The results of ordered probit Model I suggests that regardless of harm severity the 
probability that physicians will be highly likely to disclose is greater than or equal to 
0.8000. Similarly, the probability that physicians will be highly likely to disclose is quite 
high, regardless of their perceived malpractice risk. Conversely, they are less likely to 
report that they would be unlikely or somewhat likely to disclose what happened. 
When interaction terms for the relationship between harm severity and 
malpractice risk are added to the ordered probit model, their estimated probabilities are 
statistically significant. Physicians’ willingness to disclose harmful errors varies 
depending on their perceived malpractice risk. For instance, when patients sustain severe 
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harm and a malpractice lawsuit is highly unlikely or unlikely the probability of disclosure 
is 0.9999 and 0.5232 (p-values < 0.001), respectively. When a malpractice lawsuit is 
likely or highly likely, the probability of being highly likely to disclose is 0.7303 and 
0.8337 (p-values < 0.001), respectively. Overall, following medical errors that cause low, 
moderate, or severe harm, physicians are highly likely to disclose what happened, 
regardless of their perceived malpractice risk. 
Table 26: The Predicted Probability of Disclosing Medical Errors, By 
Harm Severity and Malpractice Risk (Probit Models Only) 
 Model I Model II 
 Pr(Y) P-value Pr(Y) P-value 
Harm Severity     
Low Harm 0.8102 
<0.001*   
 (0.0500)   
Moderate Harm 0.8316 
<0.001*   
 (0.0521)   
Severe Harm 0.7986 
<0.001*   
 (0.0484)   
Malpractice Risk     
Very Unlikely 0.7639 
<0.001*   
 (0.0595)   
Unlikely 0.8386 
<0.001*   
 (0.0550)   
Likely 0.7619 
<0.001*   
 (0.0769)   
Very Likely 0.8410 
<0.001*   
 (0.0533)   
Harm Severity & 
Malpractice Risk     
Low Harm     
Very Unlikely   0.6984 <0.001* 
   (0.0307) 
Unlikely   0.8837 <0.001* 
   (0.0556) 
Likely   not estimable 
   
Very Likely   0.6315 <0.001* 
   (0.0771) 
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Moderate Harm     
Very Unlikely   0.7145 <0.001* 
   (0.0801) 
Unlikely   0.8661 <0.001* 
   (0.0483) 
Likely   0.7510 <0.001* 
   (0.0733) 
Very Likely   not estimable 
   
Severe Harm     
Very Unlikely   not estimable 
   
Unlikely   0.5783 <0.001* 
   (0.1317) 
Likely   0.7717 <0.001* 
   (0.0659) 
Very Likely   0.8396 <0.001* 
   (0.0344) 
Notes: 




Table 27: The Predicted Probability of Disclosing Medical Errors, By Harm Severity 
and Malpractice Risk (Ordered Probit Models Only) 
 Model I 
 
Not Likely to 
Disclose 
Somewhat Likely to 
Disclose 
Highly Likely to 
Disclose 
 Pr(Y) P-value Pr(Y) P-value Pr(Y) P-value 
Harm Severity       
Low Harm 0.0382 0.057 0.1607 <0.001* 0.8011 <0.001* 
 (0.0201)  (0.0382)  (0.0503)  
Moderate Harm 0.0252 0.091 0.1273 <0.001* 0.8476 <0.001* 
 (0.0149)  (0.0349)  (0.0445)  
Severe Harm 0.0393 0.045* 0.1631 <0.001* 0.7976 <0.001* 
 (0.0196)  (0.0419)  (0.0535)  
Malpractice Risk       
Very Unlikely 0.0498 0.038* 0.1864 <0.001* 0.7638 <0.001* 
 (0.0240)  (0.0444)  (0.0579)  
Unlikely 0.0262 0.081 0.1308 0.003* 0.8430 <0.001* 
 (0.0150)  (0.0438)  (0.0536)  
Likely 0.0531 0.135 0.1926 <0.001* 0.7544 <0.001* 
 (0.0355)  (0.0501)  (0.0774)  
Very Likely 0.0270 0.090 0.1332 0.001* 0.8398 <0.001* 
 (0.0159)  (0.0411)  (0.0514)  
 Model II 
 
Not Likely to 
Disclose 
Somewhat Likely to 
Disclose 
Highly Likely to 
Disclose 
 Pr(Y) P-value Pr(Y) P-value Pr(Y) P-value 
Harm Severity & 
Malpractice Risk 
Low Harm       
Very Unlikely 0.0546 0.022* 0.2146 <0.001* 0.7308 <0.001* 
(0.0239)  (0.0400)  (0.0522)  
Unlikely 0.0140 0.182 0.1000 0.008* 0.8860 <0.001* 
(0.0105)  (0.0377)  (0.0457)  
Likely 1.03e-9 0.773 1.25e-6 0.676 1.00e0 <0.001* 
(3.57e-9)  (2.99e-6)  (3.00e-6)  
Very Likely 0.0946 0.022* 0.2712 <0.001* 0.6342 <0.001* 
(0.0414)  (0.0506)  (0.0756)  
Moderate Harm       
Very Unlikely 0.0275 0.193 0.1499 0.013* 0.8227 <0.001* 
(0.0211)  (0.0603)  (0.0777)  
Unlikely 0.0139 0.080 0.0994 0.002* 0.8867 <0.001* 
(0.0079)  (0.0320)  (0.0367)  
Likely 0.0683 0.181 0.2377 <0.001* 0.6939 <0.001* 
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(0.0511)  (0.0642)  (0.1076)  
Very Likely 2.37e-10 0.787 4.19e-7 0.700 1.0000 <0.001* 
(8.78e-10)  (1.09e-6)  (1.09e-6)  
Severe Harm       
Very Unlikely 1.49e-9 0.826 1.65e-6 0.766 1.0000 <0.001* 
(6.87e-9)  (5.53e-6)  (0.0000)  
Unlikely 0.1581 0.079 0.3187 <0.001* 0.5232 <0.001* 
(0.0899)  (0.0614)  (0.1306)  
Likely 0.0548 0.139 0.2149 0.001* 0.7303 <0.001* 
(0.0370)  (0.0653)  (0.9546)  
Very Likely 0.0248 0.015* 0.1415 <0.001* 0.8337 <0.001* 





Table 28 displays the coefficients from the probit and ordered probit regression 
analyses performed on the adverse event data only. Tables 29 and 30 display the 
predicted probabilities for apparentness for each outcome category estimated using the 
probit and ordered probit regression models, respectively. Across all model 
specifications, the probability that physicians will be highly likely to disclose readily 




Table 28: Predictors of the Likelihood of Disclosing Adverse Events 
  Probit Ordered Probit 
  Model I Model II Model I Model II 
  Coef. P-value Coef. P-value Coef. P-value Coef. P-value 
Harm Severity#         








 (0.3226) (0.5024) (0.2847) (0.4760) 








 (0.3754) (0.5388) (0.3398) (0.4723) 






















(0.4021) (0.3998) (0.3283) (0.3533) 
Harm Severity & 
Malpractice Risk  
 


























x Very Likely 
  -1.2821 
0.420 
  -6.3903 
<0.001* 
  (1.5900)   (1.1494) 

















--     














Risk+         


























 (0.2970) (0.6144) (0.2628) (0.4884) 











(0.2920) (0.2891) (0.2377) (0.2399) 








 (0.2030) (0.2070) (0.1957) (0.1976) 
Blame Culture 0.3048 0.258 0.3935 0.165 0.2914 0.252 0.3437 0.189 
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(0.0538) (0.0556) (0.0512) (0.0534) 
Physician 
Attributes         
Age^^         








 (0.6623) (0.6351) (0.6340) (0.6024) 








 (0.8673) (0.8069) (0.7750) (0.7152) 








 (0.9192) (0.8792) (0.8059) (0.7585) 









 (0.3413) (0.3586) (0.3100) (0.3378) 









 (0.3541) (0.3451) (0.3338) (0.3170) 
Hispanic         




     (0.7375) (0.7457) 









 (0.3535) (0.3699) (0.3140) (0.3247) 
Years in 
Practice++         








 (0.6712) (0.6480) (0.6286) (0.6315) 








 (0.7015) (0.6935) (0.6661) (0.6573) 








 (0.9129) (0.8789) (0.8158) (0.7770) 








 (0.9600) (0.9062) (0.8401) (0.7962) 








 (0.8744) (0.8475) (0.8153) (0.7983) 
Ever Sued for 









 (0.3820) (0.3940) (0.3765) (0.4072) 




observations 221 208 226 226 
Notes:  
Standard errors have been adjusted for clustering at the physician level and are shown in parentheses. 
* p-value < 0.05 
# The reference group is low harm. 
^ The reference group is not readily apparent. 
+ The reference group is very unlikely. 
^^ The reference group is 30 – 39 years of age. 
## The reference group is non-white. 
++ The reference group is 1 – 5 years in practice. 
Generalist practice areas: Emergency Medicine, Family Medicine, and Internal Medicine 
Specialist practice areas: Allergy and Immunology, Anesthesiology, Dermatology, Medical Genetics and Genomics, Neurological Surgery, Neuromusculoskeletal 
Medicine, Nuclear Medicine, Obstetrics and Gynecology, Ophthalmology, Ophthalmology and Otolaryngology, Orthopedic Surgery, Otolaryngology, Pathology, 
Pediatrics, Physical Medicine and Rehabilitation, Plastic Surgery, Preventative Medicine, Psychiatry and Neurology, Radiology, Surgery, Thoracic Surgery, and 
Urology 
 
Table 29: The Predicted Probability of Disclosing Adverse 
Events (Probit Models Only) 
 Model I Model II 
  
Highly Likely to 
Disclose 
Highly Likely to 
Disclose 
 Pr(Y) P-value Pr(Y) P-value 






















Standard errors in parentheses. 





Table 30: The Predicted Probability of Disclosing Adverse Events (Ordered Probit 
Models Only) 
  Model I 
  
Not Likely to 
Disclose 
Somewhat Likely 
to Disclose Likely to Disclose 
 Pr(Y) P-value Pr(Y) P-value Pr(Y) P-value 


















(0.0177) (0.0421) (0.0435) 






(0.0028) (0.0175) (0.0193) 
 Model II 
 
Not Likely to 
Disclose 
Somewhat Likely 
to Disclose Likely to Disclose 
 Pr(Y) P-value Pr(Y) P-value Pr(Y) P-value 


















(0.0187) (0.0387) (0.0402) 






(0.0026) (0.0169) (0.0186) 
Notes: 
Standard errors in parentheses. 
*p-value < 0.05 
 
As with the disclosure of medical errors, physicians’ probability of disclosing 
harmful adverse events varies, depending on their perceived likelihood of being sued for 
malpractice following disclosure (see Tables 31 and 32). The estimated probabilities for 
these interaction effects are not very similar across models for low or moderate harm 
events. For instance, based on probit Model II, the probability of physicians being highly 
likely to disclose adverse events that cause patients low harm is 0.8530 and 0.7791 if they 
perceive their malpractice risk as very unlikely or unlikely, respectively (p-values < 
0.001). Based on ordered probit Model II, these probabilities are less than 0.0001. 
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However, the result is not statistically significant for low harm events that physicians 
believe are not very likely to result in a lawsuit. 
In contrast, the probabilities for the interaction effects are similar across models 
for adverse events that cause severe harm. For example, based on probit Model II, 
following adverse events that cause patients severe harm, the probability that physicians 
will be highly likely to disclose is 0.8735 and 0.5786, given a perceived malpractice risk 
of likely and very likely, respectively (p-values < 0.001). Based on the ordered probit 




Table 31: The Predicted Probability of Disclosing Adverse Events, 
By Harm Severity and Malpractice Risk (Probit Models Only) 
  Model I Model II 
  
Highly Likely to 
Disclose 
Highly Likely to 
Disclose 
  Pr(Y) P-value Pr(Y) P-value 
Harm Severity     
Low Harm 0.8173 
<0.001*   
 (0.0476)   
Moderate Harm 0.6990 
<0.001*   
 (0.0420)   
Severe Harm 0.8156 
<0.001*   
 (0.0345)   
Malpractice Risk     
Very Unlikely 0.8191 
<0.001*   
 (0.0430)   
Unlikely 0.7671 
<0.001*   
 (0.0316)   
Likely 0.8236 
<0.001*   
 (0.0617)   
Very Likely 0.4433 
0.006*   
 (0.1607)   
Harm Severity & 
Malpractice Risk     
Low Harm     
Very Unlikely   0.8530 <0.001* 
   (0.0310) 
Unlikely   0.7791 <0.001* 
   (0.0930) 
Likely   not estimable 
     
Very Likely   not estimable 
     
Moderate Harm     
Very Unlikely   0.6976 <0.001* 
   (0.0529) 
Unlikely   0.7528 <0.001* 
   (0.0464) 
Likely   0.5143 0.001* 
   (0.1501) 
Very Likely   0.1517 0.146 
   (0.1044) 
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Severe Harm     
Very Unlikely   not estimable 
     
Unlikely   0.7497 <0.001* 
   (0.0424) 
Likely   0.8735 <0.001* 
   (0.0498) 
Very Likely   0.5786 <0.001* 
    (0.1395) 
Notes: 
Standard errors are shown in parentheses. 





Table 32: The Predicted Probability of Disclosing Adverse Events, By Harm Severity and Malpractice Risk (Ordered Probit Models Only) 
  Model I Model II 
  




Highly Likely to 
Disclose 




Highly Likely to 
Disclose 
  Pr(Y) P-value Pr(Y) P-value Pr(Y) P-value Pr(Y) P-value Pr(Y) P-value Pr(Y) P-value 
Harm Severity             





<0.001*       
 (0.0143) (0.0358) (0.0449)       





<0.001*       
 (0.0235) (0.0356) (0.0444)       





<0.001*       
 (0.0096) (0.0315) (0.0353)       
Malpractice Risk             





<0.001*       






<0.001*       






<0.001*       
 (0.0190) (0.0523) (0.0671)       





<0.001*       
 (0.0784) (0.0775) (0.1431)       
Harm Severity & 
Malpractice Risk             
Low Harm             





       (0.0125) (0.0325) (1.63e
-9) 





       (0.0193) (0.0185) (0.0181) 
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Likely       




       (0.1775) (0.0068) 







       (8.78e
-9) (0.2312) (0.0518) 
Moderate Harm             





       (0.0399) (0.0599) (1.91e
-6) 





       (0.0566) (0.0344) (0.0358) 
Likely       




       (0.0515) (0.0367) 







       (7.54e
-6) (0.0782) (0.1057) 
Severe Harm             





       (0.0498) (0.0845) (1.92e
-6) 





       (0.0716) (0.0439) (0.0447) 
Likely       




       (0.1888) (0.0415) 







              (7.55e-6) (0.1687) (0.1532) 
Notes: 
Standard errors in parentheses. 





Chapter VI: Discussion 
The purpose of this dissertation is to explore the relationship between harm 
severity, apparentness, and physicians’ willingness to disclose medical errors and adverse 
events to patients and/or their families. A literature review conducted by Kaldjian, Jones, 
Rosenthal, Tripp-Reimer, and Hillis (2006) suggests that physicians’ malpractice 
concerns could either encourage or discourage disclosure. If physicians believe that 
disclosure reduces their malpractice risk, then they may be more apt to disclose what 
happened. From a financial and legal perspective, disclosure may be in their best interest, 
given that prior research suggests that some individuals sue for malpractice in an effort to 
find out what happened to them or a loved one (Hickson et al., 1992; Vincent et al., 1994; 
Witman et al., 1996; Schwappach & Koeck, 2004). 
When dealing with disclosure and malpractice, physicians are presented with a 
Catch-22 at best and a Faustian bargain at worst. The American Medical Association’s 
(AMA) Code of Medical Ethics calls physicians to be “honest in all professional 
interactions” (American Medical Association, 2016, pg. 1). This ethical statement falls 
somewhere between a moral value and an enforceable law. It is a behavioral standard that 
all physicians are expected to strive to achieve. As such, it does not carry the threat of 
civil or criminal litigation. In contrast, acts of malpractice are accompanied by the threat 
of civil litigation. In the wake of truly horrendous acts, like the intentional killing of 
patients under their care (Getlen, 2018), it may also carry the threat of criminal 
prosecution, incarceration and, in some states, the death penalty. 
Faced with the possibility of being sued for malpractice, physicians may be 
tempted to violate the AMA’s ethical stance on honesty and forgo disclosure following 
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harmful medical errors in hopes that patients and/or their families will not find out what 
happened. They would not want to do or say anything that patients and/or their families 
could use against them in court (Bell et al., 2012). If no one discovers the truth, then 
physicians may be able to avoid the personal and professional costs of malpractice. But, 
prior research suggests that physicians involved in malpractice litigation may experience 
numerous forms of psychological and physiological distress, like anger, insomnia, 
diminished self-esteem, and fear of reputational harm, just to name a few (Charles et al., 
1988; Charles, 2001). Some physicians’ desire to avoid reputational harm is so great that, 
in the event they are sued, they will go to great lengths to preserve their reputation—
“insisting on vindication through trial rather than settling out of court,…pressuring 
hospitals to offer payment in exchange for having the physician dropped from the 
complaint” (Sage, 2004b, pg. 174). They may also file a lawsuit against the patient or 
media outlet(s) publicizing the case for defamation of character (Sage, 2004b). 
Since malpractice cases can take anywhere from a few months to a few years to 
be adjudicated (Seabury et al., 2013), physicians may experience a significant loss of 
income. And, there is a lot of uncertainty surrounding the outcome of malpractice cases. 
Thus, patients whose injuries were not caused by medical errors may be awarded 
compensation for their injuries, resulting in a false-positive decision (Brennan et al., 
1996; Studdert et al., 2006). 
Alternatively, following a harmful medical error, physicians may decide to 
disclose what happened to patients and/or their families and accept the personal and 
professional consequences of their actions. Disclosure is not risk-free. In some instances, 
patients with harmful injuries may sue for malpractice, despite disclosure. In a vignette 
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study of parents, Hobgood et al. (2005) found that when presented with medical errors 
that they deemed moderate, compared to minor, parents were less likely to take legal 
action following disclosure (relative risk = 1.25; 95% CI: 1.05 – 1.45). However, “if 
parents thought that the error was severe, their desire for legal action was less amendable 
to reduction by disclosure” (relative risk = 0.74; 95% CI: 0.59 – 0.90) (pg. 1284). Since 
severe injuries can have a significant, adverse impact on individuals’ quality of life, they 
may be motivated to sue, despite disclosure, to obtain the resources they need to care for 
themselves. 
The results of this study suggest that physicians’ malpractice concerns may 
encourage them to engage in disclosure. A statistically significant relationship was found 
between harm severity, malpractice risk, and disclosure. Physicians are “somewhat 
likely” to “highly likely” to disclose harmful medical errors, regardless of their perceived 
likelihood of being sued for what happened. The observed relationship between harm 
severity and disclosure is consistent with the attitudinal beliefs of physicians published in 
prior studies (White et al., 2008; Linthorst et al., 2012). In a study of medical trainees at 
two U.S. academic medical centers, 99% of respondents agreed that serious medical 
errors9 should be disclosed, compared to 84% of respondents for minor medical errors10 
(p-value = 0.031) (White et al., 2008). Similarly, in a study of internists and internist 
trainees conducted by Linthorst et al. (2012), 93.8% of respondents said they would 
probably or certainly report a major error to the patient. In contrast, 60.7% of respondents 
stated that they would probably or certainly report a minor error to the patient. Only 
 
9 The authors defined a serious error as one that “causes permanent injury or transient but potentially life-
threatening harm” (White et al., 2008, pg. 252). 
10 The authors defined a minor error as one that “causes harm that is neither permanent nor potentially life-
threatening” (White et al., 2008, pg. 252). 
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26.7% of them stated that they would probably or certainly report a near miss to the 
patient. Similarly, Garbutt et al. (2007) and White et al. (2008) found that many 
physicians believe that near misses do not need to be disclosed to patients. 
Not surprisingly, due to this study’s use of hypothetical vignettes and methods 
susceptible to social desirability bias, physicians indicated that they would disclose 
medical errors, regardless of whether what happened was apparent to patients and/or their 
families. However, consistent with the theoretical framework for this study, the 
likelihood of disclosure increased as what happened became more apparent to patients 
and/or their families. These findings are consistent with the results of prior studies, which 
suggest that physicians are more apt to disclose more apparent errors compared to less 
apparent errors (Gallagher et al., 2006a; Loren et al., 2008; White et al., 2011). For 
instance, in Loren et al.’s (2008) vignette study of pediatricians practicing in the United 
States, 75% of respondents reported that they would definitely disclose the more apparent 
error, an insulin overdose, while only 34% said they would definitely disclose the less 
apparent error, failing to check lab results (p-value < 0.001). 
Disclosing readily apparent errors is in physicians’ best interest. If errors are 
apparent to patients and/or their families, then they may ask about them. If physicians are 
not forthcoming, then patients and/or their families may file a malpractice lawsuit, 
viewing it as the only way of finding out what really happened to them or a loved one 
(Hickson et al., 1992; Vincent et al., 1994; Witman et al., 1996; Schwappach & Koeck, 
2004). Compared to readily apparent errors, physicians may be less apt to disclose not 
readily apparent or somewhat apparent errors due to asymmetric information. Lacking 
specialized knowledge, patients may not realize an error has occurred; therefore, they 
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would not have a reason to question the quality of care they are receiving or sue for 
information. 
Essentially, physicians are basing their medical error disclosure decisions in part 
on the severity of the harm patients sustain as well as how apparent what happened is to 
them and/or their families. While this behavior may seem rational to physicians, it is 
unethical and inconsistent with the American Medical Association’s Code of Medical 
Ethics, which calls for “honest[y] in all professional interactions” (American Medical 
Association, 2016, pg. 1). Their behavior is also inconsistent with many patients’ 
expectations. Following unanticipated health outcomes, many patients want an apology, 
an explanation of what happened to them, and a promise that steps will be taken to 
prevent similar occurrences in the future. Denied this, they may sue their providers for 
malpractice (Hickson et al., 1992; Vincent et al., 1993; Vincent et al., 1994; Witman et 
al., 1996; Wu, 1999; Schwappach & Kopeck, 2004). 
While this study focused primarily on physician-level behaviors, ecological 
models of behavior posit that human behavior is influenced by a variety of different 
factors, such as personal beliefs, interpersonal relationships, and the larger social and 
physical environment (Sallis & Owen, 2015). Applied to the topic of disclosure, these 
models suggest that physicians’ disclosure practices may be influenced, in part, by the 
culture of the organizations that employ them. However, this study did not find a 
statistically significant relationship between organizational culture and physicians’ 
willingness to disclosure. 
Similarly, Etchegaray, Gallagher, Bell, Sage, and Thomas (2017) examined the 
relationship between organizational culture and the intent to disclose amongst clinical 
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faculty at the University of Texas Health System. Amongst those who received disclosure 
training, there was not a statistically significant relationship between safety culture, 
teamwork culture, and the intent to disclose (correlations of 0.08 and 0.07, respectively). 
However, amongst faculty who reported not receiving any training, there was a 
statistically significant, albeit very weak, positive correlation between safety culture, 
teamwork culture, and intent to disclose (correlations of 0.21 and 0.19, respectively). 
Taken together, these findings suggest that organizational culture has little, if any, effect 
on physicians’ disclosure intentions, at least amongst the study population. Since this 
study and the one conducted by Etchegaray et al. (2017) used different measures of safety 
culture (see Table 29), yet reached similar conclusions regarding the relationship between 
safety culture and disclosure, future research should examine whether these findings are 




Table 33: Operationalizing Safety Culture 
This Study* Etchegaray et al. (2017)^ 
In my workplace, the procedures and 
systems that are in place are good at 
preventing medical errors from happening. 
I would feel safe being treated in this 
clinical area as a patient. 
In my workplace, reporting (medical 
errors/adverse events) to the institution 
(e.g. risk managers, patient safety 
advocates, etc.) is considered an important 
component of patient safety. 
Medical errors are handled appropriately 
in this clinical area. 
My supervisor/manager seriously 
considers my suggestions for improving 
patient safety. 
I know the proper channels to direct 
questions regarding patient safety in this 
clinical area. 
  
In my workplace, direct care providers 
(e.g. physicians, nurses) are regularly 
doing things to improve patient safety. 
In this clinical area, it is difficult to 
discuss medical errors. 
When I have patient safety concerns, my 
colleagues encourage me to report them to 
the appropriate personnel (e.g. my 
supervisor, risk managers, patient safety 
advocates, etc.). 
I am encouraged by my colleagues to 
report any patient safety concerns I may 
have. 
In my workplace, it is easy for me to learn 
from others’ mistakes. 
The culture in this clinical area makes it 
easy to learn for the errors of others. 
 I receive appropriate feedback about my 
performance. 
Notes: 
*All items were measured on a four-point Likert scale where 1 = strongly agree and 4 = strongly disagree. 




There are three primary limitations associated with this study. First, due to the 
limited information included in the sampling frame, I was unable to perform a thorough 
non-response analysis. While responders and non-responders did not differ with respect 
to practice area and location, they may have different demographic characteristics. Since 
prior research suggests that responders and non-responders may differ in terms of gender, 
age, and number of years in practice (Cull et al., 2005; McFarlene et al., 2007; Bjertnaes 
et al., 2008) the possibility of non-response bias cannot be ruled out. 
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Second, there is the possibility of social desirability bias. Since policymakers, 
ethicists, and researchers have emphasized, and are continuing to emphasize, the 
importance of disclosing medical errors and adverse events to patients and/or their 
families, it is possible that some of the respondents said they would engage in disclosure, 
but not actually do so in practice. Prior research suggests that physicians who support 
error disclosure do not always disclose their errors to patients and their families 
(Ghalandarpoorattar et al., 2012). However, the effects of social desirability may be 
attenuated to some extent, given that physicians stated they were less apt to disclose 
medical errors that are not harmful. Perhaps, a better way to examine disclosure practices 
would be to shadow physicians to determine whether they engage in disclosure following 
a medical error or adverse event. 
However, physicians who know they are being observed may temporarily change 
their behavior, a phenomenon known as the Hawthorne effect. In a systematic review, 
Choi, Jung, and Grantcharov (2019) found that observed healthcare professionals often 
engaged in “‘positive’ behavioral changes defined as increased productivity, compliance, 
or adherence to best practice guidelines or protocols” (pg. 28). This suggests that a study 
designed to observe physicians’ disclosure-related behaviors is apt to overestimate how 
often they disclose medical errors and adverse events to patients and their families. 
Similarly, observation may affect what physicians choose to tell them. Specifically, they 
may be more apt to apologize for what happened and offer assurances that they will take 
steps to prevent similar occurrences from happening in the future, given that this is what 
many patients want following an error. Additionally, since observation can be incredibly 
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time-consuming and labor-intensive, I might be unable to collect enough data to perform 
the statistical analyses needed to answer my research questions. 
Lastly, since a simple random sample of practicing Minnesota physicians was 
selected, this study’s results may not be generalizable to physicians practicing in other 
states. Each state’s medicolegal environment is unique. The extent to which the contents 
of disclosure conversations are admissible in court varies from state to state (Mastroianni 
et al., 2010). In states where statements of apology and the contents of disclosure 
conversations are deemed inadmissible in court, physicians may be more apt to engage in 
disclosure. 
Strengths 
There are three primary strengths associated with this study. First, to examine the 
relationship between harm severity, apparentness, and disclosure, I planned to use the 
same vignettes used in previous studies (Espin et al., 2006; Fein et al., 2007; White et al., 
2011) so that I could easily compare my findings to their findings. However, during my 
cognitive interviews, numerous physicians stated that the situations depicted in these 
vignettes were outdated and unlikely to occur today, given advances in patient safety over 
the years. To correct for this failure, I identified seventeen vignettes which better 
reflected the realities of current medical practice from a list of medical error and adverse 
event vignettes compiled by the National Rural Bioethics Project. Prior to fielding this 
study, I pilot tested these vignettes using a QualtricsTM web survey sent to physicians 
who were not sampled for this study. The pilot test assessed their relevance to the current 
practice environment, the type of event being depicted (i.e. medical error or adverse 
event), and the level of harm the patient sustained. A total of 456 physicians completed 
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the survey, which confirmed that the seventeen vignettes better reflected the realities of 
contemporary medical practice, compared to the vignettes taken from previous studies. 
Second, in this study, apparentness was conceptualized and measured as a 
unipolar phenomenon lying on a continuum from not readily apparent to readily apparent. 
While I had my own a priori dichotomous classification of apparentness for each of the 
vignettes, I asked physicians to rate the apparentness of the vignettes using the continuum 
approach. For all statistically analyses, I used physicians’ apparentness rating, not my 
own. In contrast, in prior research Gallagher et al. (2006b) and White et al. (2011) treated 
apparentness as a dichotomous variable—more apparent or less apparent—and appear to 
be using their own apparentness classifications during data analysis. In doing this, they 
are assuming that physicians would agree with their classification without providing 
evidence that this is indeed the case. 
Lastly, for each of the vignettes, I asked physicians to rate the severity of the 
harm that patients sustained as either unknown, none, mild, moderate, severe, or death. 
While I combined some of the harm severity categories (e.g. 0 = unknown, none, or mild, 
1 = moderate, 2 = severe or death) prior to performing some of my analyses, the 
categories I used differ from those used in prior research. Garbutt et al. (2007) and White 
et al. (2008) examined general attitudes towards the disclosure of near misses, minor 
errors, and serious errors amongst pediatricians and medical trainees, respectively. 
Similarly, Linthorst et al. (2012) examined general attitudes towards the disclosure of 
near misses, minor errors, and major errors amongst internists and internists in training. 
While informative, these studies did not explore the grey area between minor errors and 
serious or major errors. Using a more comprehensive conceptualization of harm severity, 
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I was able to examine physicians’ attitudes toward the disclosure of medical errors that 
cause no harm and mild, moderate, or serious harm. Additionally, I was able to examine 
how varying levels of harm influence the likelihood if disclosure. 
Implications 
The physician-patient relationship is based, in part, on trust—patients trust that 
their physicians will be honest and provide them with the best care possible. Patients trust 
that physicians will provide them with an accurate diagnosis and inform them of possible 
treatment options and their inherent risks. However, the trust that patients have in 
physicians, and possibly healthcare professionals in general, can be significantly 
diminished following a medical error. Considering this, physicians may find honestly 
disclosing medical errors to patients and their families in a timely manner to be an 
incredibly challenging endeavor. Nevertheless, following a medical error, many patients 
want to know what happened, and they want to be assured that steps will be taken to 
prevent similar occurrences in the future. When physicians are not forthcoming about an 
error, patients or their loved ones may sue for malpractice in order to find out what 
happened (Hickson et al., 1992; Vincent et al., 1993; Vincent et al., 1994; Witman et al., 
1996; Wu, 1999; Schwappach & Koeck, 2004). 
This study demonstrates that physicians are likely to disclose medical errors, 
regardless of their perception that doing so will result in a malpractice lawsuit. While 
malpractice concerns may not deter physicians from engaging in disclosure, it may affect 
what they choose to tell patients and their families. Future research should examine how 
physicians’ malpractice concerns influence what they say happened, especially in regard 
to what caused the error. This type of research will provide insight into whether what 
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physicians tell patients is meeting their informational needs as well as whether physicians 
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Thank you for agreeing to help me with my dissertation research! My research will 
examine some of the factors that influence physicians’ willingness to disclose adverse 
events and medical errors. To get a better idea of what these terms mean to physicians, I 
am going to ask you some questions related to their use. This should take about 30 – 45 
minutes. Would you mind if I recorded our conversation? 
 
Randomize the order of AE, PAE, and ME Questions 
 
1. What does the term adverse event mean to you? 
• If their definition is different, give them my definition of AE. 
i. Adverse event: an unintended injury caused by medical 
management, not a patient’s underlying health condition, that 
results in temporary injury, permanent disability, and/or death (e.g. 
not having a known allergy to penicillin, taking it for the first time, 
and having an allergic reaction to it) 
1. What would you change about this definition to make it 
more consistent with your understanding of adverse events? 
 
2. When you hear the phrase adverse event, what types of things come to mind? 
• As they are talking, pay attention to the harm and observability of the 
events they are describing. Adverse events result in harm that patients are 
cognizant of. 
i. Harm: patient suffers a temporary or permanent injury, including 
death 
ii. Harm observability: patient realizes they have been harmed (e.g. 
missing a body part, severe abdominal pain, etc.) 
iii. Event observability: patient is cognizant that something happened 
to them 
 
3. What does the term medical errors mean to you? 
• If their definition is different, give them my definition. 
i. Medical error: an error that occurs due to human fallibility, system 
fallibility, or the dynamic interaction between them. They do not 
cause temporary or permanent injuries, include death, to patients 
(e.g. missed or delayed diagnosis). 
1. What would you change about this definition to make it 
more consistent with your understanding of medical errors? 
 
4. When you hear the phrase medical error, what types of things come to mind? 
• As they are talking, pay attention to the harm and observability of the 
events they are describing. Medical errors do not result in harm. If they 




5. What does the term preventable adverse events mean to you? 
• If their definition is different, give them my definition. 
i. Preventable adverse event: an event that is caused by human 
fallibility, system fallibility, or the dynamic interaction between 
them and results in temporary or permanent harm to patients, 
including death. 
1. What would you change about this definition to make it 
more consistent with your understanding of preventable 
adverse events? 
 
6. When you hear the phrase preventable adverse event, what types of things come 
to mind? 
• As they are talking, pay attention to the harm and observability of the 
events they 
are describing. Preventable adverse events harm patients and are caused 
by human fallibility, system fallibility, or the dynamic interaction between 
them. 
 
7. To you, what is the primary difference between an adverse event and a medical 
error? 
• If they don’t mention harm: 
o Does the level of harm a patient sustains influence whether 
something is considered an adverse event or medical error? If so, 
how? 
 
Classification of Clinical Vignettes 
 
Now, I am going to present you with a series of vignettes. After you read each one, I am 
going to ask you a series of questions. Give participant sheet depict each scenario 
individually. 
 
Scenario #1: The scrub and circulating nurses, anesthesia resident, and anesthesiologist 
are in the operating room prior to a liver transplant. The anesthesiologist asks out loud if 
the patient has any allergies. While the scrub nurse is busy arranging the surgical 
instruments, the resident is busy with another task, and neither of them responds; 
however, the circulating nurse says, “I didn’t check the patient in, but no, I don’t think 
so.” The anesthesiologist proceeds to inject Cefazolin into the patient’s IV. Later, the 
anesthesiologist checks the patient’s chart and discover that the patient has an allergy to 
penicillin.  
 
8. Would you classify this event as a medical error, adverse event, or something 
else?  
• Probe: Why do you consider this a (insert person’s response)? 
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i. If they do not classify it as an ME, then ask what would need to 
change about the scenario to make it an ME. 
• Did it make sense? 
 
Scenario #2: A 62-year-old diabetic patient with chronic renal insufficiency is admitted 
to the hospital with a new onset gastrointestinal bleed. He is made NPO (nothing by 
mouth) for endoscopy, but his medications were not held. Because of severe 
hypoglycemia the patient had a seizure, fell of his bed, and fractured his hip.  
 
9. Would you classify this event as a medical error, adverse event, or something 
else?  
• Probe: Why do you consider this a (insert person’s response)? 
i. If they do not classify it as a PAE, then ask what would need to 
change about the scenario to make it an PAE. 
• Did it make sense? 
Scenario #3: You have admitted a diabetic patient to the hospital for a chronic 
obstructive pulmonary disease (COPD) exacerbation. You handwrite an order for the 
patient to receive “10 U” of insulin. The “U” in your order looks like a 0. The following 
morning, the patient is given 100 U of insulin, 10 times the patient’s normal dose, and is 
later found unresponsive, with a serum glucose level of 35mg/dL (1.94 mmol/L). The 
patient is resuscitated and transferred to the intensive care unit where they are expected to 
make a full recovery.  
 
10. Would you classify this event as a medical error, adverse event, or something 
else?  
• Probe: Why do you consider this a (insert person’s response)? 
i. If they do not classify it as an APE, then ask what would need to 
change about the scenario to make it an APE. 
• Did it make sense? 
 
Scenario #4: You are seeing a patient 3 weeks after elective splenectomy for ITP. The 
splenectomy was technically challenging because of the patient’s obesity, but seemed 
uncomplicated. At this follow-up visit, the patient complains of vague persistent left 
upper quadrant (LUQ) pain. You send the patient for an abdominal x-ray film, which 
shows a foreign body consistent with a retained surgical sponge in the patient’s LUQ. 
You remember that the sponge count was correct at the end of the procedure. However, 
you also remember that you packed off a small bleeding vessel near the stomach with a 
sponge, and do not recall removing the sponge. When you review the postoperative 
records, you observe that a math error was responsible for a falsely correct sponge count. 
You believe a subsequent operation to remove the retained sponge is indicated, and 
expect the patient will make a full recovery.  
 
11. Would you classify this event as a medical error, adverse event, or something 
else?  
• Probe: Why do you consider this a (insert person’s response)? 
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i. If they do not classify it as an PAE, then ask what would need to 
change about the scenario to make it an PAE. 
• Did it make sense? 
 




Appendix B: Survey Questions for Second Round of Pilot Testing 
 
List of Scenarios Presented 
 
A physician is seeing a female patient who has a moderate cognitive impairment. She is 
complaining of lower back pain. He recommends that she undergo a CT scan of her back. 
However, his imaging request is electronically entered as a CT scan of her brain. The 
radiology technologist does not verify the physician’s electronic request using the 
patient’s medical record and performs a CT scan of her brain. Upon seeing the results, the 
physician realizes that he ordered the wrong test and submits a new order for a CT scan 
of her back. 
 
An elderly female presents to the ED complaining of severe stomach pain, nausea, and 
vomiting. She is diagnosed with appendicitis and scheduled for an emergency 
appendectomy. While in pre-op, she gets out of bed to use the bathroom, falls, and breaks 
her right arm. During a subsequent surgery, she dies on the operating table. 
 
A 62-year-old, male patient with diabetes and chronic renal insufficiency is admitted to 
the hospital with a new onset gastrointestinal bleed. He is made NPO for endoscopy and 
given diazepam. While sedated, he tries to go to the bathroom but falls out of bed and 
fractures his left hip. 
 
A male patient with no known drug allergies develops a maculopapular rash, which is 
consistent with a drug allergy to a medication he has recently been prescribed. 
Immediately, his physician stops the medication and treats his rash. He responds well to 
treatment, and his rash resolves. 
 
You were seeing a female patient 3 weeks after an elective splenectomy for ITP. The 
splenectomy was technically challenging because of the patient’s obesity, but seemed 
uncomplicated. At a follow-up visit, the patient complained of vague persistent LUQ 
pain, so you sent her for an abdominal x-ray. The film showed a foreign body consistent 
with a retained sponge in her LUQ. You remembered that the sponge count was correct at 
the end of the procedure. However, you also remembered that you packed off a small 
bleeding vessel near her stomach with a sponge, but do not recall removing it. She 
underwent a subsequent operation to remove the sponge and made a full recovery. 
 
A urologist performs a needle biopsy on the prostate glands of two patients, John and 
Michael. The urologist correctly labels each specimen with the corresponding patient’s 
identifying information and sends them to pathology for examination. Dr. Greene 
examines each specimen under a microscope and notes the presence of cancerous cells in 
John's sample. While Dr. Greene is entering the information into each patient's electronic 
medical record, she is interrupted by one of her assistants and enters the wrong 
information into each patient's file. After reviewing the pathology reports, the urologist 
tells John that he does not have cancer. He tells Michael that he does and recommends 
radiotherapy. A year later, John returns to the urologist, complaining of difficulty 
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urinating, frequent urges to urinate at night, and weak stream. A needle biopsy suggests 
prostate cancer and an evaluation shows disease metastatic to bone.  
 
A female patient’s mammography results indicate that she has a suspicious lump in both 
of her 
breasts, so she is referred for a biopsy. A surgeon biopsies both breasts and sends the 
specimen to pathology. One of the samples indicates a malignancy. However, the 
specimens are not clearly labelled, so the pathologist is not sure which breast the tissue 
came from. 
 
A physician is treating a 70-year-old male patient with uncontrolled Type II diabetes. He 
has diabetic neuropathy, a diabetic foot ulcer on his right foot, and gangrene on his left 
foot. Due to the severity of the gangrene, the physician recommends that he have his foot 
amputated. During surgery, the patient’s right foot is amputated, instead of his left. 
 
During a car accident two years ago, Shannon, a 28-year-old female, suffered permanent, 
debilitating head and spinal cord injuries. Now, she is a paraplegic, requires a shunt to 
prevent increased cranial pressure, and uses a gastrostomy tube due to problems 
swallowing. Shannon is admitted to the hospital for a shunt revision and develops 
aspiration pneumonia. 
 
A physician works on the medical-surgical unit of a small, rural hospital. One evening, a 
few of the unit’s nurses call-in sick, leaving him and two nurse’s aides caring for 16 
patients. A young boy is admitted to the unit with a primary infection of oral herpes. His 
mouth has several large, painful lesions and he is dehydrated. He has not eaten or 
drunken much in the past 24 hours. A pediatrician places an IV in his left arm. An hour 
later, the boy’s mother presses the call button because she notices the area around the IV 
stick is becoming swollen and cool to the touch. Due to the difficulty associated with 
performing the initial IV placement and the staffing shortage, the IV is not redone until a 
few hours after the mother’s initial call. 
 
Ms. Jones has diabetes and is severely ill, so she goes to the ER. There, she is stabilized 
before being transferred to the medical floor. There, Jackie, a nurse, reviews the ER 
physician’s orders. She notes that an IV is ordered as NS at 150cc/hr. She checks the IV 
fluid and notices it is NS but set at a rate of 5cc/hr on the IV pump, so she sets it to 
150cc/hr. But, the pump is not hooked up to a bag of NS. It is attached to a small 100 cc 
bag of insulin that is hanging behind the bag of NS. Ms. Jones develops severe 
hypoglycemia and dies in the hospital. 
 
Mr. Jenkins is admitted to the hospital with diagnoses of diabetes, renal disease, 
hypertension, and a foot infection. His physician cultures his foot wound, and after 
receiving the lab report, ordered several antibiotics, including Gentamicin Sulfate 60 mg 
IV q. 40 h. His physician orders a series of lab tests to assess his renal functioning and 
blood serum levels. However, the results are not closely monitored. Mr. Jenkins receives 




Ms. Smith is an elderly female patient with osteoarthritis in her left knee. She has been 
experiencing pain in that knee for a few years and has tried a variety of different 
treatments, including prescription NSAIDs, corticosteroid injections, and physical 
therapy. Since these treatments have not significantly decreased her pain, her physician 
recommends she undergo knee replacement surgery. Prior to surgery, she is asked to 
place a mark on the knee she is having surgery on. While preparing for surgery, the 
surgeon is called away to consult on an urgent case and asks a resident to perform the 
operation. The resident performs a knee replacement on Ms. Smith's right knee, not her 
left. 
 
A 35 year old woman is using Nuva Ring. After a few months, she starts experiencing 
severe pain in her right calf. Also, her right leg is swollen and she is having difficulty 
breathing. Concerned, she goes to the doctor, where she is diagnosed with deep vein 
thrombosis and a pulmonary embolism. Immediately, the doctor takes her off of birth 
control and starts treating her with blood thinners.  
 
Georgia has breast cancer and is undergoing chemotherapy. During her first cycle of 
chemo, she spikes a high fever and experiences violent chills. Alarmed, she goes to the 
ED. Blood tests indicate that Georgia has a very low neutrophil count. She is diagnosed 
with febrile neutropenia and an infection. She is treated with intravenous antibiotics in 
the hospital’s oncology ward. 
 
James is a 16-year-old patient with leukemia. For the past three months, he has been 
receiving chemotherapy. He has a central venous access device (CVAD) and alopecia. 
Recently, James was admitted to the hospital with a fever that did not respond to the 
acetaminophen his parents had been giving him for the last twenty-four hours. Blood tests 
indicate that he has anemia, neutropenia, and thrombocytopenia, which is attributed to the 
chemotherapy. 
 
Samantha and her 9 month old daughter Emily recently moved to another state. Samantha 
takes Emily to a local physician for a well-child visit. Wanting to ensure that Emily is up-
to-date on her immunizations, Samantha asks the doctor about childhood vaccinations 
and gives him a copy of her daughter's immunization card. While reviewing the card, he 
notices that she has not received her third Haemophilus influenzae type B shot and 
administers it. Shortly thereafter, he receives a copy of Emily's medical record from her 
previous pediatrician and notices that she had already received her third Hib shot. 
 
Five years ago, Jacob was hospitalized for diverticulitis while he was out of town visiting 
his niece. He responded well to treatment, except for an allergic reaction (body rash and 
facial edema) to ciprofloxacin. Jacob’s reaction was treated, and he was switched to 
metronidazole. Two days ago, Jacob was admitted to his local hospital with mild 
diverticulitis. He was in pain, nauseated, and dehydrated. He was started on 
metronidazole 500 mg q 6 hours IV until he could tolerate clear liquids, be switched to 
antibiotics, and discharged. When his condition improved, he was discharged with a 
prescription for Cipro 500 mg BID X 6 days. At the pharmacy, the pharmacist told him 
he was prescribed ciprofloxacin, which he should take twice daily for six days. Jacob said 
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he did not want to take the medication because the last time he took it he became severely 
ill. The pharmacist asked Jacob if he was allergic to any medications, but he was not sure. 
The pharmacist checked his medical records and discovered that he was indeed allergic to 
Cipro. He called Jacob’s doctor, who confirmed the allergy, and switched him to 
metronidazole. 
 
Questions asked after each vignette presented 
 
Q1. How likely is this event to occur in real-life? 
 
  Highly unlikely 
  Unlikely 
  Somewhat unlikely 
  Somewhat likely 
  Likely 
  Highly likely 
 
Q2. Is there anything you would change about this scenario to make it more realistic? If 
so, please specify. 
 
Q3. Does this scenario depict a medical error, adverse event, or something else? 
 
 Medical error 
  Adverse event 
  Other (please specify): __________________________________________ 
  
Q4. What level of harm, if any, did the patient sustain? 
 
 Unknown 
  None 
  Mild 
  Moderate 
  Severe 
 
Q5. Was the harm the patient sustained potentially life-threatening? If the respondent 
selected mild, moderate, or severe harm for Q4, this question was displayed.  
 
 Yes 
  No 
 
Q6. What is the duration of harm to the patient? If the respondent selected mild, 
moderate, or severe harm for Q4, this question was displayed. 
 
 Seconds 
  Minutes 
  Hours 
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  Days 
  Weeks 
 Months 
  Years 
  Decades 
  Lifelong 
  Other (please specify): 
_________________________________________________ 
 
Q7. Overall, how would you rate this scenario's usefulness in assessing physicians' 
thoughts on the disclosure of adverse events and medical errors to patients and/or their 
families? 
 
 Very useful 
  Moderately useful 
  Somewhat useful 
  Somewhat useless 
  Moderately useless 
 Very useless 
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Appendix C: Medical Error Disclosure Survey 
Part 1: Legal Considerations 
 












a. My malpractice 
insurer 
_______________ 
me from doing or 
saying anything that 
could be construed 
as an admission of 
legal liability (e.g. 
disclosing medical 




1 2 3 4 
b. The health system I 
work for 
_______________ 
me from doing or 
saying anything that 
could be construed 
as an admission of 
legal liability (e.g. 
disclosing medical 




1 2 3 4 
 
Q2. Disclosing harmful medical errors to patients and/or their families will make them: 
 
1  Much more likely to sue 
2  Somewhat more likely to sue 
3  Somewhat less likely to sue 














a. Failing to disclose harmful 
medical errors to patients 
and/or their families will 
make them suspicious of a 
cover-up and more likely to 
sue for malpractice. 

1 2 3 4 
b. Patients harmed by medical 
errors invariably want to 
know the truth, and when 
deprived of it, will consider 
litigation. 

1 2 3 4 
c. If disclosing harmful medical 
errors was not related to 
malpractice risk, it would be 
easier for me to disclose them 
to patients and/or their 
families. 

1 2 3 4 
 
 
Part 2: Human Fallibility 
 











a. I believe that medicine is both 
an art and a science that could 
result in unexpected injuries or 
deaths. 

1 2 3 4 
b. My patients believe that 
medicine is both an art and a 
science that could result in 
unexpected injuries or deaths. 

1 2 3 4 
c. Disclosing medical errors will 
negatively affect a provider’s 
career. 






Q5. Disclosing medical errors to my patients and/or their families would have the following 
impact on my professional reputation: Circle the number that best represents your answer. 
 
1  2  3  4  5  6  7  8  9  10 
A Substantial         A Substantial 
        Negative Impact              Positive Impact 
 
Q6. How much easier would it be for you to disclose medical errors to each of the following if 
there was no potential for stigmatization associated with disclosing them:  
 
 








a. Your patients and/or their 
families 

1 2 3 4 
b.   Your colleagues 1 2 3 4 
c.   The health system you work 
for 

1 2 3 4 
 
Q7. How humiliated does having to admit to patients and/or their families that you made a 
mistake make you feel? Circle the number that best represents your answer. 
 
1  2  3  4  5  6  7  8  9  10 
Not at All         Extremely 
 
 
Part 3: Practice Culture 
 




1  The top priority 
2  In top 3 
3  In top 5 
4  In top 10 
5  Less than that  
 
Q9. In your workplace, how often does each of the following occur: 
 
 NEVER RARELY SOMETIMES FREQUENTLY 
ALL THE 
TIME 
a. Direct care 
providers (e.g. 
physicians, nurses) 
freely speak up 
when they see 
something that 
could negatively 
affect patient safety. 

1 2 3 4 5 
b. Direct care 
providers (e.g. 
physicians, nurses) 
are informed of 
problems that affect 
patient safety. 

1 2 3 4 5 
c. Direct care 
providers (e.g. 
physicians, nurses) 




















a. In my workplace, direct care 
providers (e.g. physicians, 
nurses) feel like their mistakes 
are held against them. 

1 2 3 4 
b. In my workplace, it is difficult 
for direct care providers (e.g. 
physicians, nurses) to discuss 
patient safety issues. 

1 2 3 4 
c. In my workplace, it is difficult 
for me to speak up when I 
perceive a problem with patient 
safety. 

1 2 3 4 
d. My supervisor/manager 
routinely overlooks patient 
safety problems that happen 
repeatedly. 

1 2 3 4 
e. When I have patient safety 
concerns, my colleagues 
encourage me to report them to 
the appropriate personnel (e.g. 
my supervisor, risk managers, 
patient safety advocates, etc.). 

1 2 3 4 
f. My supervisor/manager 
seriously considers my 
suggestions for improving 
patient safety. 

1 2 3 4 
g. In my workplace, when 
changes are made to improve 
patient safety, there 
effectiveness is evaluated. 

1 2 3 4 
h. In my workplace, it is easy for 
me to learn from others’ 
mistakes. 

1 2 3 4 
i. In my workplace, the 
procedures and systems that are 

1 2 3 4 
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in place are good at preventing 
medical errors from happening. 
j. In my workplace, reporting 
medical errors to the institution 
(e.g. risk managers, patient 
safety advocates, etc.) is 
considered an important 
component of patient safety. 

1 2 3 4 
k. In my workplace, direct care 
providers (e.g. physicians, 
nurses) are regularly doing 
things to improve patient 
safety. 

1 2 3 4 
l. In my workplace, the lack of 
supportive forums for and 
policies regarding the 
disclosure of medical errors 
prevents me from disclosing 
them to patients and/or their 
families. 

1 2 3 4 
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Q11. In your workplace, how often are each of the following reported to the organization when 
they occur: 
 
 NEVER RARELY SOMETIMES USUALLY 
a. Near misses 1 2 3 4 
b. Medical errors that have no 
potential to harm patients  

1 2 3 4 
c. Medical errors that could potentially 
harm patients but don’t 

1 2 3 4 
d. Medical errors that cause patients 
mild harm 

1 2 3 4 
e. Medical errors that cause patients 
moderate harm 

1 2 3 4 
f. Medical errors that cause patients 
serious harm 

1 2 3 4 
 
Q12. In your workplace, how often does the following occur: 
 
 NEVER RARELY SOMETIMES USUALLY 
a. Medical errors, regardless of their 
potential to cause harm or the harm 
actually caused, are disclosed to 
patients and/or their families. 

1 2 3 4 
 











a. Disclosing medical errors to 
patient safety employees, 
such as risk managers 

1 2 3 4 
b. Disclosing medical errors to 
your colleagues 

1 2 3 4 
c. Disclosing medical errors to 
patients and/or their families 







Part 4: Professional Ethics 
 











a. The need to disclose medical 
errors to patients and/or their 
families is a proportionate 
one—it increases as the harm 
or risk of harm to the patient 
increases. 

1 2 3 4 
b. I prefer not to do or say 
anything that could be 
construed as an admission of 
legal liability. 

1 2 3 4 
 
Q15. How likely or unlikely would you be to disclose the following to one of your patients and/or 
their families, if it was to occur: 
 
 UNLIKELY      LIKELY 
a. A near miss  1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
b. A medical error that has no 
potential to harm the patient 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
c. A medical error that could 
potentially harm the patient 
but do not 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
d. A medical error that causes 
mild harm 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
e. A medical error that causes 
moderate harm 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
f. A medical error that causes 
serious harm 




Q16. How likely or unlikely would you be to disclose the following to one of your patients and/or 
their families, if it was to occur: 
 
 UNLIKELY     LIKELY 
A medical error that is not readily apparent to 
the patient and 
          
a. Has no potential to harm the patient 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
b. Could potentially harm the patient but 
does not 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
c. Causes mild harm 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
d. Causes moderate harm 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
e. Causes serious harm 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
A medical error that is readily apparent to the 
patient and 
          
a. Has no potential to harm the patient 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
b. Could potentially harm the patient but 
does not 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
c. Causes mild harm 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
d. Causes moderate harm 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
e. Causes serious harm 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
 
Q17. While some medical errors are readily apparent to patients, others are not as readily 
apparent. At what point does the apparentness of a medical error influence your willingness to 
disclose it to patients and/or their families? 
 
1  2  3  4  5  6  7  8  9  10 
Not at All        Readily 
















a. When medical errors occur, I 
disclose them to patients and/or 
their families because that is 
the way I would like to be 
treated if I were in their shoes. 

1 2 3 4 
b. When medical errors occur, I 
feel an obligation to make it 
clear to the patient and/or their 
families that what happened 
was a mistake. 

1 2 3 4 
c. I take responsibility for my 
actions when they have a 
serious, adverse impact on 
patients’ health and well-being. 

1 2 3 4 
 
 











a. Disclosing medical errors is the 
right thing to do, even if it 
comes at a significant personal 
or professional cost. 

1 2 3 4 
b. Failing to disclose medical 
errors to patients and/or their 
families is deceptive and 
undermines their trust in the 
health care system. 






Part 5: Self-efficacy 
 
Q20. Next, I’d like to ask you about any training on disclosing medical errors you have received.  
 
 NONE A LITTLE SOME A LOT 
A GREAT 
DEAL 
a. How much education or 
training on disclosing 
medical errors to 
patients and/or their 
families have you 
received? 

1 2 3 4 5 
b. How much experience 
do you have disclosing 
medical errors to 
patients and/or their 
families? 

1 2 3 4 5 
 
 
Q21. How comfortable or uncomfortable would you feel disclosing the following to one of your 
patients and/or their families, if it was to occur: 
 
 COMFORTABLE  UNCOMFORTABLE 
A medical error that is not readily 
apparent to the patient and 
          
a. Has no potential to harm the 
patient 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
b. Could potentially harm the patient 
but does not 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
c. Causes mild harm 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
d. Causes moderate harm 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
e. Causes serious harm 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
A medical error that is readily apparent to 
the patient and 
          
a. Has no potential to harm the 
patient 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
b. Could potentially harm the patient 
but does not 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
c. Causes mild harm 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
d. Causes moderate harm 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 





Part 6: Clinical Scenarios 
 
In this section, you will be presented with a series of clinical vignettes. Please read each 
vignette carefully and answer the corresponding questions. 
 
Q22. Randomly assigned vignette 
 
a. Would you classify the event being described as a medical error, adverse event, or 
something else? 
 
1  Medical error 
2  Adverse event  
3  Something else (please specify): 
________________________________________________ 
 
b. What level of harm, if any, did the patient sustain? 
 
1  Unknown 
2  None 
3  Mild 
4  Moderate 
5  Severe 
6  Death 
 
c. How apparent would this event be to the patient? 
 
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
Not Readily Apparent     Readily Apparent 
 
d. If this was your patient, how likely would you be to disclose what happened to the patient 
and/or their family? 
  
1  2  3  4  5  6  7  8  9  10 
Highly Unlikely       Highly Likely 
 













f. If disclosed, how likely is this event to result in a malpractice lawsuit? 
 

1 2 3 4 
Very likely Likely Unlikely Very unlikely 
 
Q23. Randomly assigned vignette 
 
a. Would you classify the event being described as a medical error, adverse event, or 
something else? 
 
1  Medical error 
2  Adverse event  
3  Something else (please specify): 
________________________________________________ 
 
b. What level of harm, if any, did the patient sustain? 
 
1  Unknown 
2  None 
3  Mild 
4  Moderate 
5  Severe 
6  Death 
  
c. How apparent would this event be to the patient? 
 
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
Not Readily Apparent     Readily Apparent 
 
d. If this was your patient, how likely would you be to disclose what happened to the patient 
and/or their family? 
  
1  2  3  4  5  6  7  8  9  10 
Highly Unlikely       Highly Likely 
 














f. If disclosed, how likely is this event to result in a malpractice lawsuit? 
 

1 2 3 4 
Very likely Likely Unlikely Very unlikely 
 
Q24. Randomly assigned vignette 
 
a. Would you classify the event being described as a medical error, adverse event, or 
something else? 
 
1  Medical error 
2  Adverse event  
3  Something else (please specify): 
________________________________________________ 
 
b. What level of harm, if any, did the patient sustain? 
 
1  Unknown 
2  None 
3  Mild 
4  Moderate 
5  Severe 
6  Death 
 
c. How apparent would this event be to the patient? 
 
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
Not Readily Apparent     Readily Apparent 
 
d. If this was your patient, how likely would you be to disclose what happened to the patient 
and/or their family? 
  
1  2  3  4  5  6  7  8  9  10 
Highly Unlikely       Highly Likely 
 














f. If disclosed, how likely is this event to result in a malpractice lawsuit? 
 

1 2 3 4 
Very likely Likely Unlikely Very unlikely 
 
Q25. Randomly assigned vignette 
 
a. Would you classify the event being described as a medical error, adverse event, or 
something else? 
 
1  Medical error 
2  Adverse event  
3  Something else (please specify): 
________________________________________________ 
 
b. What level of harm, if any, did the patient sustain? 
 
1  Unknown 
2  None 
3  Mild 
4  Moderate 
5  Severe 
6  Death 
 
c. How apparent would this event be to the patient? 
 
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
Not Readily Apparent     Readily Apparent 
 
d. If this was your patient, how likely would you be to disclose what happened to the patient 




1  2  3  4  5  6  7  8  9  10 
Highly Unlikely       Highly Likely 
 












f. If disclosed, how likely is this event to result in a malpractice lawsuit? 
 

1 2 3 4 
Very likely Likely Unlikely Very unlikely 
 
 
Part 7: About You… 
 
Q26. Please select your sex. 
 
1  Male     2  Female 
 
Q27. Do you consider yourself Hispanic, Latino, or Latina? 
 
1  Yes     2  No 
 
Q28. What is your race? Check all that apply. 
 
1  Caucasian 
2  African American 
3  American Indian or Alaskan Native 
4  Asian or Pacific Islander 
5  Other (please specify): ____________________ 
 
Q29. How old are you? 
   




Q30. What is your primary area of practice/specialty? Please specify. 
___________________________ 
 
Q31. How many years have you been practicing medicine? 
 
         |___|___| Years 
 
Q32. In which zip code, do you primarily practice? 
         
         |___|___|___|___|___| 
 
Q33. Please specify what percentage of your time is spent in each of the following: 
 
A. Clinical care      |___|___|___|% 
B. Hospital care     |___|___|___|% 
C. Research      |___|___|___|% 
D. Other       |___|___|___|% 
Total                                                                         100% 
 
Q34. Have you ever provided medical testimony in a legal deposition that was related to medical 
malpractice? 
 
1  Yes     
2  No 
 
Q35. Have you ever been named as a defendant in a medical malpractice lawsuit? 
 
1  Yes    
2  No 
 
Q36. How many malpractice claims have been filed against you? 
 
0  Zero 
1  One 
2  Two  
3  Three 
4  Four 




Appendix D: Adverse Event Disclosure Survey 
Part 1: Legal Considerations 
 












a. My malpractice 
insurer 
_______________ 
me from doing or 
saying anything 
that could be 
construed as an 
admission of legal 
liability (e.g. 
disclosing adverse 




1 2 3 4 
b. The health system 
I work for 
_______________ 
me from doing or 
saying anything 
that could be 
construed as an 
admission of legal 
liability (e.g. 
disclosing adverse 




1 2 3 4 
 
Q2. Disclosing adverse events to patients and/or their families will make them: 
 
1  Much more likely to sue 
2  Somewhat more likely to sue 
3  Somewhat less likely to sue 

















a. Failing to disclose adverse 
events to patients and/or 
their families will make 
them suspicious of a cover-
up and more likely to sue 
for malpractice. 

1 2 3 4 
b. Patients harmed by adverse 
events invariably want to 
know the truth, and when 
deprived of it, will consider 
litigation. 

1 2 3 4 
c. If disclosing adverse events 
was not related to 
malpractice risk, it would 
be easier for me to disclose 
them to patients and/or 
their families. 

1 2 3 4 
 
 
Part 2: Human Fallibility 
 











a. I believe that medicine is 
both an art and a science that 
could result in unexpected 
injuries or deaths. 

1 2 3 4 
b. My patients believe that 
medicine is both an art and a 
science that could result in 
unexpected injuries or 
deaths. 

1 2 3 4 
c. Disclosing adverse events 
will negatively affect a 
provider’s career. 





Q5. Disclosing adverse events to my patients and/or their families would have the following 
impact on my professional reputation: Circle the number that best represents your answer. 
 
1  2  3  4  5  6  7  8  9  10 
A Substantial         A Substantial 
       Negative Impact              Positive Impact 
 
Q6. How much easier would it be for you to disclose adverse events to each of the following if 
there was no potential for stigmatization associated with disclosing them:  
 
 








a. Your patients and/or 
their families 

1 2 3 4 
b. Your colleagues 1 2 3 4 
c. The health system you 
work for 

1 2 3 4 
 
Q7. How humiliated does having to admit to patients and/or their families that you made a 
mistake make you feel? Circle the number that best represents your answer. 
 
1  2  3  4  5  6  7  8  9  10 




Part 3: Practice Culture 
 
Q8. In your workplace, how much of a priority is patient safety? 
 
1  The top priority 
2  In top 3 
3  In top 5 
4  In top 10 
5  Less than that 
 
Q9. In your workplace, how often does each of the following occur: 
 
 NEVER RARELY SOMETIMES FREQUENTLY 
ALL THE 
TIME 
a. Direct care 
providers (e.g. 
physicians, nurses) 
freely speak up 
when they see 
something that 
could negatively 
affect patient safety. 

1 2 3 4 5 
b. Direct care 
providers (e.g. 
physicians, nurses) 
are informed of 
problems that affect 
patient safety. 

1 2 3 4 5 
c. Direct care 
providers (e.g. 
physicians, nurses) 




















a. In my workplace, direct care 
providers (e.g. physicians, 
nurses) feel like their mistakes 
are held against them. 

1 2 3 4 
b. In my workplace, it is difficult 
for direct care providers (e.g. 
physicians, nurses) to discuss 
patient safety issues. 

1 2 3 4 
c. In my workplace, it is difficult 
for me to speak up when I 
perceive a problem with 
patient safety. 

1 2 3 4 
d. My supervisor/manager 
routinely overlooks patient 
safety problems that happen 
repeatedly. 

1 2 3 4 
e. When I have patient safety 
concerns, my colleagues 
encourage me to report them 
to the appropriate personnel 
(e.g. my supervisor, risk 
managers, patient safety 
advocates, etc.). 

1 2 3 4 
f. My supervisor/manager 
seriously considers my 
suggestions for improving 
patient safety. 

1 2 3 4 
g. In my workplace, when 
changes are made to improve 
patient safety, there 
effectiveness is evaluated. 

1 2 3 4 
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h. In my workplace, it is easy for 
me to learn from others’ 
mistakes. 

1 2 3 4 
i. In my workplace, the 
procedures and systems that 
are in place are good at 
preventing adverse events 
from happening. 

1 2 3 4 
j. In my workplace, reporting 
adverse events to the 
institution (e.g. risk managers, 
patient safety advocates, etc.) 
is considered an important 
component of patient safety. 

1 2 3 4 
k. In my workplace, direct care 
providers (e.g. physicians, 
nurses) are regularly doing 
things to improve patient 
safety. 

1 2 3 4 
l. In my workplace, the lack of 
supportive forums for and 
policies regarding the 
disclosure of adverse events 
prevents me from disclosing 
them to patients and/or their 
families. 

1 2 3 4 
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Q11. In your workplace, how often are each of the following reported to the organization when 
they occur: 
 
 NEVER RARELY SOMETIMES USUALLY 
a. Adverse events that cause 
patients mild harm 

1 2 3 4 
b. Adverse events that cause 
patients moderate harm  

1 2 3 4 
c. Adverse events that cause 
patients serious harm 

1 2 3 4 
 
Q12. In your workplace, how often does the following occur: 
 
 NEVER RARELY SOMETIMES USUALLY 
a. Adverse events, regardless of 
the severity of the harm they 
cause, are disclosed to patients 
and/or their families. 

1 2 3 4 
 











a. Disclosing adverse events to 
patient safety employees, such 
as risk managers 

1 2 3 4 
b. Disclosing adverse events to 
your colleagues 

1 2 3 4 
c. Disclosing adverse events to 
patients and/or their families 







Part 4: Professional Ethics 
 











a. The need to disclose adverse 
events to patients and/or their 
families is a proportionate 
one—it increases as the harm or 
risk of harm to the patient 
increases. 

1 2 3 4 
b. I prefer not to do or say 
anything that could be 
construed as an admission of 
legal liability. 

1 2 3 4 
 
Q15.  How likely or unlikely would you be to disclose the following to one of your patients 
and/or their families, if it was to occur: 
 
 UNLIKELY      LIKELY 
a. An adverse event that causes mild 
harm 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
b. An adverse event that causes 
moderate harm 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
c. An adverse event that causes serious 
harm 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
 
Q16. How likely or unlikely would you be to disclose the following to one of your patients and/or 
their families, if it was to occur: 
 
 UNLIKELY     LIKELY 
An adverse event that is not readily apparent 
to the patient and 
          
a. Causes mild harm 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
b. Causes moderate harm 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
c. Causes serious harm 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
An adverse event that is readily 
apparent to the patient and 
          
a. Causes mild harm 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
b. Causes moderate harm 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 




Q17. While some adverse events are readily apparent to patients, others are not as readily 
apparent. At what point does the apparentness of an adverse event influence your willingness to 
disclose it to patients and/or their families? 
 
1  2  3  4  5  6  7  8  9  10 
Not at All        Readily 
Apparent        Apparent 
 











a. When adverse events occur, I 
disclose them to patients and/or 
their families because that is 
the way I would like to be 
treated if I were in their shoes. 

1 2 3 4 
b. I take responsibility for my 
actions when they have a 
serious, adverse impact on 
patients’ health and well-being. 

1 2 3 4 
 











a. Disclosing adverse events is the 
right thing to do, even if it 
comes at a significant personal 
or professional cost. 

1 2 3 4 
b. Failing to disclose adverse 
events to patients and/or their 
families is deceptive and 
undermines their trust in the 
health care system. 






Part 5: Self-efficacy 
 
Q20. Next, I’d like to ask you about any training on disclosing adverse events you have received.  
 
 NONE A LITTLE SOME A LOT 
A GREAT 
DEAL 
a. How much education or 
training on disclosing 
adverse events to patients 
and/or their families have 
you received? 

1 2 3 4 5 
b. How much experience do 
you have disclosing 
adverse events to patients 
and/or their families? 

1 2 3 4 5 
 
Q21. How comfortable or uncomfortable would you feel disclosing the following to one of your 
patients and/or their families, if it was to occur: 
 
 COMFORTABLE  UNCOMFORTABLE 
An adverse event that is not readily 
apparent to the patient and 
          
a. Causes mild harm 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
b. Causes moderate harm 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
c. Causes serious harm 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
An adverse event that is readily apparent 
to the patient and 
          
a. Causes mild harm 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
b. Causes moderate harm 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
c. Causes serious harm 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
 
Part 6: Clinical Scenarios 
 
In this section, you will be presented with a series of clinical vignettes. Please read each 
vignette carefully and answer the corresponding questions. 
 
Q22. Randomly assigned vignette 
 
a. Would you classify the event being described as a medical error, adverse event, or 
something else? 
 
1  Medical error 
2  Adverse event  





b. What level of harm, if any, did the patient sustain? 
 
1  Unknown 
2  None 
3  Mild 
4  Moderate 
5  Severe 
6  Death 
 
c. How apparent would this event be to the patient? 
 
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
Not Readily 
Apparent 
       Readily 
Apparent 
 
d. If this was your patient, how likely would you be to disclose what happened to the patient 
and/or their family? 
 
1  2  3  4  5  6  7  8  9  10 
       Highly                Highly 
  Unlikely                Likely 
 











f. If disclosed, how likely is this event to result in a malpractice lawsuit? 
 

1 2 3 4 





Q23. Randomly assigned vignette 
 
a. Would you classify the event being described as a medical error, adverse event, or 
something else? 
 
1  Medical error 
2  Adverse event  
3  Something else (please specify): 
_____________________________________________ 
 
b. What level of harm, if any, did the patient sustain? 
 
1  Unknown 
2  None 
3  Mild 
4  Moderate 
5  Severe 
6  Death 
 
c. How apparent would this event be to the patient? 
 
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
Not Readily 
Apparent 
       Readily 
Apparent 
 
d. If this was your patient, how likely would you be to disclose what happened to the patient 
and/or their family? 
  
1  2  3  4  5  6  7  8  9  10 
       Highly                 Highly 
      Unlikely                 Likely 
 














f.  If disclosed, how likely is this event to result in a malpractice lawsuit? 
 

1 2 3 4 
Very likely Likely Unlikely Very unlikely 
 
Q24. Randomly assigned vignette 
 
a. Would you classify the event being described as a medical error, adverse event, or 
something else? 
 
1  Medical error 
2  Adverse event  
3  Something else (please specify): 
_____________________________________________ 
 
b. What level of harm, if any, did the patient sustain? 
 
1  Unknown 
2  None 
3  Mild 
4  Moderate 
5  Severe 
6  Death 
 
c. How apparent would this event be to the patient? 
 
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
Not Readily 
Apparent 
       Readily 
Apparent 
 
d. If this was your patient, how likely would you be to disclose what happened to the patient 
and/or their family? 
  
1  2  3  4  5  6  7  8  9  10 
       Highly                 Highly 
    Unlikely                 Likely 
 














f. If disclosed, how likely is this event to result in a malpractice lawsuit? 
 

1 2 3 4 
Very likely Likely Unlikely Very unlikely 
 
Q25. Randomly assigned vignette 
 
a. Would you classify the event being described as a medical error, adverse event, or 
something else? 
 
1  Medical error 
2  Adverse event  
3  Something else (please specify): 
______________________________________________ 
 
b. What level of harm, if any, did the patient sustain? 
 
1  Unknown 
2  None 
3  Mild 
4  Moderate 
5  Severe 
6  Death 
 
c. How apparent would this event be to the patient? 
 
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
Not Readily 
Apparent 
       Readily 
Apparent 
 
d. If this was your patient, how likely would you be to disclose what happened to the patient 
and/or their family? 
  
1  2  3  4  5  6  7  8  9  10 
       Highly                 Highly 
    Unlikely                 Likely 
 














f. How likely is this event to result in a malpractice suit, if disclosed? 
 

1 2 3 4 
Very likely Likely Unlikely Very unlikely 
 
 
Part 7: About You… 
 
Q26. Please select your sex. 
 
1  Male     2  Female 
 
Q27. Do you consider yourself Hispanic, Latino, or Latina? 
 
1  Yes     2  No 
 
Q28. What is your race? Check all that apply. 
 
1  Caucasian 
2  African American 
3  American Indian or Alaskan Native 
4  Asian or Pacific Islander 
5  Other (please specify): ____________________ 
 
Q29. How old are you? 
 
     |___|___| Years 
 









Q32. In which zip code, do you primarily practice? 
         
         |___|___|___|___|___| 
 
Q33. What percentage of your time is spent on each of the following: 
 
A. Clinical care      |___|___|___|% 
B. Hospital care     |___|___|___|% 
C. Research      |___|___|___|% 
D. Other      |___|___|___|% 
Total             100% 
 
Q34. Have you ever provided medical testimony in a legal deposition that was related to medical 
malpractice? 
 
1  Yes      
2  No 
 
Q35. Have you ever been named as a defendant in a medical malpractice lawsuit? 
 
1  Yes      
2  No 
Q36. How many malpractice claims have been filed against you? 
 
0  Zero 
1  One 
2  Two  
3  Three 
4  Four 
5  Five or more 
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Appendix E: Copy of Clinical Vignettes 
Scenario #1: CT Scan (medical error group 1, adverse event group 2)  
 
A physician is seeing a female patient who has a moderate cognitive impairment. She is 
complaining of lower back pain. He recommends that she undergo a CT scan of her back. 
However, his imaging request is electronically entered as a CT scan of her brain. The 
radiology technologist performs a CT scan of her brain, as requested. Upon seeing the 
results, the physician realizes that he ordered the wrong test and submits a new order for 
a CT scan of her back. 
 
Scenario #2: Appendectomy (adverse event group 2 and 3) 
 
An elderly female presents to the ED complaining of severe stomach pain, nausea, and 
vomiting. She is diagnosed with appendicitis and scheduled for an emergency 
appendectomy. While in pre-op, she gets out of bed to use the bathroom, falls, and breaks 
her right arm, resulting in a slight delay of her appendectomy surgery. During this delay, 
her appendix bursts, and subsequently, she develops an abscess. During the surgery to 
treat her abscess, she dies on the operating table. 
 
Scenario #3: Gastrointestinal Bleed (medical error group 3, adverse event group 2 and 
3) 
 
A 62-year-old, male patient with diabetes and chronic renal insufficiency is admitted to 
the hospital with a new onset gastrointestinal bleed. He is made NPO for endoscopy. He 
demonstrates a high-level of anxiety about the procedure. Prior to the procedure, he is 
given diazepam to calm him. While waiting for the procedure, he gets out of bed to use 
the bathroom but is disoriented, falls, and fractures his left hip. 
 
Scenario #4: Allergic Reaction (adverse event group 1) 
 
A male patient with no known drug allergies develops a maculopapular rash, which is 
consistent with a drug allergy to a medication he has recently been prescribed. 
Immediately, his physician stops the medication and treats his rash. He responds well to 
treatment, and his rash resolves. 
 
Scenario #5: Retained Sponge (medical error group 1) 
 
A physician is seeing a female patient 3 weeks after an elective splenectomy for ITP. The 
splenectomy was technically challenging because of the patient’s obesity, but seemed 
uncomplicated. During a follow-up visit, she complains of vague, persistent LUQ pain 
and is sent for an abdominal x-ray. The film shows a foreign body in her LUQ. She 
undergoes a subsequent operation to have it removed. A small piece of sponge, 
associated with the splenectomy, is subsequently removed from her abdomen. She makes 




Scenario #6: Prostate Cancer (medical error group 1) 
 
A urologist performs a needle biopsy on the prostate glands of two patients, John and 
Michael. The urologist correctly labels each specimen with the corresponding patient’s 
identifying information and sends them to pathology for examination. Dr. Greene 
examines each specimen under a microscope and notes the presence of cancerous cells in 
John's sample. While Dr. Greene is entering the information into each patient's electronic 
medical record, she is interrupted by one of her assistants and enters the wrong 
information into each patient's file. After reviewing the pathology reports, the urologist 
tells John that he does not have cancer. He tells Michael that he does and recommends 
radiotherapy. A year later, John returns to the urologist, complaining of difficulty 
urinating, frequent urges to urinate at night, and weak stream. A needle biopsy suggests 
prostate cancer and an evaluation shows disease metastatic to bone.  
 
Scenario #7: Breast Biopsies (medical error group 3) 
 
A female patient’s mammography results indicate that she has a suspicious lump in both 
of her breasts, so she is referred for a biopsy. A surgeon performs a biopsy on both 
breasts and sends the specimen to pathology. One of the samples indicates a malignancy. 
However, the specimens are not clearly labelled, so the pathologist is not sure which 
breast the tissue came from. 
 
Scenario #8: Foot Amputation (medical error group 2) 
 
A physician is treating a 70-year-old male patient with uncontrolled Type II diabetes. He 
has diabetic neuropathy, a diabetic foot ulcer on his right foot, and gangrene on his left 
foot. Due to the severity of the gangrene, the physician recommends that he have his foot 
amputated. During surgery, the patient’s right foot is amputated, instead of his left. 
 
Scenario #9: Shunt Revision (adverse event group 1) 
 
During a car accident two years ago, Shannon, a 28-year-old female, suffered permanent, 
debilitating head and spinal cord injuries. Now, she is a paraplegic, requires a shunt to 
prevent increased cranial pressure, and uses a gastrostomy tube due to problems 
swallowing. Shannon is admitted to the hospital for a shunt revision and develops 
aspiration pneumonia. 
 
Scenario #10: IV Infiltration (adverse event group 2 and 3) 
 
A physician works on the medical-surgical unit of a small, rural hospital. One evening, a 
few of the unit’s nurses call-in sick, leaving him and two nurse’s aides caring for 16 
patients. A young boy is admitted to the unit with a primary infection of oral herpes. His 
mouth has several large, painful lesions and he is dehydrated. He has not eaten or 
drunken much in the past 24 hours, so an IV is placed in his left arm. An hour later, the 
boy’s mother presses the call button because she notices the area around the IV stick is 
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becoming swollen and cool to the touch. Due to the current staffing levels, the issue is not 
resolved for several hours. 
 
Scenario #11: IV Mix-up (medical error group 2 and 3, adverse event group 1) 
 
Ms. Jones has diabetes. She gets the flu (H1N1) and goes to the ER. There, she is 
stabilized before being transferred to the medical floor. There, Jackie, a nurse, reviews 
the ER physician’s orders. She notes that an IV is ordered as NS at 150cc/hr. She checks 
the IV fluid and notices it is NS but set at a rate of 5cc/hr on the IV pump, so she sets it to 
150cc/hr. But, the pump is not hooked up to a bag of NS. It is attached to a small 100 cc 
bag of insulin that is hanging behind 
the bag of NS. Ms. Jones develops severe hypoglycemia and dies in the hospital. 
 
Scenario #12: Hearing Loss (adverse event group 3) 
 
Mr. Jenkins is admitted to the hospital with diagnoses of diabetes, renal disease, 
hypertension, and a foot infection. His physician cultures his foot wound, and after 
receiving the lab report, ordered several antibiotics, including Gentamicin Sulfate 60 mg 
IV q. 40 h. His physician orders a series of lab tests to assess his renal functioning and 
blood serum levels. However, the results are not closely monitored. Mr. Jenkins receives 
Gentamicin for three days and develops ototoxicity. 
 
Scenario #13: Knee Replacement (medical error group 3) 
 
Ms. Smith is an elderly female patient with osteoarthritis in both knees. She has had knee 
pain for a few years and has tried a variety of different treatments, including prescription 
NSAIDs, corticosteroid injections, and physical therapy. Since these treatments have not 
significantly decreased her pain, her physician recommends she undergo knee 
replacement surgery, starting with her left knee. Prior to surgery, she is asked to place a 
mark on the knee she is having surgery on, but labels the wrong knee. While preparing 
for surgery, the surgeon is called away to consult on an urgent case and asks a resident to 
start the surgery. The resident, not knowing the patient’s history, starts operating on the 
wrong knee. When the surgeon returns, he notices that the resident is operating on the 
wrong knee. 
 
Scenario #14: Birth Control (adverse event group 2) 
 
A 35-year-old woman is using Nuva Ring. After a few months, she starts experiencing 
severe pain in her right calf. Also, her right leg is swollen, and she is having difficulty 
breathing. Concerned, she goes to the doctor, where she is diagnosed with deep vein 
thrombosis and a pulmonary embolism. Immediately, the doctor takes her off birth 
control and starts treating her with blood thinners.  
 




Georgia has breast cancer and is undergoing chemotherapy. During her first cycle of 
chemo, she spikes a high fever and experiences violent chills. Alarmed, she goes to the 
ED. Blood tests indicate that Georgia has a very low neutrophil count. She is diagnosed 
with febrile neutropenia and an infection. She is treated with intravenous antibiotics in 
the hospital’s oncology ward. 
 
Scenario #16: Leukemia (medical error group 1) 
 
James is a 16-year-old patient with leukemia. For the past three months, he has been 
receiving chemotherapy. He has a central venous access device (CVAD) and alopecia. 
Recently, James was admitted to the hospital with a fever that did not respond to the 
acetaminophen his parents have been directed to give him. Blood tests indicate that he 
has anemia, neutropenia, and thrombocytopenia, which is attributed to the chemotherapy. 
 
 
Scenario #17: Childhood Vaccination (medical error group 2) 
 
Samantha and her 9-month-old daughter Emily recently moved to another state. 
Samantha takes Emily to a local physician for a well-child visit. Wanting to ensure that 
Emily is up-to-date on her immunizations, Samantha asks the doctor about childhood 
vaccinations and gives him a copy of her daughter's immunization card. While reviewing 
the card, he notices that she has not received her third Haemophilus influenzae type B 
shot and administers it. Shortly thereafter, he receives a copy of Emily's medical record 









<insert physician’s full name> 
<insert organization> 
<insert address Line 1> 
<insert address Line 2> 
 
Dear Dr.  <insert physician’s last name>:  
 
My name is Lesley Weaver, and I am a doctoral student at the University of Minnesota, Twin 
Cities. For my dissertation, I am examining the factors that influence physicians’ willingness to 
disclose <insert survey version> to patients and/or their families. Since you are a practicing 
physician, I am inviting you to participate in this study by completing the enclosed survey. 
 
The following questionnaire will require approximately 25 minutes to complete. Four participants 
will be randomly selected to receive an iPad or Android tablet of their choice (approximate value 
$500 per tablet). Your participation in this research study is completely voluntary and you can 
refuse to participate at any time. Additionally, you can skip any questions you do not want to 
answer for any reason. If you choose to participate, please answer all questions to the best of your 
ability and promptly return it using the enclosed self-addressed stamped envelope. 
 
Before completing the survey, I would like to assure you that all data collected as part of this 
study will be deidentified prior to data analysis and interpretation. No personally identifiable 
information will be associated with your responses in any reports or papers stemming from this 
study. 
 
Thank you for taking the time to assist me in my educational endeavors. The data collected will 
provide useful information regarding the disclosure of <insert survey version>. Completing and 
returning this enclosed questionnaire will indicate your willingness to participate in this study.  
 
If you have any questions or concerns about this study, please feel free to contact me or my 
dissertation adviser Todd Rockwood, Ph.D.. Our contact information is listed below.  
 
To share feedback privately about your research experience, including any concerns about the 
study, call the Research Participants Advocate Line: (612) 625-1650 or give feedback online at 
www.irb.umn.edu/report.html. You may also contact the Human Research Protection Program in 
writing at D528 Mayo, 420 Delaware Street SE, Minneapolis, MN 55455. 
 





Lesley Weaver, M.P.P. 
weav0095@umn.edu 




Todd Rockwood, Ph.D. 
rockw001@umn.edu 
Office: (612) 625-3993 
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<insert physician’s full name> 
<insert organization> 
<insert address Line 1> 
<insert address Line 2> 
 
Dear Dr.  <insert physician’s last name>:  
 
A few weeks ago, I sent you a letter that asked you to participate in my survey on the 
factors that influences physicians’ willingness to disclose <survey_version> to patients 
and their families. To the best of my knowledge, it has not been returned. 
 
To date, the results indicate that physicians are in a very precarious situation with 
many competing demands that they must balance when dealing with the disclosure 
of «survey_version». While these results suggest that physicians must navigate a 
complex process, it is important that I hear from nearly everyone in my sample to ensure 
that my results are truly representative of Minnesota physicians’ views on disclosure. 
Therefore, I am asking that you take the time to fill out and return the enclosed 
questionnaire.  
 
The survey should take approximately 20 minutes to complete. As a token of my 
appreciation, four participants will be randomly selected to receive an iPad or Android 
tablet of their choice (approximate value $500 per tablet) at the end of the study. Your 
participation in this study is completely voluntary, and you can skip any questions you do 
not want to answer for any reason.  
 
This study is being conducted confidentially. During data collection, I will know whether 
you have returned the survey, but all links between your personal information and the 
data will be destroyed prior to data analysis.   
 
The University of Minnesota’s Institutional Review Board has approved this study. If you 
have any questions about this study, please contact me or my dissertation adviser. Our 
contact information is listed below.  
 
To share feedback privately about your research experience, including any concerns 
about the study, call the Research Participants Advocate Line: (612) 625-1650 or give 
feedback online at www.irb.umn.edu/report.html. You may also contact the Human 
Research Protection Program in writing at D528 Mayo, 420 Delaware Street SE, 
Minneapolis, MN 55455. 
 




Lesley Weaver, M.P.P.  Todd Rockwood, Ph.D. 
weav0095@umn.edu   rockw001@umn.edu 




Appendix H: Reminder Letter for Second Follow-up Mailing to the Mail Only Groups 
<insert date> 
 
<insert physician’s full name> 
<insert organization> 
<insert address Line 1> 
<insert address Line 2> 
 
Dear Dr.  <insert physician’s last name>:  
 
In recent weeks, I have sent you a letter asking you, as part of a random sample of 
currently practicing Minnesota physicians, to let me know your thoughts on the 
disclosure of <insert survey version> to patients and their families. I plan to start 
summarizing the results within the next month or two, so I hope that all surveys will be 
completed by then. 
 
For your convenience, I have enclosed a paper copy of the survey. You can help me by 
filling it out and returning it in the envelope provided. For many years, policy makers, 
accrediting organizations, and health systems have been talking about and developing 
disclosure policies and guidelines. I hope that this study will contribute to these 
conversations and provide insight into Minnesota physicians’ views on disclosure. 
 
The survey should take approximately 20 minutes to complete. Your participation in this 
study is completely voluntary, and you can skip any questions you do not want to answer 
for any reason. At the end of the study, four participants will be randomly selected to 
receive a tablet of their choice (approximate value $500 per tablet).  
 
This study is being conducted confidentially. During data collection, I will know whether 
you have returned the survey, but all links between your personal information and the 
data will be destroyed prior to data analysis.   
 
If you have any questions about this study, please contact me via phone or email at (612) 
656-9389 or weav0095@umn.edu. 
 
The University of Minnesota’s Institutional Review Board has approved this study. To 
share feedback privately about your research experience, including any concerns about 
the study, call the Research Participants Advocate Line: (612) 625-1650 or give feedback 
online at www.irb.umn.edu/report.html. You may also contact the Human Research 
Protection Program in writing at D528 Mayo, 420 Delaware Street SE, Minneapolis, MN 
55455. 
 
Many thanks for considering this request. 
 









Appendix I: Short-form Medical Error Survey 
 
Part 1: Legal Considerations 
 












a. My malpractice 
insurer 
_______________ 
me from doing or 
saying anything that 
could be construed 
as an admission of 
legal liability (e.g. 
disclosing medical 




1 2 3 4 
b. The health system I 
work for 
_______________ 
me from doing or 
saying anything that 
could be construed 
as an admission of 
legal liability (e.g. 
disclosing medical 




1 2 3 4 
 
Q2. Disclosing harmful medical errors to patients and/or their families will make them: 
 
1  Much more likely to sue 
2  Somewhat more likely to sue 
3  Somewhat less likely to sue 














a. If disclosing harmful medical 
errors was not related to 
malpractice risk, it would be 
easier for me to disclose them 
to patients and/or their 
families. 

1 2 3 4 
 
 
Part 2: Human Fallibility 
 











a. Disclosing medical errors will 
negatively affect a provider’s 
career. 

1 2 3 4 
 
Q5. Disclosing medical errors to my patients and/or their families would have the following 
impact on my professional reputation: Circle the number that best represents your answer. 
 
1  2  3  4  5  6  7  8  9  10 
A Substantial         A Substantial 
        Negative Impact            Positive Impact 
 
Q6. How much easier would it be for you to disclose medical errors to each of the following if 
there was no potential for stigmatization associated with disclosing them:  
 
 








a. Your patients and/or their 
families 

1 2 3 4 
b.   Your colleagues 1 2 3 4 
c.   The health system you work 
for 





Q7. How humiliated does having to admit to patients and/or their families that you made a 
mistake make you feel? Circle the number that best represents your answer. 
 
1  2  3  4  5  6  7  8  9  10 
Not at All         Extremely 
 
 
Part 3: Practice Culture 
 
Q8. In your workplace, how often does each of the following occur: 
 
 NEVER RARELY SOMETIMES FREQUENTLY 
ALL THE 
TIME 
a. Direct care 
providers (e.g. 
physicians, nurses) 
freely speak up 
when they see 
something that 
could negatively 
affect patient safety. 

1 2 3 4 5 
b. Direct care 
providers (e.g. 
physicians, nurses) 
are informed of 
problems that affect 
patient safety. 

1 2 3 4 5 
c. Direct care 
providers (e.g. 
physicians, nurses) 






















a. In my workplace, direct care 
providers (e.g. physicians, 
nurses) feel like their mistakes 
are held against them. 

1 2 3 4 
b. In my workplace, it is difficult 
for me to speak up when I 
perceive a problem with 
patient safety. 

1 2 3 4 
c. When I have patient safety 
concerns, my colleagues 
encourage me to report them 
to the appropriate personnel 
(e.g. my supervisor, risk 
managers, patient safety 
advocates, etc.). 

1 2 3 4 
d. My supervisor/manager 
seriously considers my 
suggestions for improving 
patient safety. 

1 2 3 4 
e. In my workplace, it is easy for 
me to learn from others’ 
mistakes. 

1 2 3 4 
f. In my workplace, reporting 
medical errors to the 
institution (e.g. risk managers, 
patient safety advocates, etc.) 
is considered an important 
component of patient safety. 

1 2 3 4 
g. In my workplace, the lack of 
supportive forums for and 
policies regarding the 
disclosure of medical errors 
prevents me from disclosing 
them to patients and/or their 
families. 






Q10. In your workplace, how often are each of the following reported to the organization when 
they occur: 
 
 NEVER RARELY SOMETIMES USUALLY 
a. Near misses 1 2 3 4 
b. Medical errors that have no 
potential to harm patients  

1 2 3 4 
c. Medical errors that could potentially 
harm patients but don’t 

1 2 3 4 
d. Medical errors that cause patients 
mild harm 

1 2 3 4 
e. Medical errors that cause patients 
moderate harm 

1 2 3 4 
f. Medical errors that cause patients 
serious harm 

1 2 3 4 
 
Q11. In your workplace, how often does the following occur: 
 
 NEVER RARELY SOMETIMES USUALLY 
a. Medical errors, regardless of their 
potential to cause harm or the harm 
actually caused, are disclosed to 
patients and/or their families. 

1 2 3 4 
 











a. Disclosing medical errors to 
patient safety employees, 
such as risk managers 

1 2 3 4 
b. Disclosing medical errors to 
your colleagues 

1 2 3 4 
c. Disclosing medical errors to 
patients and/or their families 







Part 4: Professional Ethics 
 











a. The need to disclose medical 
errors to patients and/or their 
families is a proportionate 
one—it increases as the harm 
or risk of harm to the patient 
increases. 

1 2 3 4 
 
Q14. How likely or unlikely would you be to disclose the following to one of your patients and/or 
their families, if it was to occur: 
 
 UNLIKELY      LIKELY 
a. A near miss  1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
b. A medical error that has no 
potential to harm the patient 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
c. A medical error that could 
potentially harm the patient 
but do not 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
d. A medical error that causes 
mild harm 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
e. A medical error that causes 
moderate harm 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
f. A medical error that causes 
serious harm 





Q15. How likely or unlikely would you be to disclose the following to one of your patients and/or 
their families, if it was to occur: 
 
 UNLIKELY     LIKELY 
A medical error that is not readily apparent to 
the patient and 
          
a. Has no potential to harm the patient 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
b. Could potentially harm the patient but 
does not 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
c. Causes mild harm 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
d. Causes moderate harm 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
e. Causes serious harm 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
A medical error that is readily apparent to the 
patient and 
          
f. Has no potential to harm the patient 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
g. Could potentially harm the patient but 
does not 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
h. Causes mild harm 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
i. Causes moderate harm 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
j. Causes serious harm 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
 
Q16. While some medical errors are readily apparent to patients, others are not as readily 
apparent. At what point does the apparentness of a medical error influence your willingness to 
disclose it to patients and/or their families? 
 
1  2  3  4  5  6  7  8  9  10 
Not at All        Readily 
             Apparent        Apparent 
 











a. When medical errors occur, I 
disclose them to patients and/or 
their families because that is 
the way I would like to be 
treated if I were in their shoes. 

1 2 3 4 
b. I take responsibility for my 
actions when they have a 
serious, adverse impact on 
patients’ health and well-being. 

1 2 3 4 
c. Disclosing medical errors is the 
right thing to do, even if it 
comes at a significant personal 
or professional cost. 





Part 5: Self-efficacy 
 
Q18. Next, I’d like to ask you about any training on disclosing medical errors you have received.  
 
 NONE A LITTLE SOME A LOT 
A GREAT 
DEAL 
a. How much education or 
training on disclosing 
medical errors to 
patients and/or their 
families have you 
received? 

1 2 3 4 5 
b. How much experience 
do you have disclosing 
medical errors to 
patients and/or their 
families? 

1 2 3 4 5 
 
Q19. How comfortable or uncomfortable would you feel disclosing the following to one of your 
patients and/or their families, if it was to occur: 
 
 COMFORTABLE  UNCOMFORTABLE 
A medical error that is not readily 
apparent to the patient and 
          
a. Has no potential to harm the 
patient 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
b. Could potentially harm the patient 
but does not 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
c. Causes mild harm 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
d. Causes moderate harm 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
e. Causes serious harm 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
A medical error that is readily apparent to 
the patient and 
          
f. Has no potential to harm the 
patient 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
g. Could potentially harm the patient 
but does not 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
h. Causes mild harm 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
i. Causes moderate harm 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 





Part 6: Clinical Scenarios 
 
In this section, you will be presented with a series of clinical vignettes. Please read each 
vignette carefully and answer the corresponding questions. 
 
Q20. Randomly assigned vignette 
 
a. Would you classify the event being described as a medical error, adverse event, or 
something else? 
 
1  Medical error 
2  Adverse event  
3  Something else (please specify): 
________________________________________________ 
 
b. What level of harm, if any, did the patient sustain? 
 
1  Unknown 
2  None 
3  Mild 
4  Moderate 
5  Severe 
6  Death 
 
c. How apparent would this event be to the patient? 
 
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
Not Readily Apparent     Readily Apparent 
 
d. If this was your patient, how likely would you be to disclose what happened to the patient 
and/or their family? 
  
1  2  3  4  5  6  7  8  9  10 
Highly Unlikely       Highly Likely 
 
e. If disclosed, how likely is this event to result in a malpractice lawsuit? 
 

1 2 3 4 
Very likely Likely Unlikely Very unlikely 
 
Q21. Randomly assigned vignette 
 
a. Would you classify the event being described as a medical error, adverse event, or 
something else? 
 
1  Medical error 
2  Adverse event  





b. What level of harm, if any, did the patient sustain? 
 
1  Unknown 
2  None 
3  Mild 
4  Moderate 
5  Severe 
6  Death 
  
c. How apparent would this event be to the patient? 
 
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
Not Readily Apparent     Readily Apparent 
 
d. If this was your patient, how likely would you be to disclose what happened to the patient 
and/or their family? 
  
1  2  3  4  5  6  7  8  9  10 
Highly Unlikely       Highly Likely 
 
e. If disclosed, how likely is this event to result in a malpractice lawsuit? 
 

1 2 3 4 
Very likely Likely Unlikely Very unlikely 
 
Q22. Randomly assigned vignette 
 
a. Would you classify the event being described as a medical error, adverse event, or 
something else? 
 
1  Medical error 
2  Adverse event  
3  Something else (please specify): 
________________________________________________ 
 
b. What level of harm, if any, did the patient sustain? 
 
1  Unknown 
2  None 
3  Mild 
4  Moderate 
5  Severe 





c. How apparent would this event be to the patient? 
 
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
Not Readily Apparent     Readily Apparent 
 
d. If this was your patient, how likely would you be to disclose what happened to the patient 
and/or their family? 
  
1  2  3  4  5  6  7  8  9  10 
Highly Unlikely       Highly Likely 
 
e. If disclosed, how likely is this event to result in a malpractice lawsuit? 
 

1 2 3 4 
Very likely Likely Unlikely Very unlikely 
 
Q23. Randomly assigned vignette 
 
a. Would you classify the event being described as a medical error, adverse event, or 
something else? 
 
1  Medical error 
2  Adverse event  
3  Something else (please specify): 
________________________________________________ 
 
b. What level of harm, if any, did the patient sustain? 
 
1  Unknown 
2  None 
3  Mild 
4  Moderate 
5  Severe 
6  Death 
 
c. How apparent would this event be to the patient? 
 
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
Not Readily Apparent     Readily Apparent 
 
d. If this was your patient, how likely would you be to disclose what happened to the patient 
and/or their family? 
  
1  2  3  4  5  6  7  8  9  10 
Highly Unlikely       Highly Likely 
 
e. If disclosed, how likely is this event to result in a malpractice lawsuit? 
 

1 2 3 4 
235 
 
Very likely Likely Unlikely Very unlikely 
 
 
Part 7: About You… 
 
Q24. Please select your sex. 
 
1  Male     2  Female 
 
Q265. Do you consider yourself Hispanic, Latino, or Latina? 
 
1  Yes     2  No 
 
Q26. What is your race? Check all that apply. 
 
1  Caucasian 
2  African American 
3  American Indian or Alaskan Native 
4  Asian or Pacific Islander 
5  Other (please specify): ____________________ 
 
Q27. How old are you? 
   
     |___|___| Years 
 
Q28. What is your primary area of practice/specialty? Please specify. 
___________________________ 
 
Q29. How many years have you been practicing medicine? 
 
         |___|___| Years 
 
Q30. In which zip code, do you primarily practice? 
         
         |___|___|___|___|___| 
 
Q31. Please specify what percentage of your time is spent in each of the following: 
 
E. Clinical care      |___|___|___|% 
F. Hospital care     |___|___|___|% 
G. Research      |___|___|___|% 
H. Other       |___|___|___|% 
Total                                                                         100% 
 
Q32. Have you ever provided medical testimony in a legal deposition that was related to medical 
malpractice? 
 
1  Yes     




Q33. Have you ever been named as a defendant in a medical malpractice lawsuit? 
 
1  Yes    
2  No 
 
Q34. How many malpractice claims have been filed against you? 
 
0  Zero 
1  One 
2  Two  
3  Three 
4  Four 








Appendix J: Short-form Adverse Event Survey 
 
Part 1: Legal Considerations 
 












a. My malpractice 
insurer 
_______________ 
me from doing or 
saying anything 
that could be 
construed as an 
admission of legal 
liability (e.g. 
disclosing adverse 




1 2 3 4 
b. The health system 
I work for 
_______________ 
me from doing or 
saying anything 
that could be 
construed as an 
admission of legal 
liability (e.g. 
disclosing adverse 








Q2. Disclosing adverse events to patients and/or their families will make them: 
 
1  Much more likely to sue 
2  Somewhat more likely to sue 
3  Somewhat less likely to sue 
4  Much less likely to sue 
 











a. If disclosing adverse 
events was not related to 
malpractice risk, it would 
be easier for me to 
disclose them to patients 
and/or their families. 

1 2 3 4 
 
 
Part 2: Human Fallibility 
 











a. Disclosing adverse 
events will negatively 
affect a provider’s 
career. 

1 2 3 4 
 
Q5. Disclosing adverse events to my patients and/or their families would have the following 
impact on my professional reputation: Circle the number that best represents your answer. 
 
1  2  3  4  5  6  7  8  9  10 
A Substantial         A Substantial 





Q6. How much easier would it be for you to disclose adverse events to each of the following if 
there was no potential for stigmatization associated with disclosing them:  
 
 








a. Your patients and/or their 
families 

1 2 3 4 
b. Your colleagues 1 2 3 4 
c. The health system you work 
for 

1 2 3 4 
 
Q7. How humiliated does having to admit to patients and/or their families that you made a 
mistake make you feel? Circle the number that best represents your answer. 
 
1  2  3  4  5  6  7  8  9  10 
Not at All         Extremely 
 
Part 3: Practice Culture 
 
Q8. In your workplace, how often does each of the following occur: 
 
 NEVER RARELY SOMETIMES FREQUENTLY 
ALL THE 
TIME 
a. Direct care providers 
(e.g. physicians, 
nurses) freely speak 
up when they see 




1 2 3 4 5 
b. Direct care providers 
(e.g. physicians, 
nurses) are informed 
of problems that 
affect patient safety. 

1 2 3 4 5 
c. Direct care providers 
(e.g. physicians, 
nurses) discuss ways 
to prevent patient 
safety problems from 
happening again. 

1 2 3 4 5 
 















a. In my workplace, direct care 
providers (e.g. physicians, 
nurses) feel like their mistakes 
are held against them. 

1 2 3 4 
b. In my workplace, it is difficult 
for me to speak up when I 
perceive a problem with patient 
safety. 

1 2 3 4 
c. When I have patient safety 
concerns, my colleagues 
encourage me to report them to 
the appropriate personnel (e.g. 
my supervisor, risk managers, 
patient safety advocates, etc.). 

1 2 3 4 
d. My supervisor/manager 
seriously considers my 
suggestions for improving 
patient safety. 

1 2 3 4 
e. In my workplace, it is easy for 
me to learn from others’ 
mistakes. 

1 2 3 4 
f. In my workplace, the 
procedures and systems that are 
in place are good at preventing 
adverse events from happening. 

1 2 3 4 
g. In my workplace, the lack of 
supportive forums for and 
policies regarding the 
disclosure of adverse events 
prevents me from disclosing 
them to patients and/or their 
families. 






Q10. In your workplace, how often are each of the following reported to the organization when 
they occur: 
 
 NEVER RARELY SOMETIMES USUALLY 
a. Adverse events that cause 
patients mild harm 

1 2 3 4 
b. Adverse events that cause 
patients moderate harm  

1 2 3 4 
c. Adverse events that cause 
patients serious harm 

1 2 3 4 
 
Q11. In your workplace, how often does the following occur: 
 
 NEVER RARELY SOMETIMES USUALLY 
a. Adverse events, regardless of 
the severity of the harm they 
cause, are disclosed to patients 
and/or their families. 

1 2 3 4 
 











a. Disclosing adverse events to 
patient safety employees, such 
as risk managers 

1 2 3 4 
b. Disclosing adverse events to 
your colleagues 

1 2 3 4 
c. Disclosing adverse events to 
patients and/or their families 







Part 4: Professional Ethics 
 











a. The need to disclose adverse 
events to patients and/or their 
families is a proportionate 
one—it increases as the harm or 
risk of harm to the patient 
increases. 

1 2 3 4 
 
Q14.  How likely or unlikely would you be to disclose the following to one of your patients 
and/or their families, if it was to occur: 
 
 UNLIKELY      LIKELY 
a. An adverse event that causes mild 
harm 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
b. An adverse event that causes 
moderate harm 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
c. An adverse event that causes serious 
harm 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
 
Q15. How likely or unlikely would you be to disclose the following to one of your patients and/or 
their families, if it was to occur: 
 
 UNLIKELY     LIKELY 
An adverse event that is not readily apparent 
to the patient and 
          
a. Causes mild harm 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
b. Causes moderate harm 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
c. Causes serious harm 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
An adverse event that is readily 
apparent to the patient and 
          
d. Causes mild harm 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
e. Causes moderate harm 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
f. Causes serious harm 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
 
Q16. While some adverse events are readily apparent to patients, others are not as readily 
apparent. At what point does the apparentness of an adverse event influence your willingness to 
disclose it to patients and/or their families? 
 
1  2  3  4  5  6  7  8  9  10 
Not at All        Readily 















a. When adverse events occur, I 
disclose them to patients and/or 
their families because that is 
the way I would like to be 
treated if I were in their shoes. 

1 2 3 4 
b. I take responsibility for my 
actions when they have a 
serious, adverse impact on 
patients’ health and well-being. 

1 2 3 4 
c. Disclosing adverse events is 
the right thing to do, even if it 
comes at a significant personal 
or professional cost. 

1 2 3 4 
 
 
Part 5: Self-efficacy 
 
Q18. Next, I’d like to ask you about any training on disclosing adverse events you have received.  
 
 NONE A LITTLE SOME A LOT 
A GREAT 
DEAL 
a. How much education or 
training on disclosing 
adverse events to patients 
and/or their families have 
you received? 

1 2 3 4 5 
b. How much experience do 
you have disclosing 
adverse events to patients 
and/or their families? 






Q19. How comfortable or uncomfortable would you feel disclosing the following to one of your 
patients and/or their families, if it was to occur: 
 
 COMFORTABLE  UNCOMFORTABLE 
An adverse event that is not readily 
apparent to the patient and 
          
a. Causes mild harm 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
b. Causes moderate harm 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
c. Causes serious harm 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
An adverse event that is readily apparent 
to the patient and 
          
d. Causes mild harm 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
e. Causes moderate harm 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
f. Causes serious harm 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
 
 
Part 6: Clinical Scenarios 
 
In this section, you will be presented with a series of clinical vignettes. Please read each 
vignette carefully and answer the corresponding questions. 
 
Q20. Randomly assigned vignette 
 
a. Would you classify the event being described as a medical error, adverse event, or 
something else? 
 
1  Medical error 
2  Adverse event  




b. What level of harm, if any, did the patient sustain? 
 
1  Unknown 
2  None 
3  Mild 
4  Moderate 
5  Severe 
6  Death 
 
c. How apparent would this event be to the patient? 
 
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
Not Readily 
Apparent 





d. If this was your patient, how likely would you be to disclose what happened to the patient 
and/or their family? 
 
1  2  3  4  5  6  7  8  9  10 
  Highly                Highly 
Unlikely                Likely 
 
e. If disclosed, how likely is this event to result in a malpractice lawsuit? 
 

1 2 3 4 
Very likely Likely Unlikely Very unlikely 
 
Q21. Randomly assigned vignette 
 
a. Would you classify the event being described as a medical error, adverse event, or 
something else? 
 
1  Medical error 
2  Adverse event  
3  Something else (please specify): 
_____________________________________________ 
 
b. What level of harm, if any, did the patient sustain? 
 
1  Unknown 
2  None 
3  Mild 
4  Moderate 
5  Severe 
6  Death 
 
c. How apparent would this event be to the patient? 
 
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
Not Readily 
Apparent 
       Readily 
Apparent 
 
d. If this was your patient, how likely would you be to disclose what happened to the patient 
and/or their family? 
  
1  2  3  4  5  6  7  8  9  10 
  Highly                 Highly 
     Unlikely                 Likely 
 
e.  If disclosed, how likely is this event to result in a malpractice lawsuit? 
 

1 2 3 4 





Q22. Randomly assigned vignette 
 
a. Would you classify the event being described as a medical error, adverse event, or 
something else? 
 
1  Medical error 
2  Adverse event  
3  Something else (please specify): 
______________________________________________ 
 
b. What level of harm, if any, did the patient sustain? 
 
1  Unknown 
2  None 
3  Mild 
4  Moderate 
5  Severe 
6  Death 
 
c. How apparent would this event be to the patient? 
 
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
Not Readily 
Apparent 
       Readily 
Apparent 
 
d. If this was your patient, how likely would you be to disclose what happened to the patient 
and/or their family? 
  
1  2  3  4  5  6  7  8  9  10 
   Highly                 Highly 
   Unlikely                 Likely 
 
e. If disclosed, how likely is this event to result in a malpractice lawsuit? 
 

1 2 3 4 
Very likely Likely Unlikely Very unlikely 
 
Q23. Randomly assigned vignette 
 
a. Would you classify the event being described as a medical error, adverse event, or 
something else? 
 
1  Medical error 
2  Adverse event  






b. What level of harm, if any, did the patient sustain? 
 
1  Unknown 
2  None 
3  Mild 
4  Moderate 
5  Severe 
6  Death 
 
c. How apparent would this event be to the patient? 
 
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
Not Readily 
Apparent 
       Readily 
Apparent 
 
d. If this was your patient, how likely would you be to disclose what happened to the patient 
and/or their family? 
  
1  2  3  4  5  6  7  8  9  10 
   Highly                 Highly 
   Unlikely                 Likely 
 
e. How likely is this event to result in a malpractice suit, if disclosed? 
 

1 2 3 4 
Very likely Likely Unlikely Very unlikely 
 
 
Part 7: About You… 
 
Q24. Please select your sex. 
 
1  Male     2  Female 
 
Q25. Do you consider yourself Hispanic, Latino, or Latina? 
 
1  Yes     2  No 
 
Q26. What is your race? Check all that apply. 
 
1  Caucasian 
2  African American 
3  American Indian or Alaskan Native 
4  Asian or Pacific Islander 
5  Other (please specify): ____________________ 
 
Q27. How old are you? 
 




Q28. What is your primary area of practice/specialty? Please specify. 
_____________________________ 
 




Q30. In which zip code, do you primarily practice? 
         
         |___|___|___|___|___| 
 
Q31. What percentage of your time is spent on each of the following: 
 
A. Clinical care     |___|___|___|% 
B. Hospital care     |___|___|___|% 
C. Research      |___|___|___|% 
D. Other      |___|___|___|% 
Total             100% 
 
Q32. Have you ever provided medical testimony in a legal deposition that was related to medical 
malpractice? 
 
1  Yes      
2  No 
 
Q33. Have you ever been named as a defendant in a medical malpractice lawsuit? 
 
1  Yes      
2  No 
 
Q34. How many malpractice claims have been filed against you? 
 
0  Zero 
1  One 
2  Two  
3  Three 
4  Four 
5  Five or more 
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Appendix K: Cover Letter for the Initial Email Contact with Web Only and Web-Mail 
Groups 
Dear Dr. <insert physician’s last name>:  
  
My name is Lesley Weaver, and I am a doctoral student at the University of Minnesota, 
Twin Cities. For my dissertation, I am examining the factors that influence physicians’ 
willingness to disclose medical errors and adverse events to patients and/or their families. 
Since you are a practicing physician, I am writing to request your participation in a web 
survey. 
  
The survey should take approximately 25 minutes to complete. Four participants will be 
randomly selected to receive an iPad or Android tablet of their choice (approximate value 
$500 per tablet). Your participation in this research study is completely voluntary and 
you can refuse to participate at any time. Additionally, you can skip any questions you do 
not want to answer for any reason. If you choose to participate, please click the link 
below or copy and paste the link into your Internet browser.  
  
Follow this link to the Survey:  
${l://SurveyLink?d=Take the Survey} 
 
Or copy and paste the URL below into your internet browser: 
${l://SurveyURL} 
 
Your participation in this research study is completely voluntary. All your responses will 
be kept confidential. All of the information collected as part of this study will be 
deidentified prior to data analysis and interpretation. No personally identifiable 
information will be associated with your responses in any reports or papers stemming 
from this study. Completing and submitting the survey indicates your willingness to 
participate in this study.  
  
The University of Minnesota Institutional Review Board has approved this study. If you 
have any questions or concerns about this study, please feel free to contact me or my 
dissertation adviser Todd Rockwood, Ph.D. Our contact information is listed below.  
  
To share feedback privately about your research experience, including any concerns 
about the study, call the Research Participants Advocate Line: (612) 625-1650 or give 
feedback online atwww.irb.umn.edu/report.html. You may also contact the Human 
Research Protection Program in writing at D528 Mayo, 420 Delaware Street SE, 
Minneapolis, MN 55455. 
  








Cell: (612) 656-9389 
 
Todd Rockwood, Ph.D. 
rockw001@umn.edu 
Office: (612) 625-3993 
 
Follow the link to opt out of future emails: 
<insert opt out link> 
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Appendix L: Reminder Letter for First Follow-up with Web Only and Web-mail Groups 
Dear Dr. <insert physician’s last name>: 
  
At this point in time, it is critical to understand what physicians think about disclosure. 
Health systems and insurers are starting to set disclosure guidelines and policies, and 
often these are developed without considering what the physician community thinks 
about what should be disclosed. This study will help the physician community understand 
how they as a group feel about and perceive disclosure, which can be used to influence 
how policies are developed by agents external to the physician community. 
  
A little over a week ago, I sent you an email asking you to participate in this survey, 
which is for my dissertation research. You were randomly selected from a list of all 
licensed Minnesota physicians. The value of this survey for my research and the 
physician community is directly proportional to the number of individuals who were 
randomly selected to complete the survey. Given the importance of this issue, please 
make the time to complete my survey, which should take approximately 20 minutes to 
complete. I recognize that this seems like a long time, but disclosure is a complex issue, 
and I have made the survey as short as I possibly can. 
  
As a token of my appreciation, four participants will be randomly selected to receive an 
iPad or Android tablet of their choice (approximate value $500 per tablet) at the end of 
the study. Your participation in this study is completely voluntary. You can skip any 
questions you do not want to answer for any reason. If you choose to participate, please 
click the link below or copy and paste it into your Internet browser. 
  
Follow this link to the Survey:  
${l://SurveyLink?d=Take the Survey} 
 
Or copy and paste the URL below into your internet browser: 
${l://SurveyURL} 
  
This study is being conducted confidentially. During the fieldwork, I will know whether 
you have responded to the survey, but all links between your personal information and 
the data will be destroyed. Thus, the analytic dataset will be completely anonymous.   
  
The University of Minnesota’s Institutional Review Board has approved this study. If you 
have any questions or concerns about this study, please feel free to contact me or my 
dissertation adviser. Our contact information is listed below. To share feedback privately 
about your research experience, including any concerns about the study, call the Research 
Participants Advocate Line: (612) 625-1650 or give feedback online 
atwww.irb.umn.edu/report.html. You may also contact the Human Research Protection 
Program in writing at D528 Mayo, 420 Delaware Street SE, Minneapolis, MN 55455. 
  






Lesley Weaver, M.P.P. 
weav0095@umn.edu 
  
Todd Rockwood, Ph.D. 
rockw001@umn.edu 
Office: (612) 625-3993 
 
Follow the link to opt out of future emails: 
<insert opt-out link> 
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Appendix M: Reminder Letter for Second Follow-up with Web Only Group 
Dear Dr. ${m://LastName}: 
  
At this point in time, it is critical to understand what physicians think about disclosure. 
Health systems and insurers are starting to set disclosure guidelines and policies, and 
often these are developed without considering what the physician community thinks 
about what should be disclosed. This study will help the physician community understand 
how they as a group feel about and perceive disclosure, which can be used to influence 
how policies are developed by agents external to the physician community. 
  
A little over a week ago, I sent you an email asking you to participate in this survey, 
which is for my dissertation research. You were randomly selected from a list of all 
licensed Minnesota physicians. The value of this survey for my research and the 
physician community is directly proportional to the number of individuals who were 
randomly selected to complete the survey. Given the importance of this issue, please 
make the time to complete my survey, which should take approximately 20 minutes to 
complete. I recognize that this seems like a long time, but disclosure is a complex issue, 
and I have made the survey as short as I possibly can. 
  
As a token of my appreciation, four participants will be randomly selected to receive an 
iPad or Android tablet of their choice (approximate value $500 per tablet) at the end of 
the study. Your participation in this study is completely voluntary. You can skip any 
questions you do not want to answer for any reason. If you choose to participate, please 
click the link below or copy and paste it into your Internet browser. 
  
Follow this link to the Survey:  
${l://SurveyLink?d=Take the Survey} 
 
Or copy and paste the URL below into your internet browser: 
${l://SurveyURL} 
  
This study is being conducted confidentially. During the fieldwork, I will know whether 
you have responded to the survey, but all links between your personal information and 
the data will be destroyed. Thus, the analytic dataset will be completely anonymous.   
  
The University of Minnesota’s Institutional Review Board has approved this study. If you 
have any questions or concerns about this study, please feel free to contact me or my 
dissertation adviser. Our contact information is listed below. To share feedback privately 
about your research experience, including any concerns about the study, call the Research 
Participants Advocate Line: (612) 625-1650 or give feedback online 
atwww.irb.umn.edu/report.html. You may also contact the Human Research Protection 
Program in writing at D528 Mayo, 420 Delaware Street SE, Minneapolis, MN 55455. 
  






Lesley Weaver, M.P.P. 
weav0095@umn.edu 
  
Todd Rockwood, Ph.D. 
rockw001@umn.edu 
Office: (612) 625-3993 
 
Follow the link to opt out of future emails: 




Appendix N: Reminder Letter for Third Follow-up with Web Only Group 
Dear Dr. ${m://LastName}: 
  
A few weeks ago, I sent you an email asking you to participate in my dissertation 
research. I am conducting a statewide survey of physicians to better understand the 
factors that influence their willingness to disclose medical errors and adverse events to 
patients and their families. My records indicate that you have not completed the survey, 
so I am writing again to request your participation. 
  
You have been randomly selected to receive this survey because you are currently 
practicing medicine in Minnesota. Your participation will help me accurately represent 
the views of physicians on disclosure. 
  
As a token of my appreciation, four participants will be randomly selected to receive an 
iPad or Android tablet of their choice (approximate value $500 per tablet) at the end of 
the study. Your participation in this study is completely voluntary, and the questionnaire 
should take about 20 minutes to complete. You can skip any questions you do not want to 
answer for any reason. If you choose to participate, please click the link below or copy 
and paste it into your Internet browser. 
  
Follow this link to the Survey:  
${l://SurveyLink?d=Take the Survey} 
 
Or copy and paste the URL below into your internet browser: 
${l://SurveyURL} 
  
This study is being conducted confidentially. During data collection, I will know whether 
you have responded to the survey, but all links between your personal information and 
the data will be destroyed prior to data analysis.   
  
The University of Minnesota’s Institutional Review Board has approved this study. If you 
have any questions about this study, please contact me or my dissertation adviser. Our 
contact information is listed below. To share feedback privately about your research 
experience, including any concerns about the study, call the Research Participants 
Advocate Line: (612) 625-1650 or give feedback online at www.irb.umn.edu/report.html. 
You may also contact the Human Research Protection Program in writing at D528 Mayo, 
420 Delaware Street SE, Minneapolis, MN 55455. 
  
Thank you for your participation! 
  
Lesley Weaver, M.P.P. 
weav0095@umn.edu 
  




Office: (612) 625-3993 
 
Follow the link to opt out of future emails: 





Appendix O: Reminder Letter for Second Follow-up with Web-mail Group (Letter Only) 




Dear Dr. «LastName»: 
 
I few weeks ago, I sent you an email inviting you to participate in my dissertation 
research. I am conducting a statewide survey of physicians to better understand the 
factors that influence their willingness to disclose «survey_version» to patients and their 
families. 
 
You have been randomly selected to receive this important survey because you are 
currently practicing medicine in Minnesota. Your participation will help me accurately 
represent the views of physicians on disclosure. 
 
As a token of my appreciation, four participants will be randomly selected to receive an 
iPad or Android tablet of their choice (approximate value $500 per tablet) at the end of 
the study. Your participation in this study is completely voluntary, and the questionnaire 
should take about 20 minutes to complete. You can skip any questions you do not want to 
answer for any reason. If you choose to participate enter the link below into your browser 
and it will take you to the survey. 
 
Survey link: «Link» 
 
This study is being conducted confidentially. During data collection, I will know whether 
you have responded to the survey, but all links between your personal information and 
the data will be destroyed prior to data analysis.   
 
The University of Minnesota’s Institutional Review Board has approved this study. If you 
have any questions about this study, please contact me at 612.656.9389 or my dissertation 
adviser. Our contact information is listed below. To share feedback privately about your 
research experience, including any concerns about the study, call the Research 
Participants Advocate Line: (612) 625-1650 or give feedback online at 
www.irb.umn.edu/report.html. You may also contact the Human Research Protection 
Program in writing at D528 Mayo, 420 Delaware Street SE, Minneapolis, MN 55455. 
 
Thank you for your participation! 
 
Lesley Weaver, M.P.P.  Todd Rockwood, Ph.D. 
weav0095@umn.edu   rockw001@umn.edu 




Appendix P: Reminder Letter for Second Follow-up with Web-mail Group (Survey 
Packet Group) 




Dear Dr. «LastName»: 
 
A few weeks ago, I sent you an email inviting you to participate in my dissertation 
research. To date, results indicate that physicians are in a very precarious situation 
with many competing demands that they must balance when dealing with the 
disclosure of «survey_version». 
 
While the preliminary results suggest that physicians must navigate a complex process, it 
is important that I hear from all randomly selected physicians to understand what the 
physician community in Minnesota is confronting when disclosing «survey_version» to 
patients and their families.  Health systems, insurers, and accrediting organizations are 
starting to set disclosure guidelines and policies. The results of this study could help 
ensure that physicians’ views are taken into consideration when these guidelines and 
policies are being developed. 
 
As a token of my appreciation, four participants will be randomly selected to receive an 
iPad or Android tablet of their choice (approximate value $500 per tablet) at the end of 
the study. Your participation in this study is completely voluntary, and you can skip any 
questions you do not want to answer for any reason. This study is being conducted 
confidentially. During data collection, I will know whether you have responded to the 
survey, but all links between your personal information and the data will be destroyed 
prior to data analysis.   
 
The University of Minnesota’s Institutional Review Board has approved this study. If you 
have any questions about this study, please contact me at 612.656.9389 or my dissertation 
adviser. Our contact information is listed below. To share feedback privately about your 
research experience, including any concerns about the study, call the Research 
Participants Advocate Line: (612) 625-1650 or give feedback online at 
www.irb.umn.edu/report.html. You may also contact the Human Research Protection 
Program in writing at D528 Mayo, 420 Delaware Street SE, Minneapolis, MN 55455. 
 
Thank you for your participation! 
 
Lesley Weaver, M.P.P.  Todd Rockwood, Ph.D. 
weav0095@umn.edu   rockw001@umn.edu 




Appendix Q: Reminder Letter for Final Follow-up with Web-Mail Group 
<insert date> 
 
<insert full name> 
<insert address line 1> 
<insert address line 2> 
<insert city, state zip code> 
 
Dear Dr. <insert last name>: 
 
In recent weeks, I have sent you an email asking you, as part of a random sample of 
currently practicing Minnesota physicians, to let me know your thoughts on the 
disclosure of < insert survey version> to patients and their families. I plan to start 
summarizing the results within the next month or two, so I hope that all surveys will be 
completed by then. 
 
For your convenience, I have enclosed a paper copy of the survey. You can help me by 
filling it out and returning it in the envelope provided. For many years, policy makers, 
accrediting organizations, and health systems have been talking about and developing 
disclosure policies and guidelines. I hope that this study will contribute to these 
conversations and provide insight into Minnesota physicians’ views on disclosure. 
 
The survey should take approximately 20 minutes to complete. Your participation in this 
study is completely voluntary, and you can skip any questions you do not want to answer 
for any reason. At the end of the study, four participants will be randomly selected to 
receive a tablet of their choice (approximate value $500 per tablet).  
 
This study is being conducted confidentially. During data collection, I will know whether 
you have returned the survey, but all links between your personal information and the 
data will be destroyed prior to data analysis.   
 
If you have any questions about this study, please contact me via phone or email at (612) 
656-9389 or weav0095@umn.edu. 
 
The University of Minnesota’s Institutional Review Board has approved this study. To 
share feedback privately about your research experience, including any concerns about 
the study, call the Research Participants Advocate Line: (612) 625-1650 or give feedback 
online at www.irb.umn.edu/report.html. You may also contact the Human Research 
Protection Program in writing at D528 Mayo, 420 Delaware Street SE, Minneapolis, MN 
55455. 
 
Many thanks for considering this request. 
 









Appendix R: Final Reminder Letter for Mail-Web Group 
Dear Dr. ${m://LastName}: 
  
Over a month ago, I sent you a letter asking for your thoughts on the disclosure 
of${e://Field/survey_version} to patients and their families. To the best of my 
knowledge, I have not received your response. Given current national initiatives aimed at 
increasing disclosure, my hope is that you will provide your thoughts and opinions on 
this important issue. 
  
I am writing again because of the importance that your responses have for helping me 
obtain accurate results. It is only by hearing from nearly everyone in the sample that I can 
be sure that my results are truly representative of the beliefs and values of physicians 
currently practicing in Minnesota. I would greatly appreciate your help in this endeavor. 
  
For your convenience, I am giving you the opportunity to complete the survey online. 
The survey will take approximately 20 minutes to complete.   
 
Follow this link to the Survey:  
${l://SurveyLink?d=Take the Survey} 
 
Or copy and paste the URL below into your internet browser: 
${l://SurveyURL} 
 
As a token of my appreciation, four participants will be randomly selected to receive an 
iPad or Android tablet of their choice (approximate value $500 per tablet) at the end of 
the study. Your participation in this study is completely voluntary, and you can skip any 
questions you do not want to answer for any reason. 
  
This study is being conducted confidentially. During data collection, I will know whether 
you have returned the survey, but all links between your personal information and the 
data will be destroyed prior to data analysis.   
  
If you have any questions about this study, please contact me via phone or email at (612) 
656-9389 or weav0095@umn.edu.   
  
The University of Minnesota’s Institutional Review Board has approved this study. To 
share feedback privately about your research experience, including any concerns about 
the study, call the Research Participants Advocate Line: (612) 625-1650 or give feedback 
online at www.irb.umn.edu/report.html. You may also contact the Human Research 
Protection Program in writing at D528 Mayo, 420 Delaware Street SE, Minneapolis, MN 
55455. 
  






Lesley Weaver, M.P.P. 
Follow the link to opt out of future emails: 
${l://OptOutLink?d=Click here to unsubscribe} 
 
